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The purpose of this thesis is to offer a synoptic and distinctive resolution 
to the debate between Hubert Dreyfus and John McDowell, which concerns the 
extent to which conceptual capacities are involved in human perceptual 
experience and intentional action. My resolution demonstrates how 
conceptualism accommodates the phenomenon of unreflective action, avoiding 
“Cartesian” implications, and preserving distinctive insights from existential 
phenomenology. 
In my first chapter, I expound Dreyfus’s non-conceptualist account of the 
phenomenon of “unreflective action”. I highlight how such an account is 
supposed to avoid a Cartesian picture of the relationship between the human 
being and the world. In my second chapter, I demonstrate how conceptual 
involvement arises in practically engaged experience. This undermines Dreyfus’s 
argument that conceptual involvement necessarily entails Cartesianism. In my 
third chapter, I demonstrate the incoherence of a non-conceptualist account of 
intentional responses, with reference to Wilfred Sellars’ critique of the “given”, 
and go on to demonstrate how McDowell’s conceptualism avoids Cartesianism. 
In my fourth chapter, I argue that the intentional character of unreflective action 
necessarily entails that the agent possesses the relevant concepts. I then 
demonstrate how the apparently non-conceptual “motor intentional” content 
that Dreyfus highlights only plays a normative role through its integration into a 
framework of operative conceptual capacities. In my fifth chapter, I secure the 
idea that perceptual content can be “intrinsically” practically significant in a way 
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consistent with its normative relation to unreflective action. I provide a 
distinctive conceptualist interpretation of Heidegger’s notion of the “ready-to-
hand” in order to do this.  
My resolution therefore demonstrates how a conceptualist account of 
intentional content accommodates the phenomenon that Dreyfus appeals to; the 
unreflective, embodied and practical way in which human beings engage with 
their environment. This resolution allows for a post-Cartesian conception of the 
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 The debate between Hubert Dreyfus and John McDowell concerns the 
extent to which conceptual capacities, understood as constituents of thought, are 
involved in human perceptual experience and intentional action1. McDowell 
holds that conceptual capacities are “operative” in all human perceptual 
experience and intentional action, and are as such constitutive of the kind of 
relation to the world that human beings have (see McDowell, 1994: 11; 90). 
Dreyfus, drawing on the work of existential phenomenologists such as Martin 
Heidegger and Maurice Merleau-Ponty, highlights examples of “skilful coping”, 
or “unreflective action”, where an agent’s skilful intentional actions proceed 
automatically, instinctively, and apparently without involvement from mental 
capacities at all. Dreyfus argues that McDowell’s focus on mental capacities 
cannot accommodate the distinctive characteristics of unreflective action, and 
further claims that this focus propagates an unsatisfactory “Cartesian” or 
“mediational” picture of the relationship between the human being and the 
world. The debate proceeds with McDowell emphasising the advantages of his 
conceptualist approach, and clarifying how it can accommodate the distinctive 
characteristics of unreflective action while avoiding such a Cartesian picture.  
 My purpose in this thesis is to offer a synoptic resolution to the 
McDowell-Dreyfus debate that shows how we can emphasise the role of 
conceptual capacities while preserving certain of Dreyfus’s existential 
                                                          
1
 McDowell understands “conceptual capacities” on the model of Fregean senses. I refer to the 
definition of “conceptual” below, noting that the precise way in which to conceive of conceptual 
capacities is a central issue in the debate.  
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phenomenological insights, and avoiding the pitfalls of Cartesianism. This 
approach has the advantage of securing the epistemic significance and 
normativity that should be ascribed to human perceptual experience and action, 
and retaining the distinctively affective and practically significant perceptual 
content that existential phenomenology highlights. I hold that a satisfactory 
resolution to the debate depends upon theorising the relationship between 
perceptual content and the sort of unreflective action that Dreyfus appeals to. I 
argue that Dreyfus’s conception of “motor intentional content” indeed plays a 
crucial role in practically engaged experience, but can only do so in virtue of 
being integrated into an established framework of conceptual capacities. I go on 
to argue that our practically engaged experience entails perceptual content that is 
both conceptual and practically significant. I suggest that we can understand such 
perceptual content with reference to Heidegger’s phenomenology, properly 
interpreted. My account therefore draws from conceptualist and existential 
phenomenological approaches to perceptual experience; in principle satisfying 
the concerns of both Dreyfus and McDowell. This resolution shows how we can 
clarify the positive role and character of the mind without committing ourselves 
to a Cartesian picture or playing down the role of embodied skills.   
 
The Debate and its Context 
The debate begins with Dreyfus’s 2005 presidential address to the 
American Philosophical Association, “Overcoming the Myth of the Mental: How 
Philosophers Can Profit from the Phenomenology of Everyday Expertise”. 
McDowell first responds in “What Myth” (2007). The debate spans seven papers 
in total from 2005 to 2013, including two chapters in Joseph K. Schear’s 2013 
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edited collection, Mind, Reason, and Being-in-the-World: the McDowell-Dreyfus 
Debate.2 
The debate can be characterised and contextualised in a number of 
different ways. Roughly approximated, the debate concerns how we ought to 
philosophically characterise the way in which human beings primarily “relate” 
to the world3. Both Dreyfus and McDowell focus on two crucial ways in which 
we might say that human beings relate to the world. One sort of relation is 
perceptual – human beings relate to the world through their perceptual 
experience of it. Another sort of relation is practical – human beings relate to the 
world through their active, bodily engagement with it4. Characterising the way 
in which human beings relate to the world, then, becomes a matter of 
characterising ordinary, everyday human perception and action. One option is to 
emphasise the role of capacities that human beings share with animals; 
physiological capacities for perceiving and recognising environmental features, 
and navigating them skilfully. The other option is to emphasise the role of 
capacities that are distinctly human – in short, the sorts of capacities that pertain 
to language, thought, and reasoning. Think, for instance, of the way in which we 
might derive knowledge of some environmental situation from our perceptual 
experience, express that knowledge in a judgement, and use the judgement to 
reason about what course of action to take.  
                                                          
2The sources for the debate are as follows: Dreyfus, 2005, 2007a, 2007b; McDowell, 2007a, 
2007b; Dreyfus in Schear, 2013; McDowell in Schear, 2013. Dreyfus 2007c also represents a 
response to McDowell, though it isn’t clear if McDowell reads or responds to the material here.  
3 As my thesis progresses, I move away from the phrase “human relation to the world” in favour 
of the terminology of intentionality and intentional content, which I introduce further in this 
introduction.  
4 We should also consider the relation of thinking – human beings relate to the world through 
having thoughts about it. However, the question of how thoughts relate to the world has a 
complex status in the McDowell-Dreyfus debate, which focuses on the relations of perceiving 
and acting. This point will become important as I move on to characterise the debate in Chapters 
One and Two.    
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 McDowell refers to these latter capacities as “conceptual capacities” – 
capacities to possess, apply, infer between, and productively combine concepts. 
McDowell uses the term “conceptual” ‘in close connection with the idea of 
rationality’ (McDowell, 2007a: 338). McDowell argues that conceptual 
capacities are “operative” in all human perceptual experience and intentional 
action5. They are as such constitutive of the kind of relation to the world that 
human beings enjoy (see for example McDowell, 1994: 11; 90). For McDowell, 
‘our perceptual relation to the world is conceptual all the way to the world’s 
impact on our receptive capacities’ (McDowell, 2007a: 338). Similarly, 
intentional action is a matter of ‘realizing a concept of a thing to do’ (McDowell, 
2013: 48). Roughly, then, the idea is that human beings perceive and act in the 
world in virtue of their conceptual abilities (see McDowell, 1994: 66). 
Accordingly, we have to differentiate human perceptual experience and action 
from that of animals, despite what look to be shared capacities for perceptual 
discrimination and reaction (McDowell, 1994: 64). McDowell therefore argues 
for a conceptualist picture of the primary way in which human beings relate to the 
world. McDowell first expounds this picture in Mind and World (1994), and 
many of his papers since have been dedicated to developing and defending it. 
His debate with Dreyfus represents one such defence.  
 In 2005, in what becomes the opening paper of the debate, Dreyfus 
targets McDowell’s position. Dreyfus agrees with McDowell that conceptual 
capacities are operative in some forms of perception and action. However, he 
denies that the involvement of conceptual capacities characterises all kinds of 
                                                          
5I have specified “intentional” action in the first instance so as not to invite premature counter-
examples of involuntary actions, which I indeed come to differentiate from the kind of action 
that McDowell takes to be conceptual.   
13 
 
perception and action (Dreyfus, 2005: 47). Throughout the debate, Dreyfus 
refers to examples in which an agent acts without reflection, deliberation, 
decision-making, or an accompanying thought process. In these cases, the agent 
may not be perceptually attentive to the environmental objects that their actions 
involve. Examples range from expert performances, such as a tennis player 
returning a fast serve, to everyday activity, such as running down stairs or tying 
one’s shoelaces. Given the absence of any thought process, the role that 
conceptual capacities play here is unclear. There is a sense in which ingrained 
bodily skill has taken over responsibility for the action. Dreyfus argues that 
McDowell’s conceptualism denies ‘the more basic perceptual capacities we seem 
to share with prelinguistic infants and higher animals’ (2005: 47). Dreyfus argues 
that conceptual capacities are in fact dependent on prior capacities for 
unreflective perception and action. Dreyfus is sceptical that philosophers can 
‘successfully describe the conceptual upper floors of the edifice of knowledge 
while ignoring the embodied coping going on on the ground floor’ (Dreyfus, 
2005: 46; also see Dreyfus, 2013: 23). Dreyfus accuses McDowell of falling prey 
to what he calls “the Myth of the Mental” – the “myth” that capacities belonging 
to the mind must be involved at all levels of human experience (2005: 46). 
Dreyfus therefore argues for a non-conceptualist picture of the primary way in 
which human beings relate to the world.  
 From the outset, then, the McDowell-Dreyfus debate concerns the extent 
to which concepts are involved or “operative” in human perceptual experience 
and intentional action. The debate generally proceeds with McDowell arguing 
that his conceptualism accommodates Dreyfus’s examples of unreflective action 
perfectly well, and clarifying what it means for concepts to be “operative” in 
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such unreflective experience and action. For his part, Dreyfus attempts to refine 
his non-conceptualism in order to absorb McDowell’s clarifications. The overt 
content of the debate centres on a characterisation of perceptual experience and 
action, and as such ranges across topics in the philosophy of perception, the 
philosophy of action, and the philosophy of mind. In the introduction to his 
edited collection, Schear describes the “central issue at stake” in the McDowell-
Dreyfus debate as ‘the extent to which conceptual rationality is involved in our 
skilful embodied rapport with the world’ (2013: 2). Schear also expresses this 
issue as concerning whether or not human beings are ‘essentially rational 
animals’ (Schear, 2013: 9). Erik Rietveld characterises the debate in terms of 
McDowell’s claim that ‘unreflective bodily coping is conceptual and that such 
unreflective action is permeated with rationality and mindedness’ (Rietveld, 
2010: 186). I concur with these characterisations of the principal and pervasive 
disagreement of the debate, but I want to emphasise that there are philosophical 
states to the debate that are not immediately apparent.  
A reviewer of Schear’s collection rightly notes that ‘the stakes in this 
debate are not simply about philosophical problems, but also about 
philosophical traditions’ (Mohr, 2014: 239). We might say, at least nominally, 
that the debate represents a confrontation between a phenomenological 
approach to philosophical problems, and an analytic approach. Certainly, 
Dreyfus’s use of phenomenology and his commitment to preserving 
phenomenological insights is of signal importance in the debate. Dreyfus’s 
assumption that the analytic tradition – at least in McDowell’s understanding of 
it – cannot accommodate the phenomenology that Dreyfus appeals to is called 
into question throughout the debate. This is why a significant strand of my thesis 
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attempts to highlight the relevance of existential phenomenology beyond 
Dreyfus’s usage of it. If existential phenomenology simply contributes a non-
conceptualist account of the human being’s relation to the world, then there may 
be a concern as to the relevance of that phenomenology if, in the end, we opt for 
a conceptualist account.  Specifically, I focus on Dreyfus’s interpretation and use 
of Heidegger. Dreyfus attributes non-conceptualism to Heidegger partly due to 
Heidegger’s explicit goal of moving beyond Cartesianism. However, I argue in 
this thesis that conceptualism is at least compatible with Heidegger’s views in 
Being and Time (1927), and that Heidegger does not avoid Cartesianism simply 
by discounting the role of the mind or mental capacities. My contention is that 
Heidegger’s phenomenology in fact runs close to McDowell’s position in 
important respects, but can contribute a distinctive, “tailored” account of how 
conceptual capacities are operative in practically engaged experience6. We can 
thus take an existential phenomenological approach to articulating a post-
Cartesian conception of the mind as integrated into practically engaged 
experience.  
It is indeed important to clarify the important role that “Cartesianism” 
plays in this debate. Both McDowell and Dreyfus take themselves to be 
attempting to think past traditional Cartesian assumptions about the mind and 
its relation to the world. Dreyfus’s view is that the philosophical focus on the 
human mind’s capacity to “represent” the world has resulted in what he has 
most recently termed a “mediational picture” (Dreyfus & Taylor, 2015: 2). The 
general idea is that the human being does not have direct contact with the 
external world. The closest we get to a point of contact is a resemblance or 
                                                          
6 Erik Rietveld (2010) argues that we require a “tailored” account of unreflective action; I expand 
on this below.   
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correspondence between, for an example, an internal mental representation and 
an external state of affairs. For Dreyfus, emphasising conceptual involvement 
necessarily entails a “detachment” between the human being and the world. 
Consistent with the Cartesian tradition, conceptualism pictures the human being 
as a detached observer who is not immersed or engaged with the world. Dreyfus 
understands McDowell’s conceptualism to prioritise the epistemic dimension of 
the human being’s relationship to the world; how it entails ‘getting it right about 
a distanced reality’ (Dreyfus, 2013: 23). It is partly to dispel a mediational 
picture that Dreyfus highlights the phenomenon of unreflective action, which 
doesn’t seem to rely on capacities belonging to the mind, and so bypasses the 
mediational problem. Dreyfus refers to his account of perceptual experience and 
action as a “contact” theory; he takes his non-conceptualism to offer us a 
satisfactory picture of the human being is directly and substantively in contact 
with the world (see Dreyfus & Taylor, 2015: 17).  
McDowell does indeed come out of a tradition that emphasises the 
epistemic features of experience, thought, and language. However, McDowell is 
motivated by a strikingly similar concern to Dreyfus. McDowell does think that 
a focus on the involvement of conceptual capacities threatens a philosophical 
detachment between the human being and the external world. Our conceptual 
thought about the world seems to operate independently of it: ‘we risk losing our 
grip on how exercises of concepts can constitute warranted judgements about the 
world […] what we wanted to conceive of exercises of concepts threaten to 
degenerate into moves in a self-contained game’ (McDowell, 1994: 5). However, 
McDowell argues that we must still affirm the role of conceptual capacities to 
avoid other problematic philosophical implications. In fact, McDowell’s basic 
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objections to Dreyfus’s non-conceptualism bring this point into relief. If we 
conceive of perception as non-conceptual, we cannot account for the role that 
perception plays in acquiring or justifying empirical knowledge. To think 
otherwise, McDowell argues, is to fall into “the myth of the given”, the 
incoherent idea that knowledge of the world is “given” to us through sensory 
capacities alone7. If we conceive of intentional action as non-conceptual, we 
cannot secure any sense in which action is an expression of human agency.  
McDowell is concerned that Dreyfus’s non-conceptualism conceives of 
human perception and action as causal events in nature, falling solely within the 
remit of scientific explanation. For McDowell, these problems work to shore up 
a dualism familiar to philosophy, wherein the normative features of the human 
being are sharply distinguished from natural features. Conceptual capacities 
come to look “alien” in the context of the sorts of natural capacities that Dreyfus 
wants to emphasise. Overcoming such a dualism is essential to McDowell’s 
wider philosophical project. McDowell conceives of conceptual capacities as 
themselves natural propensities of human animals, and further insists on their 
operation in perceptual experience and action, precisely to stave off the dualism 
of the normative and the natural. McDowell wants to conceive of the operation 
of conceptual capacities as ‘integrally bound up with the animal nature of the 
rational animal’ (McDowell, 2009: vii).  
Both McDowell and Dreyfus are therefore concerned to overcome a 
broadly Cartesian picture of the relationship between the human being and the 
world. This consideration is not always as apparent in the debate as it should be, 
                                                          
7 This is not the only form the myth of the given takes, but it is the most relevant here. Wilfred 
Sellars “Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind” (1956) provides the classic diagnosis of 
various forms of “givenness”. I outline this in detail in Chapter Three.   
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and any systematic approach to understanding and resolving the debate should 
take it into account. The McDowell-Dreyfus debate represents the challenge of 
how to understand the role of mind in practically engaged experience without 
lapsing into a flatly causal account of human activity. My thesis is therefore 
concerned with demonstrating how Dreyfus’s association of conceptual 
involvement with Cartesianism is misguided, while clarifying how 
conceptualism can preserve those practical, embodied features of the human 
being’s relation to the world that Dreyfus draws attention to.  
I should make an initial clarification about how I am defining 
“conceptual capacities”, “content”, or “conceptual” in general. A resolution to 
the debate in fact hinges on how these terms should be defined and used, and so 
I will return to this issue on a number of occasions. At least in the beginning of 
the debate, Dreyfus seems to identify concepts with mental representations. The 
involvement of a conceptual capacity can be associated with an ‘internal system 
of representation’ (Margolis, 2003: 562). However, McDowell comes out of a 
tradition which tends to identify concepts with Fregean senses. A Fregean sense 
should not be identified with an internal mental item, but rather as an abstract 
entity that is the constituent of a proposition. The principle and pervasive 
disagreement of the debate is over ‘the extent to which content is conceptual’ 
(Gardner, 2013: 110). “Content” in this context means the content of intentional 
states, states that are characterised by being about or directed at some object or 
state of affairs. The content is what the state is about or directed at. Beliefs, for 
example, are intentional states. The belief that “the taxi is here” is about that 
state of affairs in the world. “The taxi is here” is the intentional content of the 
belief, which in this case is propositional, conceptual content. The proposition is 
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composed of concepts, or Fregean senses. Thus, to explain how a subject can be 
in the intentional state of believing that “the bus is late”, we ascribe them 
possession of the concepts that are the constituents of that proposition8. Sacha 
Golob offers a helpful definition, therefore, of the “conceptualism” that someone 
like McDowell may endorse:  
[Conceptualism is] the thesis that all standard adult 
human intentional states (i) necessarily contain 
concepts and (ii) these concepts play a central, 
although not necessarily exhaustive, role in 
explaining the distinctive intentional features of such 
states. (Golob, 2014: 150).  
Importantly, both Dreyfus and McDowell agree that perceiving is an 
intentional state – for example, perceiving that “the taxi is here” - and the debate 
is partly over whether the content of this perceptual intentional state is 
conceptual in the same way as the belief above. However, it is worth saying that 
McDowell means “conceptual capacities” to refer to something more than our 
acquisition and possession of concepts. For McDowell, conceptual capacities 
belong to ‘a network that rationally governs comprehension-seeking responses to 
the impact of the world on sensibility’ (1994: 12). The term also to refers to our 
ability to make the sort of inferential connections that are characteristic of 
human reasoning, and to bring that to bear on aspects of our lives, in the 
broadest sense, that we don’t yet have the conceptual vocabulary to describe. 
Again, the proper way in which to understand the nature of conceptual content 
is a decisive issue here, and I accordingly return to assess it in detail. 
 
 
                                                          
8 I will not go further in unpacking a Fregean account of senses here, as there is of course plenty 
more to add. I do return to discuss this account in 3.5 and 5.3.  
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Objectives, Content, and Structure 
 My thesis is structured around gradually building an account of how 
conceptual capacities are “operative” in unreflective action, and engaged 
practical experience in general, and at the same time showing how such an 
account can avoid Cartesianism and preserve certain insights of existential 
phenomenology. Chapter One expounds Dreyfus’s non-conceptualism, and its 
anti-Cartesian motivations. From Chapter Two to Chapter Four, I focus on 
demonstrating that conceptualism can accommodate Dreyfus’s phenomenology 
of unreflective action without lapsing into a Cartesian picture of the relationship 
between the human being and the world. I therefore offer a resolution to the 
principle and pervasive disagreement of the McDowell-Dreyfus debate. In 
Chapter Five, I move past that disagreement to develop and secure the idea that 
perceptual content has “intrinsic” practical significance consistent with its 
normative relation to unreflective action.  
 In Chapter One, I first introduce and characterise the phenomenon that 
Dreyfus appeals to in the debate. I use “unreflective action” as a catch-all term 
for intentional, skilful, engaged or embodied action that is unreflectively 
performed. I specify that unreflective action should be further understood as the 
primary and pervasive way in which human beings relate to their environment. 
Dreyfus claims that the absence of reflection or conscious thought in this 
phenomenon entails the absence of conceptual capacities. I expound Dreyfus’s 
non-conceptualist account of the intentional content involved in unreflective 
action and the perceptual experience pertaining to it. I refer to Ryle’s work on 
“knowing-how” and Merleau-Ponty’s conception of “motor intentionality” here. 
This relates to a question highlighted by John Bengson (2015) about how 
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perceptual experience can be said to “produce” intentional action 9; Dreyfus 
takes “motor intentional content” to entail bodily skills that are reliably keyed on 
to, or triggered by, non-conceptual perceptual capacities. Further, Dreyfus 
argues that motor intentional content is a necessary condition of conceptual 
intentional content. Finally, Dreyfus claims that the involvement of conceptual 
capacities in fact scuppers, compromises, or interrupts skilful engagement with 
the world, thus “detaching” the human being from the world, and making 
possible a “Cartesian” picture of intentionality.  
 In Chapter Two I focus on this latter claim that the involvement of 
conceptual capacities compromises skilful engagement with the world, and 
accordingly implies a form of detachment that can be described in Cartesian 
terms. I first demonstrate how Dreyfus derives such an argument about 
conceptual involvement from his influential interpretation of Heidegger – I thus 
introduce some important Heideggerian terminology into the narrative of my 
thesis, notably the “ready-to-hand” and the “present-at-hand”. I then move to 
argue that explicit conceptual involvement, such as conscious thought, or 
linguistic judgement, does not necessarily compromise skilful engagement, but is a 
frequently necessary part of that engagement. As such, conceptual involvement 
cannot necessarily entail Cartesianism. I argue that Heidegger has much the 
same understanding of conceptual involvement, which we find in his account of 
“interpretation”. I thus dispute Dreyfus’s reading of Heidegger on the subject of 
the involvement of conceptual capacities. This chapter therefore undermines 
Dreyfus’s crucial assumption about the connection between the involvement of 
conceptual capacities and Cartesianism. It also calls into question Dreyfus’s 
                                                          
9 This question pertains especially to unreflective intentional action, as Bengson emphasises.  
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claim that non-conceptual intentional content is a necessary condition of 
conceptual content. However, this does not yet secure the idea that unreflective 
action necessarily entails the involvement of conceptual capacities, as McDowell 
argues.  
 In Chapter Three, I focus on McDowell’s conceptualist account of 
perceptual experience. I highlight how McDowell shares Dreyfus’s concern 
about avoiding a traditional Cartesian picture of the relationship between the 
human being and the world; and McDowell’s recognition that affording a role to 
conceptual capacities can cause problems of a Cartesian shape. However, I move 
on to demonstrate that McDowell affords such a role to conceptual capacities to 
avoid a Sellarsian “myth of the given”. I thus demonstrate why we ought to 
avoid positing a non-conceptualist, flatly causal account of intentional responses 
in general. I then elaborate McDowell’s conceptualist account of perceptual 
experience, focusing on how it might accommodate the phenomenon of 
unreflective action, and further how it is constitutively designed to avoid 
Cartesianism. That perceptual content is conceptual does not mean that the agent 
actively draws upon their conceptual repertoire in order to make sensory input 
intelligible. I focus on McDowell’s account of the “passive” way in which 
conceptual capacities are drawn into operation in perceptual experience, 
outlining the related notion of “second nature”. I then focus on his conception of 
de re singular demonstrative thought, which McDowell takes to secure the 
object-dependent, non-Cartesian nature of conceptual content. This clarification 
about the nature of conceptual content informs my resolution to the debate in 
the following chapter.  
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 In Chapter Four I move to consolidate an account of the involvement of 
conceptual capacities in unreflective action. This entails unpacking two claims 
that McDowell makes. First, he claims that intentional actions “manifest” or 
“realise” practical concepts, or concepts of things to do. Second, he claims that 
unreflective actions are responses to reasons. I begin by focusing on the first 
claim. I endorse Gottlieb’s view that Dreyfus is committed to what refers to as a 
‘phenomenological fallacy’ in his conclusion that conceptual capacities are not 
operative in unreflective action because they do not show up at the 
phenomenologically descriptive level. I argue accordingly that Dreyfus’s 
phenomenological methodology selectively ignores a transcendental element of 
phenomenology that may admit a role for the involvement of conceptual 
capacities. I relate this methodological point to an important distinction that 
Joseph Rouse (2013) makes between “normative” accounts of concept-
possession, and “descriptive” ones. I bring these points together to argue that if 
an unreflective action is nevertheless an intentional action, it is only explanatorily 
intelligible with reference to the agent’s possession of the relevant concepts.  
 I then consider McDowell’s claim that unreflective action should be 
understood as “responsiveness to reasons”. I again contextualise this claim in 
terms of the question of how perceptual experience can be said to “produce” 
unreflective action; an agent’s unreflective actions are in response to perceived 
states of affairs, and these states of affairs represent situation-specific reasons for 
those actions. I clarify why McDowell insists on this normative characterisation 
of intentional action with reference to his Aristotelian understanding of ethical 
behaviour. I then appraise how Dreyfus’s conception of “motor intentional 
content” can fit into this conceptualist picture. I demonstrate that the “know-
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how” of skilful bodily responses entails conceptual knowledge that can be 
captured in demonstrative conceptual content. Further, the agent needs to have 
knowledge that their embodied skills are reliable and appropriate to the specific 
situation, and are thus integrated into a network of conceptual capacities.  
Motor intentional content entails a phenomenologically distinctive kind 
of perceptual content that I call “affective content”; roughly speaking, Dreyfus 
construes this content in terms of an agent’s “intuiting” the relevant, specific 
aspects of the perceived situation. I argue that although such content is indeed 
phenomenologically distinctive, it can only play a normative role in producing 
intentional action in virtue of its place in a network of conceptual understanding. 
In the case of both knowledge-how, and motor intentional content, I appeal to 
McDowell’s clarification of what it means for content to be conceptual; 
“demonstrative” content does not entail a Russellian definite description, but 
can capture those specific features of situations that agents unreflectively 
respond to. I take this conceptualist approach to motor intentional content to 
represent a resolution to the principle and pervasive disagreement of the 
McDowell-Dreyfus debate.  
 In Chapter Five, I move past this principle disagreement in order to 
focus on the idea that our perceptual experience has “intrinsically” practically 
significant content. I argue that there may be a concern that McDowell’s 
conceptualism is only geared toward the perception of states of affairs that do 
not prima facie bear any relation to our practical interests. I draw on a parallel 
critique from Rietveld (2010), who argues that we should “tailor” McDowell’s 
notion of “responsiveness to reasons” to better accommodate the phenomenon 
of unreflective action; he thus argues that we should conceive of unreflective 
25 
 
action as “responsiveness to normative significance”. I argue that we can derive 
a notion of “practically significant” perceptual content from Heidegger’s analysis 
of the ready-to-hand. In order to do this, I first provide a conceptualist 
interpretation of Heidegger’s account of intentionality, and dispute Dreyfus’s 
non-conceptualist interpretation. I go on to argue that Heidegger’s 
conceptualism is distinctive in that he highlights how empirical concepts belong 
to a conceptual framework which is composed of “involvement” relations. I 
draw on Golob (2014) to do this, who offers a distinctive conceptualist 
interpretation of Heidegger. I therefore demonstrate that we can utilise 
Heidegger’s existential phenomenological insights to provide a conception of 
practically significant perceptual content, and in turn provide that tailored 
account of unreflective actions entailing responses to “normative significance”.  
I then provide some reflections on the “post-Cartesian” purport of 
existential phenomenology. I argue that Dreyfus is too quick to presume that a 
genuinely post-Cartesian account of intentionality must reject any explanatory 
role for the mind, and accordingly imposes a “motor intentional” account on 
Heidegger. However, I argue that Heidegger is concerned to offer a refined view 
of the mind, where its capacities are integrated into practically engaged 
experience. This is a position that my thesis as a whole works to articulate; a 
conceptualism that can preserve the essential way in which human beings are in 
the first instance practically engaged agents who are perceptually open to a 






A unified and extended study of the McDowell-Dreyfus debate has not 
yet been published. This thesis represents such a study. I offer a distinctive 
resolution that demonstrates how a conceptualist account of perceptual 
experience and intentional action can accommodate the distinctive “motor 
intentional content” that Dreyfus emphasises, and how we can make sense of 
the “practical significance” of perceptual content. Further, I highlight how this 
resolution entails a post-Cartesian picture of how the mind is integrated into 
practically engaged experience.  
My resolution first of all contributes to the literature that has been 
generated by the McDowell-Dreyfus debate. There are, of course, the essays 
collected in Schear’s 2013 anthology. Notably, I utilise Joseph Rouse’s 
clarificatory remarks about different kinds of conceptual involvement, and 
Barbara Montero’s reflections on conceptual involvement in expert performance. 
Gabriel Gottlieb (2011) offers a clear and straightforward response to the central 
disagreement of the debate. His critique of Dreyfus’s phenomenological 
methodology influences my approach in Chapter Three, and I build upon his 
discussion of conceptual intentional action in order to make sense of “motor 
intentional content” in a conceptualist framework. There are two notable papers 
that directly respond to the McDowell-Dreyfus debate. Rietveld (2010) and 
O’Connaill (2014) both recommend that we require a “tailored” philosophical 
framework to understand unreflective action. Such a framework represents what 
Charles Taylor (2002) refers to as the “middle ground” between reflective 
rationality and non-conceptual bodily ability, and is called “the space of 
motivations” by O’Connaill and “the space of normative significance” by 
27 
 
Rietveld. I critically assess and develop such a framework with reference to 
Heidegger’s phenomenology. I do this in order to make further sense of how 
perceptual content can be normatively or “practically” significant in a way that 
“motivates” the relevant intentional action.  
Indeed, the relationship between perception and action is a recurrent 
theme of my thesis. Approaching this topic from a conceptualist perspective is 
timely, as it has only recently received explicit and sustained interest from the 
analytic sphere. I draw in particular from Bengson (2016), and also Susanna 
Siegel (2014). Both refer to the McDowell-Dreyfus debate and are critical of 
Dreyfus’s non-conceptualist approach to the relationship between perception 
and action. My thesis first of all contributes an account of how Dreyfus’s motor 
intentional content can intelligibly be said to “produce” action by being 
integrated into a conceptual framework. This represents a development of a 
suggestion Siegel makes about how Dreyfus’s account might be supplemented. 
Secondly, my thesis contributes that Heideggerian account of practically 
significant perceptual content outlined above.   
The longstanding debate about the status of “knowing-how”, which 
arises from the work of Gilbert Ryle (1945), is essential for understanding and 
resolving the McDowell-Dreyfus debate. Gascoigne & Thornton (2013) discuss 
the McDowell-Dreyfus debate at some length. Their conceptualist position on 
knowing-how informs the position I take in Chapter Four. Stanley & 
Williamson (2001) and Bengson & Moffett (2007) also recommend a 
conceptualist approach to knowing-how, although the former do not engage 
with Dreyfus’s non-conceptualist approach. I therefore bring these latter 
approaches into dialogue. I do this in order to achieve a synoptic picture of the 
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interrelation of bodily abilities and conceptual capacities – that is, the 
interrelation of knowing-how and knowing-that – where bodily abilities are 
integrated into a framework of conceptual understanding. Significantly, I 
develop my own approach to “affective content” that runs parallel to an 
intellectualist conception of bodily ability. This forms part of my resolution to 
the principal disagreement of the McDowell-Dreyfus debate.  
Finally, my research interprets and utilises the existential phenomenology 
of Heidegger in a way that challenges Dreyfus’s own non-conceptualist 
interpretation of Heidegger. I do not mean to suggest that Dreyfus’s 
interpretation is the only one on the market, or that it is an uncontentious 
interpretation. However, it is Dreyfus’s interpretation that tends to connect 
Heidegger to analytic debates such as this one. Sacha Golob states that Dreyfus’s 
non-conceptualist interpretation is the “dominant reading” of Heidegger on 
intentional content, and associates this interpretation with Merleau-Ponty (2014: 
26). Steven Crowell clarifies Golob’s assessment here: ‘The dominant approach 
is “dominant” not because it is shared by most Heidegger scholars, but because 
it is practically the only one to treat Heidegger as an interlocutor in 
contemporary philosophical debates about intentionality, language, truth, and 
meaning’ (Crowell, 2015: 73). My discussion of Heidegger should be understood 
in the context of recent scholarship which has sought to rethink Dreyfus’s 
interpretation of Heidegger in that regard. I should mention McManus (2013), 
Golob (2014) and Crowell (2015), although only Golob advances an explicitly 
conceptualist interpretation of Heidegger. Christensen (1997), Schear (2007) and 
Dennis (2012) also offer alternative interpretations to Dreyfus’s. My thesis builds 
critically on this scholarship.  
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My view is that the relation between Heidegger’s apparent commitment 
to conceptualism requires reconciliation with his clear focus on the practically 
oriented dimension of human experience. I dispute Golob’s non-Fregean 
conceptualist interpretation, but draw on his “prototype” account of Heidegger’s 
conceptualism to support my overall argument. I argue that Heidegger’s 
distinction between the “ready-to-hand” and the “present-at-hand” does not 
amount to a distinction between the conceptual and the non-conceptual, contra 
Dreyfus, but to a distinction between the conceptual frameworks that the 
relevant empirical concepts are situated in. In brief, I argue that the conceptual 
framework operative in unreflective action (what Heidegger calls the 
“existential-hermeneutic as-structure”) is composed of specific kinds of 
“involvement” relations.  
By taking this route through the debate and the literature it has generated, 
I am able to demonstrate how the kind of existential phenomenology that 
Dreyfus draws from can make a contribution to contemporary, post-Cartesian 
debates around intentionality and perception, a contribution that does not only 
turn on ascribing intentionality to the body, but clarifies in a measured way how 
we should conceive of the role of the mind, and of conceptual capacities, so as 








1 Unreflective Action and Conceptual Involvement 
 
 1.1 Introduction  
 In this chapter, I introduce the phenomenon of “unreflective action” and 
outline how Dreyfus mobilises it against McDowell’s view that conceptual 
capacities are necessarily “operative” in perceptual experience and intentional 
action (see McDowell, 2007a: 345; 2007b: 366). Dreyfus wants to emphasise the 
way in which human beings primarily relate to their environment through 
engaged, embodied, skilful, and unreflective activity. Dreyfus argues that the 
perception and action involved in such activity does not require, and is in fact 
incompatible with, conceptual involvement. Dreyfus therefore uses the 
phenomenon of unreflective action to argue for a non-conceptualist account of 
perceptual experience and intentional action, contra McDowell.  
 Importantly, such a non-conceptualist account purports to avoid what 
Dreyfus has most recently termed a “mediational” picture of the relationship 
between the human being and the world. Such a picture is Cartesian in nature, 
and philosophically unsatisfactory in that it indicates some detachment or 
disconnection between the human being and an “external world”. Dreyfus takes 
this picture to arise due a traditional philosophical emphasis on the human 
capacity for reflection, knowledge acquisition, and conscious thought in general. 
For Dreyfus, any account of the relationship between the human being and the 
world that emphasises the role of conceptual capacities – or prioritises the mind’s 
relation to the world - is committed to a Cartesian, or mediational picture. In 
this way, philosophy has ignored the pervasive and fundamental episodes of 
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unreflective action in which human beings are already immersed and engaged in 
their environment, prior to any involvement of conceptual mental states. 
Emphasising the non-conceptual character of unreflective action allows Dreyfus 
to propose what he comes to call a “contact theory”, highlighting how the 
human being is substantively in contact with their environment through their 
skilful bodily engagement, thus bypassing a Cartesian or mediational picture 
(Dreyfus & Taylor, 2013).  
 In 1.2 I unpack what is meant by “unreflective action”. I clarify that the 
term refers to intentional, skilful, and engaged activity that is generally 
performed without the involvement of reflection, conscious thought, or 
capacities belonging to the mind. I emphasise Dreyfus’s claim that this form of 
engagement with one’s environment is pervasive and fundamental. I also 
emphasise that Dreyfus takes the lack of involvement of mental capacities to 
signal the absence of conceptual involvement. In 1.3 I begin to outline the more 
substantive philosophical implications we can draw from an analysis of 
unreflective action. I first refer to a Rylean treatment of “knowing-how”, to be 
distinguished from “knowing-that”. Ryle argues that knowing how to do 
something is not a matter of knowing a rule or set of rules. He therefore argues 
against an “intellectualist” picture, which effectively emphasises the role of 
conceptual capacities in intentional action. 
This epistemological line of thought prepares the ground for Dreyfus’s 
existential-phenomenological treatment of unreflective action in 1.4. Dreyfus 
argues for a distinctive form of intentionality, arguing that non-conceptual bodily 
and perceptual skills constitute the primary way in which human beings relate to 
their environment. “Motor intentional content” is therefore a necessary 
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condition of conceptual content. In 1.5 I detail Dreyfus’s critique of 
Cartesianism, and how that relates to his appeal to unreflective action and motor 
intentional content. This involves demonstrating why he thinks that 
conceptualism is necessarily committed to such a picture, and how his non-
conceptualist, “motor intentional” account of unreflective action avoids it 
altogether, resulting in a “contact theory” of the relationship between the human 
being and the world that undercuts Cartesian problems concerning the mind’s 
relation to the world.  
 
1.2 Defining “Unreflective Action” 
In Mind and World, McDowell argues that we must ‘see ourselves as 
animals whose natural being is permeated with rationality’ (1994: 79). His 
formulation of this claim in the final exchange of the debate with Dreyfus is as 
follows: ‘rational mindedness pervades the lives of the rational animals we are, 
informing in particular our perceptual experience and our exercises of agency’ 
(McDowell, 2013: 41)10. McDowell understands human perceptual experience 
and intentional action to be bound up with the distinctively mental abilities of 
the human being, or the distinctive character and role of the human mind. 
Specifically, this entails the view that conceptual capacities are “operative” in 
perceptual experience and intentional action (see McDowell, 2007b: 366). From 
the opening paper of the debate, Dreyfus objects to McDowell’s claim that the 
human being’s engagement with the world is a necessarily ‘conceptual activity’ 
(Dreyfus, 2005: 50; see McDowell, 1994: 111). Dreyfus appeals to a 
                                                          
10 Both of McDowell’s characterisations here signal his distinctive form of naturalism, wherein 
he attempts to accommodate the normative character of human thought within a revised 
conception of the natural world. The acquisition of conceptual capacities is a realisation of one’s 
“second nature” as a human being; I refer to this picture later in the thesis.  
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phenomenon he calls “embodied coping” to argue against McDowell’s 
characterisation: 
Can we accept John McDowell’s Sellarsian claim 
that perception is conceptual “all the way out”, 
thereby denying the perceptual capacities we seem to 
share with prelinguistic infants and higher animals? 
More generally, can philosophers successfully 
describe the conceptual upper floors of the edifice of 
knowledge while ignoring the embodied coping 
going on on the ground floor, in effect declaring that 
human experience is upper stories all the way down? 
(Dreyfus, 2005: 47).  
Dreyfus’s opening paper is meant as a plea to philosophers to pay 
attention to “embodied coping”, and accordingly to reject the idea that 
conceptual capacities are always operative in perceptual experience and 
intentional action. Further, Dreyfus seeks to show that embodied coping is 
pervasive and fundamental, representing a “ground floor” of experience upon 
which the operation of conceptual capacities becomes possible. For Dreyfus, we 
have to conceive of the distinctive capacities of the human mind as dependent 
on these prior capacities that we share with animals. The debate proceeds with 
McDowell acknowledging the existence of such “embodied coping” - ‘Embodied 
coping skills are essentially to a satisfactory understanding of our orientation to 
the world’ (2007a: 345) – but arguing that conceptual capacities are operative 
there nonetheless. Rietveld states that the debate ‘focuses on McDowell’s claims 
that, in the case of humans, unreflective bodily coping is conceptual and that 
such unreflective action is permeated with rationality and mindedness’ (Rietveld, 
2010: 186). The phenomenon of embodied coping – what Rietveld calls 
“unreflective action” – therefore gives rise to the central disagreement of the 
McDowell-Dreyfus debate. In what follows I will provide a substantive 
definition and characterisation of this phenomenon.  
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I follow Rietveld in using the term “unreflective action”. As we have seen, 
Dreyfus prefers to use variations of terms like “embodied coping”, “skilful 
coping”, or “absorbed coping”. My view is that the word “coping” has 
connotations of enduring some arduous situation, which is not at all something 
Dreyfus intends to capture. Of course, the term “unreflective action” does not 
capture everything about the phenomenon that is of interest and relevance in the 
debate. “Unreflective action” should be understood as a catch-all term for a 
category of actions or activities that are indeed unreflective, but also skilful, 
intentional, and entailing engagement, immersion, or embodiment in a particular 
practical situation. Further, unreflective action describes the pervasive and 
fundamental way in which human beings relate to their environment in the 
familiar routines of everyday life. I will unpack these aspects of unreflective 
action in the necessary detail. In this section, I will only gesture toward the 
philosophical implications that Dreyfus draws from the phenomenon of 
unreflective action. Relatedly, I will initially only refer to the apparent absence 
of conscious thought, reflection, or capacities belonging to the mind, in 
unreflective action. I will, however, try to highlight certain important issues and 
where in my thesis they are treated in the requisite philosophical detail. I start to 
draw out the specific philosophical implications in 1.3, clarifying the role, or 
lack thereof, of specifically conceptual capacities.  
First, I want to attend to the distinctively unreflective character of the 
phenomenon Dreyfus appeals to. In the debate, one example is ‘a case in which 
a person catches a Frisbee on the spur of the moment’ (McDowell, 2013: 48). 
We might think of basic examples like dodging a speeding projectile, scratching 
a sudden itch, or moving one’s foot at the last second to avoid a puddle on the 
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ground. Now, we can describe these sorts of actions as being “instinctive”, 
“impulsive”, or “automatic”. These adjectives articulate a sense in which there is 
no thought process mediating between a stimulus – say, our perception of a 
Frisbee – and the resultant action – catching the Frisbee. We can imagine, in 
contrast, examples of action where there is such a thought process. We might 
think of a person perceiving a large puddle in the street, and briefly working out 
the best route around it. In giving an account of their action, we refer to a 
mediational element in describing the way in which the action was the result of a 
process of deliberation, decision-making, or reflection. In the case of catching a 
Frisbee “on the spur of the moment”, any such reflection or thought process is 
absent. It is difficult to see when specifically mental capacities could come into 
play here, given the automatic bodily response. Indeed, it is tempting in these 
cases to attribute the action to something wholly bodily, rather than attribute any 
responsibility to the mind. For Dreyfus, making this latter attribution commits 
one to ‘the myth of the mental’ (Dreyfus, 2005: 47, my emphasis). The myth of the 
mental is characteristic of Cartesian or mediational pictures of the relationship 
between the human being and the world, where a primary role is afforded to 
capacities belonging to the mind.  
Consider the expert performances of sportspeople or musicians, where 
the actions involved are complex than the basic ones above, yet still distinctively 
unreflective. A world class tennis player, for instance, might be able to return a 
serve hit at over 130 miles per hour. This action requires them to react in a 
fraction of a second. In her critical analysis of the phenomenon of unreflective 
action, Barbara Montero cites a study which finds that ‘in grand slam tennis the 
speed of a ball after a serve is so fast and the distance it needs to travel is so short 
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that a player must strike it back before she even consciously sees the ball leave 
the servers’ racket’ (Montero, 2013: 311; Gray, 2004: 8). A return of serve, then, 
is a paradigmatic example of an unreflective action. It vividly highlights the way 
in which the body seems to be reacting to something that our mental capacities 
simply haven’t registered. The writer David Foster-Wallace, a former junior 
tennis champion, notes that ‘pro tennis involves intervals of time too brief for 
deliberate action […] temporally, we’re more in the operative range of reflexes, 
purely physical reactions that bypass conscious thought’ (Foster-Wallace, 2006).  
The idea that there is simply no time for reflection or conscious thought is 
important to Dreyfus, drawing on these examples to posit what Gabriel Gottlieb 
calls his “argument from speed”: ‘For certain expertly skilled actions there is no 
time for reflection, concepts, or the I, to contribute to the action’ (Gottlieb, 2011: 
339). In this way, Dreyfus cites the example of a grandmaster playing a version 
of chess which must be completed in two minutes. We typically think of chess as 
a distinctly intellectual pursuit, a paradigmatic case of the involvement of the 
mind. In “lightning” chess, however, ‘grandmasters must make moves as fast as 
they can move their arms, less than a second a move – and yet they can still play 
master level games’ (Dreyfus, 2005: 53). In the same way as a return of serve, 
the mandated speed of the responses in lightning chess leaves no time for 
reflection or conscious thought. By definition, if certain actions leave no time for 
reflection, the actions are therefore unreflective. It is less straightforward, 
however, to hold that for certain actions there is not time for reflection, and the 
actions are therefore non-conceptual. This latter inference relies on the 
questionable assumption that conceptual involvement necessarily entails 
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reflection or conscious thought11. This is an assumption central to Dreyfus’s case 
against McDowell.  
Focusing on expert performance highlights the skilful nature of 
unreflective action. Indeed, we should associate practical skill or expertise with 
the ability to act unreflectively. Michael Brownstein defines unreflective action 
as actions involving ‘mastery of a given skill’, which unfold ‘without the 
individual who performs them occurrently thinking about what she is doing’ 
(2013: 547).  
Expert action unfolds in the absence of self-reflective 
thought or conscious self-awareness. Sometimes this 
phenomenon seems to be an artefact of the fast speed 
at which sports are played, but it is not unique to fast 
action or sports. A skilled pianist, for example,  
might find the rhythm of a sonata only once she 
stops thinking about whether she is playing well’ 
(2013: 546).  
Take a return of serve, which is a clear case of an unreflective action. The 
return depends on recognition of the ball’s trajectory and an understanding of 
how the ball must be hit for the return to be successful. Spin, angle, and speed – 
and presumably a range of other factors, like the opponent’s position in the court 
– must all be judged in a split second. The skill and strategic understanding that 
goes into playing a master-level chess game is well known. Further, the physical 
skill involved in the return of skill is highly developed and complex. Foster-
Wallace notes that ‘an effective return of serve depends on a large set of 
decisions and physical adjustments that are a whole lot more involved and 
intentional than blinking, jumping when startled, etc.’ (2006). Dreyfus’s view is 
that the absence of reflection is the mark of the expert. Montero refers to 
                                                          
11 This comes to be clarified as the assumption that for some intentional content to count as 
conceptual, it necessarily needs to be the content of a conscious mental state. I detail the 
terminology of intentional content in 1.4.  
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Dreyfus’s view here as the principle of automaticity: ‘When all is going well, expert 
performance significantly involves neither self-reflective thinking, nor planning, 
nor deliberation, nor mental effort’ (Montero, 2013: 304). This principle results 
in a stronger claim from Dreyfus – that any such mental involvement in fact 
compromises one’s ability to act skilfully, and scuppers one’s engagement with a 
particular practical situation.  
We therefore arrive at the engaged, absorbed, immersed, or embodied 
character of the phenomenon Dreyfus appeals to. Dreyfus takes cases of 
unreflective action to illustrate the way in which the human being can be, and 
pervasively is, inextricably engaged in a particular practical situation. Nicholas 
Smith takes the appeal to unreflective action to highlight ‘a specific mode of 
comportment or relation to the world Dreyfus (following Heidegger) calls 
“involvement”’ (2013: 167). This characterisation is meant as a correction to a 
conception of the human being as an essentially knowing subject; a subject who 
adopts a neutral, disinterested perspective in order to form judgements about 
their environmental situation. “Engagement” stands in contrast to “detachment”, 
or “disconnection”. When one is acting unreflectively, one’s perspective is not, 
as it were, at a distance from the practical situation, but engaged or absorbed 
within it. Of course, this specification directly relates to Dreyfus’s attempt to 
avoid a Cartesian or mediational picture of the relationship between the human 
being and the world in favour of a “contact” theory. By emphasising the engaged 
or absorbed aspect of the kind of experience pertaining to unreflective action, we 
can avoid a philosophical picture of a subject, characterised by internal mental 
states, detached from an external environment. Dreyfus takes McDowell’s 
account of perception and intentional action to be committed to something like 
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this philosophical picture. I explore this issue in more detail in 1.5, where I also 
provide Dreyfus’s phenomenological argument that the intrusion of capacities 
belonging to the mind compromises this involved or absorbed relation to the 
world; I then assess these associated issues fully in Chapter Two.  
Unreflective action should be understood as intentional action, as Foster-
Wallace refers to above12. The actions that Dreyfus refers to in the debate are 
unreflective and automatic, but they can nevertheless be understood as actions 
that the agent meant to perform. That is, these actions can be understood as 
expressions of agency, as actions that the agent can take responsibility for. There 
is a contrast between intentional unreflective actions and non-intentional 
unreflective actions – call the latter “autonomic” actions. An autonomic action 
might be something like yawning, or flinching; actions that are involuntary, and 
belong only to the sphere of bodily reflex. However, it is clear that bodily reflex 
has much to do with intentional unreflective action. There are two broad ways in 
which we can distinguish an intentional unreflective action – that may include 
such a role for bodily reflex – from an non-intentional, involuntary unreflective 
action. The first is with reference to “Anscombean” questions, as Brownstein 
highlights here: 
[One might argue that] agents who perform skilled 
unreflective actions can, in principle, accurately 
answer “Anscombean” questions – “what” and 
“why” questions – about what they do. When an 
individual accurately answers such questions, she 
demonstrates that her action, while unreflective, is 
nevertheless agential’ (Brownstein, 2014: 546 – 547)   
                                                          
12 The “intentional” nature of an action here does not necessarily signal a commitment to a 
particular account of intentionality or intentional content – the intention of an action can be 
construed in terms of an “intentional state”, but etymologically speaking “intentionality” and 
“intention” are not related.   
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The idea is that if a question like “why did you do x?” yields a response 
that goes beyond “I didn’t know I was doing that”, or “I didn’t mean to do it”, 
then the action is intentional, or agential, rather than autonomic. McDowell 
often utilises this line of argument to argue for the rationality and conceptual 
knowledge inherent in unreflective action (see 2013: 47). To be a little more 
precise, we can look to Ryle’s analysis of action to provide us with an adequate 
criterion for judging an action to be intentional, rather than autonomic. For Ryle, 
intentional actions are aptly described with “intelligence-predicates”, or 
“intelligence-epithets”: 
Consider, first, our use of the various intelligence-
predicates, namely, “wise,” “logical,” “sensible,” 
“prudent,” “cunning,” “skilful,” “scrupulous,” 
“tasteful,” “witty” etc., with their converses “unwise,” 
“illogical,” “silly,” “stupid,” “dull,” “unscrupulous,” 
“without taste,” “humourless,” etc. (Ryle, 1945: 5) 
The appropriate application of such epithets to an action signals that an 
action is intentional. Another way of putting this is that intentional actions 
admit of normative description, or description that uses evaluative language. As 
Bengson notes, the application of an intelligence-epithet does not signal that an 
action is “intelligent” in the narrow sense of “clever”. Ryle’s “intelligence 
epithets” include “converses” like “unwise” and “silly”. Describing an action as 
intelligent in this sense really just signifies that the action is intentional, or 
agential, and can be taken responsibility for by the agent; describing an action as 
intelligent ‘includes all states of intellect and character, even stupidity, idiocy, 
foolishness, and the like’ (Bengson, 2016: 28). The kinds of action that Dreyfus 
appeals to in the debate are clearly unreflective, but can nevertheless be 
described using such intelligence-epithets. Dreyfus does not contest the idea that 
the unreflective actions he refers to are nevertheless intentional and can be 
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appraised in normative language: ‘my coping is mine in that I can break off 
doing it, and for that reason I take responsibility for it […] Moreover, it is a 
directed response to the situation that can succeed or fail’ (Dreyfus, 2007b: 375). 
Dreyfus’s position lies in what these actions are intentional in virtue of: for 
Dreyfus, any “intelligence” on display in unreflective action is a distinctive kind 
of bodily intelligence, rather than intelligence in the traditional sense of 
involving capacities of the mind. Dreyfus attempts to articulate a form of 
normativity that operates at the level of bodily intuition, rather than a 
conceptually articulable standard of acting. I detail and assess this account of the 
normative character of unreflective action in Chapter Four. I should highlight 
that the intentional component of unreflective action is important to resolving 
the debate – acknowledging this component commits one, I argue in Chapter 
Four, to conceptualist conclusions.   
 It is worth acknowledging that there are certainly cases of unreflective 
action that run up to the margins of the distinction between intentional and non-
intentional. We might question whether pulling one’s hand away from a 
previously unnoticed heat source counts as intelligent in Ryle’s sense – we might 
describe it as a “wise” thing to do, but there is also a sense in which this action 
was not genuinely agential, more akin to yawning or sneezing. Notably, Dreyfus 
raises the interesting case of “distance-standing” (2013: 24). The idea is that there 
are cultural differences in the distances that people tend to stand from each other 
in conversation. That somebody stands a certain distance from somebody else is 
not something they are doing intentionally, nor even something they notice doing. 
Yet, it is a way of acting that is not autonomic – it is a habit cultivated by 
imitation of people in one’s social environment, and if it were brought to one’s 
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attention, an action one could take responsibility for and change. McDowell is 
prepared to acknowledge that such a habit does not fall within the scope of 
rationality, and so understanding these marginal cases, while philosophically 
interesting, is not essential to resolving the debate13.    
 Finally, it is crucial to recognise that unreflective action is a fundamental, 
pervasive, phenomenon. Unreflective action does not only characterise isolated 
episodes of skilful behaviour, but is the dominant mode in which human beings 
tend to operate. Schear describes the McDowell-Dreyfus debate as a 
disagreement over the proper characterisation of ‘our skilful embodied rapport 
with the world’ (2013: 2). Now, this “rapport” is taken by Dreyfus to characterise 
the primary way in which human beings engage with their familiar environment 
in their everyday lives. Actions that we might think of as the mundane minutiae 
of day-to-day activity tend to fall under the description of unreflective action. 
Unreflective action, in this sense, ties our everyday lives together. Think of 
waking up late for work. One will jump out of bed, hurriedly dress, run down the 
stairs, and lock the door as one is leaving. Now, we can think of all the actions 
involved here, and the specific movements involved respectively within those 
activities. They are intentional actions which entail a skilful, but unreflective 
engagement with one’s environment. Brownstein brings up the example of shoe-
tying, an activity that ‘involves skill, and [...] is typically unreflective’ (2013: 548). 
In fact, certain everyday actions bear comparison to the unreflective skill we find 
in paradigmatic forms of expert performance. For example, if one were not an 
                                                          
13  Steven Levine disputes, along Hegelian lines, that McDowell should make this 
acknowledgement (McDowell, 2013: 50 – 51; Levine, 2015). I agree that a case can be made that 
something like “distance standing” represents a way of engaging in an overall intentional action, 
and is as such something the agent possesses knowledge of, knowledge that can come in useful in 
unfamiliar social situations, for instance.  
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“expert” at running down stairs, this would be an extraordinarily dangerous 
thing to do. For Dreyfus, we primarily engage with the world in an unreflective 
manner that relies on bodily expertise. It is activities that involve capacities of the 
mind that are secondary; this is why Dreyfus describes “embodied coping” as 
operating ‘on the ground floor’ (2005: 47). Dreyfus argues that the development 
of the specific perceptual and bodily capacities that pertain to unreflective action 
forms a “background” upon which it is possible to reflect on our actions and 
environment in a way that makes the involvement of distinctly “minded” 
capacities possible14. That is, the acquisition of the skills and capacities pertaining 
to unreflective action is a necessary condition of the involvement of mental 
capacities. For example, Dreyfus holds that an empirical judgement is only 
possible on the basis of a prior familiarity with one’s environmental situation that 
amounts to our skilful ability to unreflectively recognise relevant features and act 
on the basis of them (see Dreyfus, 2013: 20). I return to this issue in 1.5, and treat 
it in some further critical detail in Chapters Two and Four.  
 By now, I hope to have provided an adequate characterisation of the 
phenomenon that Dreyfus appeals to in the debate. I have defined “unreflective 
action” as intentional, skilful, engaged action that is unreflectively performed. 
Further, we should understand unreflective action to characterise the primary 
and pervasive way in which human beings relate to their environment. I have 
also gestured toward some of the philosophical difficulties that Dreyfus takes to 
arise from a phenomenology of unreflective action. Essentially, Dreyfus’s appeal 
to unreflective action turns on the apparent absence of conceptual involvement, 
which Dreyfus infers from the absence of reflection or conscious thought. I want 
                                                          
14 The “perceptual capacities” pertaining to unreflective action require some detailed explanation, 
especially as Dreyfus conceives of them. I begin to refer to the topic of perception in 1.4.  
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to emphasise this latter point once again; Dreyfus takes conceptual involvement 
to necessarily entail reflection – accordingly, conceptual involvement and 
unreflective action are incompatible, in Dreyfus’s definition of those terms. Given 
the pervasive and primary nature of unreflective action, Dreyfus thinks it is a 
philosophical mistake to emphasise the role of the mind in providing an account 
of the relationship between the human being and the world. The McDowell-
Dreyfus debate is in an important sense about clarifying the role that the mind, or 
the specifically conceptual capacities belonging to the mind, can be said to play 
in this distinctively unreflective form of engaging with the world.   
 
 1.3 An Epistemic Approach 
Having characterised and provided a definition of unreflective action, I 
now want to focus on the substantive philosophical implications we can draw 
from it. I have noted repeatedly that the role of capacities that belong to the 
mind is unclear in examples of unreflective action. For Dreyfus, the apparent 
absence of reflection, deliberation, or any conscious thought process means that 
conceptual involvement is also absent. Now, unreflective action does indeed pose 
certain problems for typical philosophical conceptions of intentional action. 
Brownstein provides a clear outline here:  
The phenomenon of flow – of being carried forward 
unreflectively in the performance of a difficult action 
– is hard to understand from the perspective of 
common philosophical views about agency and 
action. It is hard to understand how an agent can 
actively choose what to do, or engage in practical 
reasoning about what to do, or endorse what she is 
doing, for example, if she is not thinking about 
herself, or even thinking about anything at all, while 
she acts. (Brownstein, 2013: 546).  
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I have defined unreflective action as nevertheless intentional, which 
signals that such action is agential; something that the agent can endorse as 
something they meant to do, that they can intelligibly take responsibility for. 
And yet, if there is no decision making on the part of the agent – if there is no 
process of reflection that led one to choose one action over another – then it is 
difficult to reconcile the unreflective aspect of these kinds of action with the 
intentional aspect. Ryle’s work on “knowing-how” becomes significant here. It 
is reasonable to say that Ryle’s work focuses on the epistemological dimension 
of the intentional actions that Dreyfus refers to; Ryle argues that knowing how to 
do something is distinct from knowing that something is the case. As we saw 
above, Ryle is similarly interested in intentional, or “intelligent” actions – those 
actions, including unreflective ones, that can reasonably be described or assessed 
with reference to “intelligence-epithets” – and the kind of knowledge that 
informs them. The philosophical debate around “knowing-how”, particularly in 
the last two decades, is of direct relevance to the McDowell-Dreyfus debate and 
its possible resolution. I will outline Ryle’s epistemological approach as it relates 
to unreflective action and the McDowell-Dreyfus debate. I will mostly talk about 
intentional action here, but the applicability to the kinds of unreflective actions 
that Dreyfus appeals to should be kept in mind.  
Ryle begins with what he takes to be a typical philosophical account of 
intentional human action. On such an account, intentional action ‘is a process 
introduced and somehow steered by some ulterior act of theorising’ (Ryle, 1945: 
1). For an action to count as intentional, it must ‘be guided by the consideration 
of a regulative proposition’ (Ryle, 1945: 2). A regulative proposition essentially 
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means a proposition that functions as a rule15. An intentional action is “guided” 
by a rule insofar as it is an instance of knowing that something is the case – i.e. 
“I know that one rides a bicycle by pedalling clockwise” – and utilising this 
knowledge to carry out the action. It is important to highlight the consideration 
of rules in this way entails conceptual involvement. If a rule is a proposition, 
concepts are the constituents of that proposition – “bicycle”, “pedalling”, 
“clockwise”, and so on. Intentional action depends on possession and 
combination of the relevant concepts which then function as rules. Bengson & 
Moffett prefer to use the phrase “propositional attitude”, where intentional 
action is guided by states of mind that have a propositional structure. In this 
picture, the role of the mind and its distinctive capacities is crucial. Indeed, Ryle 
refers to such an account as “intellectualist”; wherein ‘intelligent performance 
involves the observance of rules, or the application of criteria’ (Ryle, 1949: 29). 
Clearly, an intellectualist account of knowing how to do something clashes with 
the phenomenon of unreflective action. As we saw most clearly in the case of a 
return of serve, it is implausible to suggest that the consideration of a particular 
rule or set of rules is in play.  
However, Ryle does not in the first instance appeal to the speed or 
unreflective nature of particular intentional actions. Ryle first identifies a regress 
in the intellectualist account of intentional action, which he articulates in the 
following two passages: 
The consideration of propositions is itself an operation 
the execution of which can be more or less intelligent, 
more or less stupid. But if, for any operation to be 
intelligently executed, a prior theoretical operation had 
first to be performed and performed intelligently, it 
                                                          
15 I will use the word “rule” from here on, insofar as a rule is understood as articulable in a 
proposition, and that proposition is regulative. 
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would be a logical impossibility for anyone ever to 
break into the circle. (Ryle, 1949: 30) 
 
If the intelligence exhibited in any act, practical or 
theoretical, is to be credited to the occurrence of some 
ulterior act of intelligently considering regulative 
propositions, no intelligent act, practical or theoretical, 
could ever begin. (Ryle, 1945: 2).  
 If an intentional action is guided by the consideration of a rule, then the 
consideration of that rule represents a further intelligent or intentional action 
which itself requires the consideration of a rule. The possibility of drawing upon, 
say, an inappropriate rule, rather than an appropriate one, means that these 
internal mental acts can themselves be described and assessed using intelligence 
epithets (see Ryle, 1949: 31). For example, an agent might draw upon, consider, 
and follow a set of rules pertaining to riding a bicycle, discovering that this is not 
appropriate to their current goal of riding a unicycle. The consideration of the 
appropriate rule is therefore an intentional act, and, on the intellectualist picture, 
requires consideration of a prior appropriate rule. A regress then arises where this 
chain of considering rules proceeds indefinitely. Ryle therefore takes the 
intellectualist picture of intentional action to be fatally flawed. I will say 
something about how Dreyfus utilises this identification of a regress further 
below. Both Dreyfus and Ryle avoid the regress by disputing that “knowing how” 
to do something is a matter of possessing propositional knowledge or following 
rules.  
 Ryle refers to the chess player in order to argue that knowing how to do 
something is not a matter of possessing propositional knowledge or following 
rules. Again, chess might seem to us to be a paradigmatic case of the 
involvement of propositional knowledge, given that its mastery is identified with 
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a high level of distinctly mental intelligence16. Ryle undermines this assumption 
by asking us to imagine a good chess player teaching a bad chess player. The 
good chess player might teach ‘so many rules, tactical maxims, “wrinkles” etc., 
that he could think of no more to tell him’ (Ryle, 1945: 5). Further, the bad 
player ‘might accept and memorise all of them, and be able and ready to recite 
them correctly on demand’ (Ryle, 1945: 5). That is, the bad chess player 
accumulates a whole stock of reliable rules, or propositional knowledge, about 
how to play good chess. Crucially, though, the bad player might remain bad: ‘he 
might still play chess stupidly, that is, be unable intelligently to apply the maxims’ 
(Ryle, 1945: 5). In The Concept of Mind (1949), Ryle states that ‘learning how or 
improving in ability is not like learning that or acquiring information […] It 
makes sense to ask at what moment someone became apprised of a truth, but not 
to ask at what moment someone acquired a skill’ (Ryle, 1949: 46). The crucial 
point here is that the stock of propositional knowledge that an agent can be said 
to possess is not identical to the practical abilities of that agent; their possession 
of that knowledge is not a sufficient condition for their knowing how to do 
something. What Ryle calls “intelligent” actions, then, may not always be 
dependent on capacities that belong to the mind.  
 We might, of course, acknowledge the role that propositional knowledge 
– conceptual knowledge – can play in the acquisition of practical ability, while 
holding that in many cases the propositional knowledge will be outstripped by 
the ability. Dreyfus makes room for the involvement of rules in this way – but, 
like Ryle, finds the idea that they are necessary for the performance of the action is 
                                                          
16 I am aware that at this point I have only hinted at a “bodily” form of intelligence that can be 
coherently contrasted with mental intelligence – detailing this form of intelligence is my concern 
from this point onward.  
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mistaken: ‘Riding a bike, for instance, would involve conceptual rules when one 
is learning, but those conceptual rules are not in play at all, not even 
unconsciously, when one is a skilled cyclist’ (Dreyfus, 2005: 52). For Dreyfus, 
being able to act unreflectively demonstrates that one does not require the 
involvement of rules – accordingly, there is no need for the concepts that 
constitute the rule to be involved. There may be a general objection, which 
Dreyfus hints at above, that rules are still operative at some unconscious level. 
Dreyfus disputes this, arguing that ‘to assume the rules we once consciously 
followed become unconscious is like assuming that, when we finally learn to ride 
a bike, the training wheels that were required for us to be able to ride in the first 
place must have become invisible’ (Dreyfus, 2005: 52). The actions that might be 
practiced with reference to conceptual guidelines become a matter of habitual 
skill. Indeed, the kind of anti-intellectualism inspired by Ryle ‘denies that internal 
states of engaging propositional content play any role in accounting for 
Intelligent action’, and that “intelligent”, or intentional action ‘is grounded in 
powers – abilities or dispositions to behaviour – rather than attitudes’ (Bengson 
& Moffett, 2011: 15). When one acquires an ability to act, there is a qualitative 
handover in the sorts of capacities that are playing the crucial role. While mental, 
conceptual, capacities can play a role in acquiring a particular ability to act, those 
capacities recede when the agent has reached a certain level of competence. The 
intentional action is rooted in some “ability” or “disposition” that does not 
amount to a “propositional attitude”, a propositionally structured mental state 
which guides the action. 
 Now, Dreyfus draws from the existential phenomenology of Heidegger 
and Merleau-Ponty to argue for a non-conceptualist account of intentional action 
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and the perceptual experience involved. In doing so, he spells out the kind of 
non-mental ability, or set of abilities, that characterises unreflective action. 
Merleau-Ponty, in fact, speaks in the straightforwardly epistemic terms of a 
Rylean approach to intentional action. Here, he describes the distinctive kind of 
“knowledge” that is in play in the case of an expert typist: 
To know how to type is not, then, to know the place of 
each letter among the keys, nor even to have acquired a 
conditioned reflex for each one, which is set in motion 
by the letter as it comes before our eyes. If it is neither a 
form of knowledge nor an involuntary action, what 
then is it? It is knowledge in the hands, which is 
forthcoming only when bodily effort is made, and 
cannot be formulated in detachment from that effort. 
(Merleau-Ponty, 1962: 144).  
The crucial thing here is that the knowledge that the typist employs 
“cannot be formulated in detachment from [bodily] effort”. The knowledge that the 
typist employs cannot be “encoded” in propositional form. Dreyfus does utilise a 
regress argument like Ryle’s; we can see here that he substitutes “intellectualist” 
for “cognitivist”: ‘the cognitivist will either have to admit a skill for applying 
these rules or face an infinite regress’ (Dreyfus, 1980: 8 – 9). For Dreyfus, the 
assumption that we have to refer to something other than bodily ability to 
characterise our intentional action, particularly our unreflective action, is 
mistaken. Dreyfus asks why we ‘shouldn’t just accept that one simply does what 
the situation requires, without recourse to rules at all?’ (Dreyfus, 1980: 9). For 
Dreyfus, insisting on a role for conceptually based capacities like rules or 
propositional attitudes here is to fall into “the myth of the mental” (Dreyfus, 
2005). The sort of unreflective skill on display in certain forms of intentional 
action is analogous to the skill that animals display in their own engagement 
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with the world – and we do not seek to ascribe propositional mental states to 
animals.  
We saw that Dreyfus draws such an analogy to animals at the beginning 
of the debate (Dreyfus, 2005: 47). We could understand unreflective action – and 
intentional, skilled action more generally – as the kind of refined habitual actions 
that animals are capable of. The problem, of course, would be preserving the 
idea of human agency – the idea that human beings have responsibility for their 
actions, and that their actions can be assessed in normative terminology. 
Dreyfus recognises that if we do not preserve this distinctly human form of 
agency, we arrive at an account where the acting agent is being ‘pushed around 
like a thing by meaningless physical and psychological forces’ (Dreyfus, 2005: 
56). We must therefore account for the crucial intentional component of human 
action, in the Rylean sense of “Intelligence”. Ryle’s distinction between 
“intelligent capacities” and “habits” speaks to this problem: ‘It is tempting to 
argue that competences and skills are just habits’ (Ryle 2009: 30). Ryle’s 
distinction here doesn’t correlate with either Dreyfus or McDowell’s 
understanding of action, but his wish to avoid a flatly causal conception of 
human action is edifying17: 
The well regulated clock keeps good time and the 
well-drilled circus seal performs its tricks flawlessly, 
                                                          
17 Ryle regards at least some intentional unreflective actions, such as walking down the street, as 
simply “habitual” and not intelligent. The further distinction Ryle makes is between “drill” and 
“training”; training results in genuinely intelligent actions, and drill results in habitual actions 
which do not display intelligence (see Ryle, 2009: 30 – 31). However, if a habitual action is 
nevertheless intentional, there is still a philosophical difficulty in specifying how it can be both 
habitual, or unreflective, and intentional. That a particular action is the result of drill does not – 
logically speaking - abdicate us from responsibility for that action. Presumably an action that is 
the result of drill is an action that the agent knows that they habitually perform on the relevant 
occasions – this means that drill-based actions don’t belong to the same category as actions like 
“distance-standing”, where the “drill”, so to speak, has happened by way of a long process of 
subpersonal imitation of people in the agent’s social environment. This point really just 
consolidates what I said about the intentional component of action in 1.2.  
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yet we do not call them “intelligent”. We reserve this 
title for the persons responsible for their 
performances. To be intelligent is not merely to 
satisfy criteria, but to apply them, to regulate one’s 
actions and not merely to be well-regulated. A 
person’s performance is described as careful and 
skilful, if in his operations he is ready to detect and 
correct lapses, to repeat and improve upon successes, 
to profit from the examples of others and so forth. 
(Ryle, 2009: 17).  
 McDowell’s own account of intentional action is primarily concerned to 
avoid an analogy between the intentional action of human beings and the 
mechanistic way in which a ‘well-drilled circus seal performs its tricks flawlessly’. 
A human intentional action is defined as such because the human being is not 
simply caused to perform a particular action by a stimulus, but through a 
justificatory and accordingly normative relation to a stimulus. I deal with 
McDowell’s account in full in Chapter Four. It is worth noting that if we define 
knowing-how, or unreflective forms of intentional action, in terms of refined 
bodily ability, philosophy then relinquishes explanatory control to the sciences. 
Indeed, Dreyfus is clear in the first paper of the debate that the relevant 
explanatory models of unreflective action are most likely to come from science. 
He cites Walter Freeman’s development of a “nonlinear dynamical system” 
model of the brain, which is apparently inspired by Merleau-Ponty’s writings on 
the body (Dreyfus, 2005: 50). Later in the debate, however, Dreyfus is keen to 
establish a normative component to unreflective action that keeps it within the 
remit of philosophical analysis. I provide a critical analysis of Dreyfus’s 
conception of normativity in 4.4.  For now, I want to move on to the topic of the 
intentionality of unreflective action. The philosophical implications of 
unreflective action are not solely epistemological. Indeed, understanding the 
kind of intentionality at work in unreflective action allows us to get clear about 
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how to preserve the “intelligent” or “intentional” component of unreflective 
action.  
 1.4 Unreflective Action and Intentional Content 
 The problem of “knowing-how” is not a narrowly epistemic issue for 
either Dreyfus or for Ryle. Bengson & Moffett argue that although the regress 
argument is ‘perhaps Ryle’s most famous challenge to intellectualism, it may not 
be the most influential’ (Bengson & Moffett, 2011: 11). They refer to Ryle’s view 
that intellectualism ‘serves to misrepresent “daily experience” and the “quite 
familiar facts of ordinary life’, in the sense that it ‘violates an intuitive distinction 
between the theoretical and the practical’ (Bengson & Moffett, 2011: 10 – 11). 
This is to broaden a epistemological problem into the terms of the McDowell-
Dreyfus debate. That is, the McDowell-Dreyfus debate is essentially about how 
to characterise what Schear refers to as the human being’s ‘skilful embodied 
rapport with the world’ (2013: 2). The debate isn’t simply about whether certain 
actions rely on conceptual knowledge. It is about the way in which human beings 
relate to or “understand” their environment in the pervasive mode of unreflective 
action. Gascoigne & Thornton refer to such an issue in their appraisal of 
knowledge-how:  
[…] understanding is part of knowing how […] for 
Ryle, knowing-how is essentially object-involving 
since it relates to the contextual sensitivity of the 
abilities and capacities that comprise it. In an 
obvious sense, then, knowing how does connote a 
basic structure of intentionality (Gascoigne & 
Thornton, 2013: 38 – 39).  
 One way of putting this point is to say that knowing-how does not only 
involve how to move one’s limbs in a particular way. It crucially involves some 
understanding of the environment or practical situation that one is actively 
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engaging with. Gascoigne & Thornton’s reference to the structure of 
“intentionality” tries to capture this point.  
I referred to intentionality in my introduction; a state or event is 
“intentional” or has “intentionality” if that state or event is directed at or is 
about some state of affairs. The term “intentionality” is re-introduced into 
philosophical discourse in the 19th Century by Franz Brentano, who defines it in 
the following terms: ‘The common feature of everything psychological […] 
consists in a relation that we bear to an object. The relation has been called 
intentional; it is a relation to something which may not be actual which is 
presented as an object’ (Brentano, 1969: 14). Intentionality is usually attributed 
to mental states; believing, knowing, or thinking, for example. Again, if an agent 
has a thought that the bus is late, the intentional content of that thought is “the 
bus is late”. Further, the content here is clearly conceptual, and propositionally 
structured; on a Fregean understanding of conceptual content, we therefore posit 
concepts as abstract entities that are the constituents of the propositional content. 
In my introduction, I referred to the idea of a human relation to the world, and 
how best to picture this relation. This relation is described more precisely in 
terms of intentionality. Gascoigne & Thornton highlight that knowing-how 
connotes a structure of intentionality because the relevant actions necessarily 
entail some sensitivity to aspects of environmental states of affairs. For example, 
a chess player might know how to respond to a particular attacking move. Their 
intelligent response depends on their being in an intentional state that is about 
the relevant state of affairs; that is, the positions of the pieces on the board. As I 
mentioned in the introduction, we might therefore conceive of perceiving as an 
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intentional state – whose content, in this case, would propositionally specify the 
positions of the chess pieces.  
In the debate, the topic of intentionality is treated more or less 
synonymously as the topic of perceptual experience; both McDowell and 
Dreyfus take perceptual experience to have some form of intentionality. For 
McDowell, the intentional content of perception is irreducibly conceptual: ‘our 
perceptual relation to the world is conceptual all the way out to the world’s 
impact on our receptive capacities’ (McDowell, 2007a: 338). For Dreyfus, 
however, holds that the perception involved in practically engaged, unreflective 
activity is non-conceptual. I want to contextualise this principal disagreement in 
terms of a question posed by Bengson (2016) about the relationship between 
perception and intentional action: how can perception be said to produce 
intelligent action? (2016: 26). Bengson makes clear that “intelligent” action 
simply signals intentional, agential action that can be assessed in normative 
terms. Bengson’s description of how perception seems to produce intentional 
action also works to encompass those unreflective actions that Dreyfus appeals 
to:  
Stated abstractly, perceiving things to be a certain 
way may in some cases lead directly to action of a 
certain kind – specifically, to action that is not blind 
but displays the agent’s quality of mind: for example, 
her wisdom, skill, or sensibility or, perhaps instead, her 
foolishness, incompetence, or dullness’. I say that 
perception leads directly to action in the sense that 
there is no intervening conscious steps or transitions. 
One perceives, and, straightaway, one acts – not 
mindlessly, but intelligently’ (2016: 26).  
The way in which Bengson poses the question in terms of perception 
directly producing an intentional action works to highlight and preserve the 
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unreflective aspect of our intentional responses to the environment. We can 
understand the principal and pervasive disagreement of the McDowell-Dreyfus 
debate in terms of this question. Both McDowell and Dreyfus take distinctive 
positions on how perception directly “produces” intentional action. McDowell’s 
account turns on the way conceptual perceptual content provides reasons for the 
agent’s unreflective response – this requires unpacking in detail, which I do in 
Chapter Four.  
Dreyfus’s account of how perception directly produces intentional action 
is, of course, a non-conceptualist account. The ability to unreflectively respond 
to an environment isn’t based in “perceiving things to be a certain way”, as 
Bengson puts it. That is, unreflective responses are not predicated on being in an 
intentional state composed of concepts. Sacha Golob points out that ‘one of the 
most influential moves in phenomenology is to argue that the explanatorily 
primary ascription of intentionality should not be to mental states, but instead to 
the body in some extended sense of that term’ (2013: 6). Dreyfus makes this 
move, arguing that the perceptual experience involved in unreflective action has 
a distinctive kind of intentional content that he has referred to as “motor 
intentional content” 18  (see Dreyfus, 2007a: 360). Dreyfus draws from the 
existential phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty and Heidegger here. A common 
reading of Heidegger takes him to argue that ‘we are familiar with our 
environment and the paraphernalia that we encounter in it primarily through our 
skills and abilities, our competences, rather than through cognition’ (Blattner, 
2006: 56). Heidegger states in Being and Time that our familiar environment is 
‘completely unobtrusive and unthought’; ‘when we enter here through the door 
                                                          
18 There is some discontinuity in how Dreyfus uses the notion of content, which I clarify below.  
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we do not apprehend the seats, and the same holds for the doorknob’ (Heidegger, 
1982: 172) 19. Smith provides a useful description of our intentionally shaped, 
unreflective engagement with a familiar environment, in which our perceptual 
experience does not contain conceptual intentional content.  
In everyday coping activity, such as turning a door 
knob upon leaving a room, keeping one’s balance while 
walking along an uneven path, or holding a hammer 
while joining some wood, on simply deals with the 
situation one is in without reflecting upon anything or 
noticing any conceptual or propositional content.  
Rather than having properties of objects “in mind” – 
such as the shape of the doorknob, the direction of the 
path, the weight of the hammer – which are ready for 
some conceptualising operation which may or may not 
be enacted (the assertion “that doorknob is round”, 
“this path is uneven” etc.), we simply cope with the 
environment by pre-reflectively responding to whatever 
opportunities for or obstacles to action it affords (Smith, 
2013: 167).  
In the pervasive mode of practically engaged unreflective activity, then, 
the content of our perceptual experience need not be conceptual. Smith’s 
description of the environment “affording” responses to it becomes important 
here. The term “affordances” belongs to the psychologist J.J. Gibson: ‘the 
affordances of the environment are what it offers to the animal, what it provides or 
furnishes, either for good or ill’ (Gibson, 1986: 127). Gibson’s view of perception 
aligns with Dreyfus, insofar as the practical role of perception is more 
fundamental than its role in providing us conceptual knowledge of an 
environment. Gibson emphasises that ‘what we perceive when we look at 
objects are their affordances, not their qualities […] phenomenal objects are not 
built up of qualities; it is the other way around. The affordance of the object is 
what the infant begins by noticing’ (Gibson, 1986: 129). Although Dreyfus does 
                                                          
19
 All citations of Heidegger use the English pagination.  
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use the term “affordance”, he comes to prefer the term “solicitation”. The latter 
term is supposed to capture how those perceived features of the environment 
relevant to unreflective action ‘are related to the needs and desires of the 
perceiver’ and aren’t reducible to facts about what opportunities for action an 
environment affords (Dreyfus, 2013: 37n12, see also 2013: 22). Dreyfus wants to 
distinguish a general sort of affordance, such an apple’s affording eating, from an 
agent and situation specific experience of an apple’s soliciting one to eat when 
one is hungry. Therefore, ‘one can think of solicitations as relevant affordances’ 
(Dreyfus, 2013: 37n12; see also 2007a: 357).  
Crucially, for Dreyfus, the way in which the environment solicits one to 
respond is not happening at the level of the conscious awareness of the agent. 
The perception of a solicitation is “registered”, so to speak, on a bodily level. To 
‘be true to the phenomenon’ of unreflective action, for Dreyfus, we should 
specify that ‘we not only do not need to think that the door affords going out […] 
We need not even respond to the door as affording going out […] we needn’t 
apprehend the door at all’ (Dreyfus, 2013: 18). In other words, there is no 
awareness involved that represents an intentional state that involves conceptual 
capacities20. This is where Dreyfus’s conception of motor intentional content 
comes in; his account of how perception can be said to produce intentional, 
unreflective action. Hudin offers a clear definition of Dreyfus’s position here: 
Dreyfus is an advocate of non-representational 
intelligent behaviour that is a function of non-
representational perceptual content – a kind of 
intentional content known as motor intentionality. 
(Hudin, 2006: 574) 
                                                          
20 I say a little more about how Dreyfus departs from Gibson’s conception of affordances in 
Chapter Four; essentially, Dreyfus cannot preserve the way in which Gibson understands 
affordances to be “meaningful”, or “value-laden”.  
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Dreyfus derives the notion of motor intentionality from Merleau-Ponty: 
‘To give a name to intentional activities that essentially involve our bodily, 
situational understanding of space and spatial features, Merleau-Ponty coins the 
phrase “motor intentionality”’ (Kelly, 2002: 377). Merleau-Ponty describes our 
body as being ‘better informed than we are about the world, and about the 
motives we have at the means of our disposal’ (Merleau-Ponty, 2002: 277). For 
Dreyfus, motor intentional content is a necessary condition of conceptual 
content. Before we are able to make conceptual judgements about the 
environment, we need to have this prior motor intentional relationship to it.  
I agree with Hudin that “motor intentionality” is largely meant to 
characterise the intentional content of perceptual experience, for Dreyfus. 
However, I find it useful to distinguish between two components of motor 
intentionality, both the perceptual content, and the skilful, bodily response itself. 
Dreyfus states that ‘being drawn [to act unreflectively] and responding to the 
draw [behaving skilfully and intelligently] are interdefined in one unitary 
phenomenon’ (Dreyfus, 2013: 18). Dreyfus means to give a complete account of 
how perception and action are interrelated in unreflective action. In Chapter 
Four, I make a further distinction between the overall intentional action, and the 
particular, bodily skilful way in which the action is carried out. Of course, we 
should associate the skilful bodily response here with knowing how to carry out 
the overall intention in the appropriate way. It should therefore be associated 
with the epistemic approach to unreflective action that I discussed above. 
Accordingly, I return to an epistemic approach in Chapter Four, in order to 
argue that such knowing-how entails conceptually structured knowledge. For 
now, I am concerned to focus on the perceptual content of motor intentionality. 
60 
 
Dreyfus argues that such content is operative on the level of bodily feeling: ‘the 
body of the performer is solicited by the situation to perform a series of 
movements that feel appropriate’ (Dreyfus, 1999: 55). We might therefore refer to 
this sort of content as “affective” content. However, I will continue to use the 
term “motor intentional content” as a catch-all term for the general form of 
intentionality that pertains to unreflective action.  
Now, the pertinent question is clearly how the body of the performer is 
solicited in such a way that produces reliable, intelligent actions. Above, Hudin 
describes a “functional” relationship between the perceptual content and the 
intelligent behaviour. In order to explain how this functional relationship is 
generated, Dreyfus argues that the unreflectively acting agent has, through 
training or gradual habituation, developed a sensitivity to ‘subtler and subtler 
similarities and differences of perceptual patterns’ (Dreyfus, 2013: 35). We can see this 
interplay of perception and response at work in Dreyfus’s example of the chess 
grandmaster. Dreyfus notes that ‘the speed of lightning chess suggests that the 
master isn’t following rules at all and so must be able to directly discriminate 
perhaps hundreds of thousands of types of positions’ (Dreyfus, 2005: 55). As 
such, the chess master is ‘directly drawn by the forces on the board to make a 
masterful move’ (Dreyfus, 2013: 35). The experience of being “directly drawn” 
by particular “forces” is what I am calling affective content. Dreyfus also 
describes such content in terms of “attractions and repulsions” (Dreyfus, 2007a: 
357). Dreyfus therefore offers something like a non-conceptualist account of 
Gibsonian affordances, where the unreflectively acting agent does not 
cognitively take account of the affording feature of the environment, but finds 
themselves simply “drawn” to act in the appropriate way. We find a similar 
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account of affective content in Merleau-Ponty’s description of a football player’s 
experience of their environment: 
For the player in action the soccer field is not an 
“object”. It is pervaded by lines of force […] and is 
articulated into sectors (for example, the “openings” 
between the adversaries), which call for a certain mode 
of action’ (Merleau-Ponty, 1966: 168). 
These kinds of developed perceptual capacities should not be identified 
with the development of a repertoire of appropriate conceptual capacities, for 
Dreyfus21. The capacity to discriminate certain perceptual patterns is akin to a 
physical skill. Indeed, bodily skills and perceptual capacities are developed in 
tandem. Dreyfus describes this process: ‘as the agent acquires skills, these skills 
are “stored”, not as representations in the mind, but as more and more refined 
dispositions to respond to the solicitations of more and more refined perceptions 
of the current situation’ (Dreyfus, 1999: 49). In an unreflective intentional action, 
some relevant aspect of the situation will be perceived in the sense of 
unconsciously registered. This “unconscious registering” triggers an ingrained 
bodily response which has developed in tandem with the relevant perceptual 
capacity, which we can understand in terms of “knowing-how”. We therefore 
have some account of how perception can be said to “produce” intentional 
action.  
I will try to sum up what I have said here in a way that leads into 
Dreyfus’s critique of a “Cartesian” picture of intentionality. For Dreyfus, 
affective or motor intentional content cannot be construed in conceptual terms. 
Dreyfus is unambiguous on this point: 
                                                          
21 This is complicated by Dreyfus’s view that conceptual capacities can help develop the requisite 
perceptual capacities, in the same way that one might develop “know-how” with reference to 
rules. I deal with this in 2.5, and it is also a theme of Chapter Four. See Dreyfus, 2013: 18.  
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Absorbed coping does not involve conceptual 
intentional content in McDowell’s sense; instead it 
involves motor intentional content, and no ‘‘aspect’’ 
of motor intentional content is ‘‘present’’ in a ‘‘form’’ 
which is ‘‘suitable to constitute the contents of 
conceptual capacities’’. The phenomena show that 
embodied skills, when we are absorbed in enacting 
them, have a kind of content which is nonconceptual, 
non-propositional, non-rational (even if rational 
means situation-specific), and non-linguistic (Dreyfus, 
2007a: 360).  
I want to emphasise Dreyfus’s claim that ‘no “aspect” of motor 
intentional content is “present” in a “form” which is “suitable to constitute the 
contents of conceptual capacities’ (Dreyfus, 2007a: 360). The kind of affective 
content on display in phenomenological descriptions of unreflective action is, for 
Dreyfus, simply qualitatively distinct from conceptual content. It is content that 
belongs to developed bodily and perceptual capacities, and does not depend on 
possession of any relevant concepts, nor any form of distinctly mental 
intelligence. We may see some initial difficulties that this account presents. We 
might reasonably hold that unreflective action does not entail the involvement of 
conceptual rules that govern the action – that is, that knowing-how is a non-
conceptual phenomenon. Furthermore, we can entertain the idea that there are 
going to be developed perceptual capacities in play which our bodily abilities are 
reliably “keyed onto”, but do not entail, conceptual content. However, it would 
surely also be reasonable to hold that unreflective action entails some 
conceptually based recognition of certain relevant aspects of our environment.  
I return to this criticism of Dreyfus’s phenomenology in Chapter Three, 
where I assess McDowell’s conceptualist account of perceptual content. Of 
course, Dreyfus denies that there is any such conceptually based recognition, 
and states that ‘the world we are drawn into when we are absorbed in coping 
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does not stand over against us a set of facts that can be captured in propositions 
but rather is directly lived by the absorbed coper as a shifting field of attractions 
and repulsions’ (Dreyfus, 2013: 18). Interestingly, Dreyfus holds that any 
attempt to bring conceptual capacities to bear on this motor intentional, affective 
content can only distort it in a way that neutralises its role in “producing”, or 
“motivating” the relevant intentional actions:   
To focus on the motor intentional content, then, is 
not to make some implicit conceptual content 
explicit—that’s the myth—but rather to transform 
the motor intentional content into conceptual 
content, thereby making it available for rational 
analysis but no longer capable of directly motivating 
action (Dreyfus, 2007a: 360).   
 Dreyfus argues this point in reference to two further, interrelated claims. 
First, Dreyfus thinks that his account of affective content explains the way in 
which the agent is able to respond in specifically appropriate ways to specific 
situations. I want to treat Dreyfus’s claim here in Chapter Four, where I can 
bring it into proper critical dialogue with McDowell’s counter-argument. Second, 
Dreyfus takes the involvement of conceptual capacities to imply a 
phenomenological form of Cartesianism, where the acting agent becomes detached 
from their engagement with a specific practical situation, and no longer able to 
skilfully deal with their environment. Dreyfus’s underlying philosophical 
motivations therefore come into play here.  
 
 1.5 Conceptual Content and Cartesianism  
So far, I have outlined Dreyfus’s view that the phenomenon of 
unreflective action – skilful, intentional, engaged action – does not entail the 
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involvement of concepts. The knowledge, intentionality, and perception proper 
to unreflective action does not seem to involve conceptual capacities, or require 
any such capacities that belong to the mind. I have also emphasised that 
unreflective action is a pervasive and fundamental mode in which human beings 
engage with the world. This becomes more important, as Dreyfus thinks that his 
appeal to unreflective action has significant philosophical implications. Dreyfus 
argues that a non-conceptualist account of unreflective action allows us to avoid 
what he refers to as “the mediational picture” of the relationship between the 
human being and the world, and to affirm a “contact theory” of this relationship. 
In this final section of the chapter, I will unpack this argument; doing so allows 
me to go on to clarify how a conceptualist account can in fact avoid that same 
Cartesian picture.  
In the debate, Dreyfus predominantly refers to “the myth of the mental” 
in critiquing conceptual involvement. However, Dreyfus’s critique of conceptual 
involvement is articulated more precisely in Retrieving Realism (2015), which he 
co-authors with Charles Taylor two years after the conclusion of the McDowell-
Dreyfus debate. The target of the “myth of the mental” becomes “the 
mediational picture”. The mediational picture is an essentially Cartesian picture 
of the relationship between the human being and the world. Both Dreyfus and 
McDowell take traditional forms of philosophy to have difficulties affirming a 
“common sense”, “natural”, or “default” picture of the human being’s 
relationship to the world22. That is, traditional philosophical frameworks struggle 
to provide a picture of the relationship between the human being and the world 
that fits the way in which we ordinarily understand ourselves to be engaged and 
                                                          
22 I owe the term “default” to DeGaynesford’s work on McDowell (2004). 
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in touch with our familiar environment. For both Dreyfus and McDowell, 
traditional epistemological approaches have resulted in a picture where the 
human being is disconnected or detached from the external world (I referenced this 
idea in my definition of unreflective action in 1.2). Such a philosophically 
unsatisfactory picture is termed “the mediational picture” by Dreyfus & Taylor.  
What we want, of course, is a picture where the human being has direct 
access to the external world, where our experience, thought, and language 
seamlessly connect up to the external world. Smith rightly points out that 
Dreyfus’s emphasis on unreflective action, particularly the engaged aspect, ‘is 
meant as a corrective to Cartesian and empiricist conceptions of the mind as the 
realm of the ‘inner’, as a series of discrete mental items variously labelled ‘ideas’, 
‘impressions’, ‘sense data’ and so forth’ (Smith, 2013: 168). Dreyfus notes that 
he and McDowell have a similar general sense of what a satisfactory picture of 
the relationship between the human being and the world should entail. Dreyfus 
says that McDowell ‘sounds as if he is channelling Heidegger when he speaks of 
“our unproblematic openness to the world”,’ (McDowell, 1994: 155; Dreyfus, 
2005: 45). He also approvingly notes McDowell’s affirmations that the human 
being is ‘embodied, substantially present in the world that she experiences and 
acts on’, and ‘always already engaged with the world’ (McDowell, 1994: 155; 
134). Crucially, however, Dreyfus doesn’t think McDowell can make good on 
these kinds of descriptions. Through his insistence on the involvement of 
conceptual capacities, Dreyfus argues, McDowell remains committed to the 
mediational picture.   
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 Dreyfus & Taylor initially put the mediational picture in epistemological 
terms. The idea is that our knowledge of the external world is mediated by inner 
mental states: 
To sum it up in a pithy formula, we might say that 
we (mis)understand knowledge as “mediational.” In 
its original form, this emerged in the idea that we 
grasp external reality through internal 
representations. Descartes, in one of his letters, 
declared himself “certain that I can have no 
knowledge of what is outside me except by means 
of the ideas I have within me” (Dreyfus & Taylor, 
2015: 2) 
 Dreyfus & Taylor further clarify their description of this picture as 
“mediational”; ‘We want to call this picture “mediational” because of the force 
of the claim which emerges in the crucial phrase “only through”[…] in 
knowledge I have a kind of contact with outer reality, but I get this only through 
some inner states’ (2015: 2). For Dreyfus & Taylor, this mediational component 
to empirical knowledge implies an essential disconnect between the human 
being and the world. As we can see above, Dreyfus & Taylor trace this problem 
back to the dualist philosophy of Descartes, which Dreyfus sometimes refer to as 
entailing a “subject-object” picture (see Dreyfus, 2001: 49). In a Cartesian picture, 
the mind of the human subject – “the ideas I have within me” - is sharply 
distinguished from external objects – “what is outside of me”. The mind is 
conceived as an interior realm, its connection to the external world in need of 
further philosophical explanation. Dreyfus’s phenomenological background 
comes into play here. In Being and Time, Heidegger argues that a Cartesian 
framework is always going to offer an unsatisfactory picture of the relationship 
between the mind and the world. He expresses the inherent problems with the 
separation of a subjective mental realm from an external world here: 
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And no matter how this inner sphere may get 
interpreted, if one does no more than ask how 
cognition makes its way “out of” it and “achieves 
transcendence,” it becomes evident that the 
cognition which presents such enigmas will remain 
problematical unless one has previously clarified 
how it is and what it is. (Heidegger, 1962: 87) 
For Heidegger, if we presuppose the idea of an internal mental realm 
then our philosophical options become limited. We shore up the disconnection 
between the human being and the world to such a degree that scepticism 
becomes difficult to discount. Heidegger states that ‘the problem of reality in the 
sense of the question whether an external world [...] can be proved turns out to 
be an impossible one’ (Heidegger, 1962: 250). Dreyfus & Taylor follow 
Heidegger in arguing that once this dualism of subject and object is in place, any 
attempts to show how the subjective realm correlates with the objective realm 
are going to be unsatisfactory. Here, Dreyfus describes such a picture as a 
Cartesian ontology that motivates traditional epistemology:  
This ontology understands the subject as a self-
sufficient mind related to the objects in the world by 
way of internal mental states that in some way 
represent those objects but in no essential way 
depend on them. The radical gap between what is 
inside the mind and is outside in the world must be 
mediated in order for a subject to have knowledge of 
the world, and epistemology is the study of this 
mediation (Dreyfus, 2004: 52).  
The closest we will get to a point of contact is some sort of resemblance 
between the internal representation and the external state of affairs. Even in this 
case, the internal representations are not dependent on any states of affairs. 
Dreyfus & Taylor suspect that any account of how the mind gets connected to 
the world is not going to provide the sort of picture that we want to affirm as 
long as it remains within a Cartesian framework.  
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Dreyfus & Taylor acknowledge that their focus on explicit, 
representational mental states may be a distortion of contemporary philosophy’s 
approach to this topic. However, they do take the mediational picture to 
manifest in any philosophical account that appeals to capacities belonging to the 
mind. This is reflected in Dreyfus & Taylor’s clarification of the differing forms 
the mediational picture can take. An important example here would be their 
description of the problems with developments in 20th Century philosophy of 
language. The idea that inner mental representations play the crucial role is 
tacitly or explicitly rejected in favour of a focus on ‘sentences held true by an 
agent’ (Dreyfus & Taylor, 2015: 3). Dreyfus & Taylor do not spell out what this 
entails, but it is likely that they are referring to the ways in which we can 
attribute possession of a concept of an external state of affairs to a subject. As we 
saw in the introduction, possession of a concept can be spelled out in Fregean 
terms. I take it that Dreyfus & Taylor have something like a Fregean approach 
to concepts in mind when they refer to a focus on “sentences held true”. 
McDowell’s own specific understanding of “conceptual” will become important 
as my thesis progresses.  
In any case, Dreyfus & Taylor recognise that the overall shift away from 
internal representations to a grasp of language may avoid an explicit Cartesian 
distinction between inner subjective experience and external reality. However, 
they recognise “the same basic pattern” of the mediational picture insofar as the 
linguistic turn still assumes that ‘the reality is out there, and the holdings true are 
in minds; we have knowledge when these beliefs (sentences held true) reliably 
correspond to the reality; we have knowledge through the beliefs’ (2015: 3). 
Dreyfus & Taylor’s problem is not only with explicit reference to mental states, 
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but with any appeal to the sort of relation that is made possible by our cognitive 
faculties. In this way, Dreyfus & Taylor are also opposed to the idea that 
perceptual experience is essentially structured by capacities that belong to the mind. 
Here the mediational element appears ‘as categorial forms, ways we have of 
conceptually structuring the input, of making sense of it for ourselves’ (2015: 10). 
The idea that human beings relate to the world in virtue of their possessing 
concepts that “structure” sensory input is of course relevant to McDowell’s 
conceptualism. McDowell’s conceptualism, even specified in Fregean terms, 
remains within the mediational picture.  
It is important to see how the mediational picture relates to Dreyfus’s 
non-conceptualism about unreflective action and the perception involved. The 
crucial claim that Dreyfus makes here is that the involvement of concepts 
compromises our ability to unreflectively engage with the world. Conceptual 
involvement interrupts or arises in the interruption of our skilful engagement 
with the world. Dreyfus’s principal example is the case of Chuck Knoblauch, a 
baseman for the New York Yankees. At some stage in Knoblauch’s career, 
according to Dreyfus, he began to consciously “monitor” those aspects of his 
performance that gave him time to think – ‘he couldn’t resist exercising his 
capacity to reflect’ (Dreyfus, 2007a: 354). Now, Knoblauch ‘could still play 
brilliant baseball in difficult situations – catching a hard-hit ground ball and 
throwing it to first faster than though’ (Dreyfus, 2007a: 354). However, other 
aspects of his performance saw an extreme dip in quality:  
What he couldn’t do was field an easy routine grounder 
directly to second base, because that gave him time to 
think before throwing to first. I’m told that in some 
replays of such easy throws one could actually see 
Knoblauch looking with puzzlement at his hand trying 
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to figure out the mechanics of throwing the ball. There 
was nothing wrong with Knoblauch’s body; he could 
still exercise his skill as long as the situation require that 
he act before he had time to think (Dreyfus, 2007a: 354).  
Dreyfus uses the case of Knoblauch to argue that ‘the enemy of expertise 
is thought’ (Dreyfus, 2007a: 354). More precisely, Dreyfus argues that when 
conceptual thought arises, an agent who was previously engaged or immersed in 
an environment ‘experiences himself as a thinking, acting, self-aware subject 
distinct from its world’ (Dreyfus, 2013: 31). This description represents Dreyfus’s 
phenomenological analysis of an experience like Knoblauch’s, when he stares in 
confusion at the baseball. Dreyfus’s view here rests in his understanding of what 
the involvement of concepts entails. Dreyfus takes concepts to play a principally 
descriptive, epistemic role – concepts are ‘devoted to getting it right about a 
distanced reality’ (Dreyfus, 2013: 23). Dreyfus states that McDowell conceives 
of the world ‘in largely descriptive terms, and our openness to it as distanced 
taking in’ (Dreyfus, 2013: 22). Indeed, McDowell bemoans that Dreyfus does 
assume his conceptualism to restrict ‘operations of conceptual capacities 
(capacities that belong to rationality) to their exercise in detached intellectual 
activity’ (McDowell, 2013: 54). McDowell sums up Dreyfus’s assumptions 
about the involvement of conceptual capacities here, substituting “conceptual 
capacities” or “rationality” for “mindedness”: 
Dreyfus assumes, and thinks I accept, that if 
mindedness informs an experience, the subject has a 
detached contemplative relation to the world she 
experiences, and that if mindedness informs an action, 
the agent has a detached monitoring relation to what 
she is doing (McDowell, 2013: 41).  
Of course, concepts do play an epistemic role; McDowell insists on their 
pervasiveness in experience at least in part to preserve a genuinely empiricist 
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conception of knowledge. Dreyfus’s assumption about the role of concepts here 
is not completely unfounded – however, we will see that it is mistaken. So, for 
Dreyfus, conceptual involvement either interrupts or arises in the interruption of 
our skilful engagement with the world.  
When [a human subject] is totally merged with the 
world there is no place for content, neither experiential 
nor propositional – there is nothing that is in any sense 
inner […] there is no way [conceptual content] could be 
introduced into the absorbed activity of the coper in 
flow without abolishing that activity by creating a 
distance between agent and world (Dreyfus, 2013: 29)23.  
Dreyfus argues that the entrenched philosophical difficulty in relating the 
mind the world – “the mediational picture” – is caused by focusing on these 
isolated instances of conceptual involvement, where our engagement with the 
world is compromised and we become “detached”. Our experience is 
describable in the Cartesian terms of a detachment between subject and object. 
For Dreyfus, the philosophical focus on this epistemic aspect of our experience 
of the world overlooks a non-epistemic, non-conceptual basis on which human 
beings first relate to the world. It overlooks the way in which human beings are 
skilfully, unreflectively, and non-conceptually absorbed into their environment. 
If philosophy were to focus on this primary way in which human beings were in 
contact with the world, the mediational picture wouldn’t cause the difficulties it 
does. Dreyfus concedes that to completely overcome the mediational picture we 
would need to show how the epistemic, conceptual aspects of our relationship to 
the world arise from the practical, non-conceptual aspects (Dreyfus, 2005: 61). 
                                                          
23 Of course, Dreyfus makes the prior claim that there is a kind of “experiential” content at work 
in “absorbed activity”, which we saw him refer to as “motor intentional content” (Dreyfus, 
2007a: 360), which he seems to call into doubt here. There is seemingly a discontinuity in his 
position. However, I will continue to refer to the “motor intentional” or “affective” content in 
Dreyfus’s account; as long as we consistently do this with clear reference to Dreyfus’s own 
phenomenological descriptions (and bearing in mind that he himself has previously referred to it 
as “content”), there is no danger of distorting Dreyfus’s non-conceptualist account.  
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However, at least one point of his emphasis on the non-conceptual character of 
unreflective action is to undercut a mediational picture of the human being and 
the world, and to undermine what he takes to be a Cartesian focus on bridging a 
gap between the mind and the world. His appeal to the primacy of motor 
intentional content is designed to avoid Cartesian assumptions about the 
relationship between the human being and the world.  
 
 1.6 Conclusion 
 I have defined “unreflective action” as intentional action that is 
unreflectively and skilfully performed in an engaged or absorbed manner. I 
outlined the way in which unreflective action poses certain problems for 
traditional conceptions of knowledge and intentionality – wherein knowledge of 
our actions or environment is “knowledge-that”, and where intentionality is 
conceptually structured. Dreyfus draws upon existential phenomenologists to 
argue that unreflective action does not entail conceptual involvement, and that 
we might reasonably describe our familiar engagement with our environment as 
“motor intentional”, following Merleau-Ponty. For Dreyfus, “motor intentional 
content” is a necessary condition of the involvement of conceptual content. 
Further, an appeal to the primacy of motor intentional content allows Dreyfus to 
avoid a problematic “mediational” or Cartesian picture of the relationship 
between the human being and the world.  
In sum, this chapter presents Dreyfus’s claims that a conceptualist 
account of perception and action cannot accommodate unreflective action, and 
that conceptualism shores up an unacceptably Cartesian picture of the 
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relationship between the human being and the world. Expounding Dreyfus’s 
non-conceptualist account of unreflective action in detail was necessary for 
properly appraising his position in the debate. Going forward, I attempt to 
systematically call his non-conceptualist position into question. I build a picture 
of the involvement of conceptual capacities that demonstrates how a 
conceptualism like McDowell’s can accommodate and better explain the 
phenomenon of unreflective action. The next two chapters focus primarily on 
how the involvement of conceptual capacities, or a conceptualist account of 
















2 Conceptual Involvement and Cartesian “Detachment” 
 
 2.1 Introduction 
 In my previous chapter I defined unreflective action and the 
philosophical implications that Dreyfus draws from it. For Dreyfus, unreflective 
action proceeds without the involvement of concepts, and represents a 
fundamental intentional relation to the world that conceptual forms of 
perception and action is conditional on. This contrasts with McDowell’s 
understanding of perceptual experience and intentional action, which he holds to 
be irreducibly conceptual. In the closing stage of the chapter, I emphasised that 
Dreyfus takes his non-conceptualism to avoid a “mediational picture” between 
the human being and the world. For Dreyfus, any account of the relationship 
between the human being and the world that emphasises the role of conceptual 
capacities is committed to a deeply philosophically unsatisfactory “mediational 
picture”. This picture is Cartesian in nature, and philosophically unsatisfactory 
in that it indicates some detachment or disconnection between the human being 
and the world.  
Dreyfus thinks that such a picture arises because of a traditional 
philosophical emphasis on episodes of reflection and conscious thought, 
ignoring the more pervasive and fundamental episodes of unreflective action. 
Crucially, Dreyfus makes a phenomenological claim that the involvement of 
conceptual capacities interrupts or scuppers our skilful engagement with the 
world. We become “detached” from the world, and our experience becomes 
describable in the Cartesian terms of a subject detached from an object. This 
chapter focuses on this claim, disputing both Dreyfus’s phenomenology and his 
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interpretation of Heidegger, in line with my concern to re-evaluate the relevance 
of existential phenomenology to contemporary debates around intentionality.   
 In 2.2 I explore Dreyfus’s interpretation and usage of Heidegger’s 
phenomenology; Dreyfus purports to derive his hard distinction between 
conceptual involvement and its absence from Heidegger. This involves defining 
a number of Heideggerian concepts – the ready-to-hand, the present-at-hand, the 
understanding, and circumspection. In 2.3 I argue against Dreyfus’s claim, 
demonstrating that conceptual involvement does not necessarily interrupt skilful 
engagement, and in some cases plays a necessary role in this engagement. In 2.4 
I refer to Heidegger’s conception of interpretation, which his account of explicit 
conceptual involvement. Contrary to Dreyfus’s reading, Heidegger does not 
conceive of conceptual involvement as entailing a detachment between the 
human being and the world, and has much the same view about its necessity in 
our skilful engagement. In 2.5, I briefly assess the resulting implications for 
Dreyfus’s claim that motor intentional content is a necessary condition of 
conceptual content. I conclude in 2.6, highlighting how my argument here has 
undermined the association Dreyfus makes between conceptual involvement 
and Cartesianism, and how conceptual content such as judgements can be 
indispensable to human practically engaged experience.  
 
 2.2 Conceptual Content and the Present-at-hand 
Dreyfus is influenced by a series of concepts and distinctions that 
Heidegger posits in Being and Time (1926). However, Dreyfus’s interpretation of 
Heidegger’s work, although influential and perhaps “dominant”, is not 
76 
 
uncontentious. It should be kept in mind at this early stage that Dreyfus too 
readily associates Heidegger’s conception of intentionality with the “motor 
intentional content” I outlined earlier. In what follows, I provide an account of 
Heidegger’s conception of “understanding”, and the associated notion of 
“circumspection”, before discussing what Heidegger means by the “ready-to-
hand” and the “present-at-hand”. I emphasise how Dreyfus utilises Heidegger 
here to argue that conceptual involvement entails a detachment between the 
human being and the world that is explicable in terms of a Cartesian framework.  
First of all, Heidegger uses the term “understanding” to denote a primary 
form of intentionality, which should look familiar to us. Heidegger emphasises 
that this term should not be taken with the traditional connotations of something 
cognitive. Rather, he states, it should have the ‘signification of “being able to 
manage something”, “being a match for it”, “being competent to do something”’ 
(Heidegger, 1962: 183)24. The “understanding” manifests specifically in what 
Heidegger calls “circumspection”, which is Heidegger’s name for the sort of 
perceptual experience that pertains to our practical engagement with our 
environment. Heidegger is popularly thought to be arguing for a non-conceptualist 
form of intentionality that bears resemblance to Ryle’s work on knowing-how, 
and Merleau-Ponty’s conception of motor intentionality. Carman defines the 
Heideggerian understanding as ‘the way we make sense of entities by dealing 
with things available for use in everyday practical activity [...] Understanding 
means knowing how, and it precedes and makes possible cognition, or knowing 
that’ (Carman, 2003: 207). Carman is emphasising here that the Heideggerian 
                                                          
24 In Chapter Five, I argue that Heidegger is not trying to throw out any role for the “cognitive”, 
but is trying to show how cognition is integrated into practically engaged experience, thus 
avoiding those “traditional” connotations.  
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understanding is not a matter of conceptual understanding – “knowing that”. 
Wrathall’s description of the Heideggerian understanding emphasises the 
importance of practical skill over the involvement of mental capacities: ‘in virtue 
of our skilful knowing-how to be in our world, rather than via any cognitive 
processes, the world itself, without any mental mediation, directly calls forth our 
intentionally shaped response’ (Wrathall, 1998: 185). Elsewhere, Blattner takes 
Heidegger to be articulating how human beings are ‘familiar with our 
environment and the paraphernalia that we encounter in it primarily through our 
skills and abilities, our competences, rather than cognition’ (2006: 56). ‘the space 
of possibilities in which we operate is wider and richer than can be described by 
our propositional resources […] we are capable of more than we describe. 
Understanding, as Heidegger uses the term, is this mastery of more than we can 
describe’ (2006: 86). In the debate with McDowell, Dreyfus defines 
circumspection as ‘the mode of awareness in which absorbed coping takes 
account of things without our apprehending them in thought’ (2013: 18).  
 Now, it is important to highlight that Heidegger’s use of terms like 
“thematic”, “non-thematic”, “thematised”, and “unthematized” are 
conventionally taken to correspond to “conceptual” and “non-conceptual”. 
Therefore, a statement like ‘the understanding does not grasp thematically that 
upon which it projects’, is taken to mean that we do not relate to our 
environment through conceptualising it. Elsewhere, Heidegger claims that 
“thematising” our understanding of the environment would ‘reduce it to the 
given contents which we have in mind’ (Heidegger, 1962: 185). Heidegger’s 
concern about “reducing” our understanding of our environment down to a 
cognitive phenomenon speaks particularly to Blattner’s point – that the way in 
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which human beings relate to their environment in a way “wider and richer” 
than our conceptual repertoire allows. Simply on these grounds, a non-
conceptualist interpretation of certain aspects of Heidegger’s work seems 
reasonable. It is worth noting, again, the popularity of this interpretation. Golob 
highlights that a non-conceptualist interpretation is the “dominant reading” of 
Heidegger on intentionality, quoting Dreyfus as the representative (and most 
influential) proponent of this reading: ‘Dreyfus, for example, states bluntly that 
the primary level of [human] experience is “nonconceptual, nonpropositional, 
nonrational, and nonlinguistic” (Golob, 2014: 26; quote from Dreyfus, 2007b: 
352). Golob is one recent commentator who has challenged this interpretation; I 
draw on his work in Chapter Five.   
 This non-conceptualist interpretation applies to the primary Heideggerian 
distinction between the ready-to-hand (zuhandenheit) and the present-at-hand 
(vorhandenheit). Readiness-to-hand is usually understood to refer to the 
environment and the objects within it insofar as they are perceived, or 
understood, and acted on in an unreflective manner in the context of everyday 
concerns (see Heidegger, 1962: 98). Heidegger’s conception of the ready-to-hand 
corresponds to the kind of relation that one has to their environment in 
unreflective action. Presence-at-hand is usually understood to refer to the 
environment and the objects in it insofar as they are perceived, or understood, 
from a neutral, theoretical perspective that defines them in terms of their 
material or causal properties. The present-at-hand describes ‘the ways in which 
things show up in a neutral mode, not in their significance for us, but as they 
appear to a disengaged agent, who is concerned just to make a neutral portrait of 
reality’ (Dreyfus & Taylor, 2015: 36).  
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There are two aspects of an object’s being ready-to-hand. Heidegger is at 
times clear that the ready-to-hand denotes an unreflective mode of engagement. 
Heidegger uses the term “withdraw” to describe the way in which ready-to-hand 
objects seem to elude our cognitive attention: ‘the peculiarity of what is 
proximally ready-to-hand is that, in its readiness-to-hand, it must as it were, 
withdraw in order to be ready-to-hand quite authentically’ (Heidegger, 1962: 99). 
John Richardson aptly demonstrates that Heidegger’s emphasis on non-mental 
capacities is intended in term “ready-to-hand” – ‘objects are ready-to-hand for 
Heidegger ‘in the sense that the hand is prepared for them, ready to reach out to 
them, in order to use them, order them, or put them out of the way (2012: 93). A 
ready-to-hand object, Heidegger states, ‘is not grasped thematically as an 
occurring thing’ (1962: 98). We can reasonably conclude that “grasping” a 
ready-to-hand object is not a matter of conceptualisation. The ready-to-hand can 
reasonably be understood to be a non-conceptual phenomenon.  
In this way, ready-to-hand objects are associated with Heidegger’s 
conceptions of the understanding and circumspection; if the understanding 
connotes a mode of intentionality, it is a mode of intentionality that pertains to 
ready-to-hand objects; if circumspection is a mode of perception, it is a mode of 
perception that pertains to ready-to-hand objects. Dreyfus certain plays up the 
similarity of the ready-to-hand to motor intentional content. Dreyfus draws up a 
chart for McDowell that categorises the ready-to-hand with other characteristics 
of non-conceptual unreflective action: ‘absorption in the flow’, ‘attractions and 
repulsions’, and the inability ‘to answer what and why questions’ (Dreyfus, 2013: 
32). As we have seen, Heidegger’s descriptions of the ready-to-hand as “non-
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thematic” and resistant to “deliberate thinking” lend Dreyfus’s interpretation 
and use some textual support. 
Heidegger’s analysis of the ready-to-hand is not only supposed to draw 
attention to the non-conceptual way in which we perceive and act upon objects 
in our skilful engagement with them. There is a contextual aspect to the ready-
to-hand; something is ready-to-hand in virtue of belonging to what Heidegger 
calls a “totality of involvements”. A hammer would be ready-to-hand in virtue 
of its relations to other ready-to-hand objects like nails and wood, its relations to 
tasks, and how those tasks fit into a wider set of human activities and existential 
concerns (see Heidegger, 1962: 98). Heidegger clarifies that readiness-to-hand 
not only defines those objects that we are unreflectively engaged with, but also 
all of the objects that make up our familiar everyday environment. In this way, 
Heidegger means the term to apply to any objects that we perceive in terms of 
their relation to human activity – from furniture, to buildings, and even to 
“natural” objects like forests and rivers (see Heidegger 1962: 100). We must note 
Heidegger’s claim that we do not cognitively focus on the contexts that an object 
belongs to (Heidegger, 1962: 98). Again, this claim offers support to Dreyfus’s 
non-conceptualist, motor intentional interpretation of Heidegger.  
Crucially, it is possible to advance a non-conceptualist interpretation that 
doesn’t rely on assumptions about what Heidegger means by “thematic”. 
Heidegger talks explicitly about the involvement of linguistic judgements – he 
uses the term “assertion”. By focusing on Heidegger’s discussion of assertions, 
we can get a more precise idea of how Heidegger conceives of conceptual 
involvement. It is through this line of thought that Dreyfus derives his 
association of conceptual involvement with detachment and the mediational 
81 
 
picture. Heidegger seems to hold that when a ready-to-hand entity becomes an 
object of a judgement, the intentional content is qualitatively transformed. He 
claims that when an object becomes the subject of a judgement, its readiness-to-
hand becomes “veiled”. Heidegger explains that a ready-to-hand object 
articulated in a judgement becomes ‘cut off from that significance, which, as 
such, constitutes environmentality’ (Heidegger, 1962: 200 – 201). We can see 
that Heidegger is associating conceptual involvement with the possibility of our 
becoming detached from the objects of our practical concerns. At this point, his 
conception of the present-at-hand comes into play. In the cited passage, cutting 
the object off from its contextual significance and its practical role entails ‘letting 
one see what is present-at-hand in a determinate way’ (Heidegger, 1962: 201). 
That is, conceptual content does not capture the ready-to-hand objects of our 
perception and action, but renders them present-at-hand. This is how the 
prevalent interpretation of Heidegger on conceptual content generally runs; 
Schear states that it is a ‘virtual consensus among commentators that judgement 
is correlated with present-at-hand entities’ (2007: 136). In order to see what this 
correlation entails - to see what it means for conceptual content to render objects 
“present-at-hand” - we need an adequate definition of the present-at-hand.  
The “present-at-hand” is a notion that plays a complex role in 
Heidegger’s wider corpus. Rehearsing the core of the idea in Being and Time will 
be adequate for my purposes here. In one sense, we can characterise the present-
at-hand as simply denoting perceived objects which are not ready-to-hand, either 
in the motor intentional or contextual sense. Present-at-hand objects are not part 
of a totality of involvements, they are not perceived and acted on in terms of 
their role in human concerns, and they are not unreflectively utilised by bodily 
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ability in skilful engagement. Again, Richardson defines the present-at-hand 
intuitively: ‘entities-at-hand are “objects”; they are “at-hand” in the sense that 
they sit inertly before our idle hands as we consider them apart from our purpose’ 
(Richardson, 2012: 93). So much can be inferred from Heidegger’s claim that 
linguistic judgement cuts ready-to-hand objects off from their relevant contexts, 
and renders them present-at-hand. It is in this way that the present-at-hand is 
associated with simply staring disinterestedly at an object (McManus, 2014: 55). 
Staring, of course, stands in stark contrast to the kind of “circumspective” 
perception involved in skilful engagement.  
However, it is not that objects become unintelligible as they switch from 
ready-to-hand to present-at-hand. The idea is more that we relate to them solely 
in terms of their material or causal properties. Paradigmatically, then, we might 
think of a present-at-hand object as the kind of object that natural science 
investigates. Preliminarily, it can be said that we relate to the present-at-hand 
only from a theoretical perspective that is aimed at explicating the causal and 
physical properties of natural objects, which serves to detach us from our skilful 
engagement with the world (see McManus, 2014: 56). Golob offers three 
definitions of the present-at-hand that are adequate to what I have said so far:   
[…] a substance in either an Aristotelian, Cartesian, 
Leibnizian, or Kantian sense; an entity individuated 
by reference to its spatio-temporal and causal 
properties; an entity in so far as it is “cut off from” 
the holistic web of instrumental, social, and other 
relations which define the Heideggerian concept of 
“world” (Golob, 2014: 16-17) 
 If the present-at-hand is not reconcilable with the kind of objects that we 
encounter in our engaged, skilful activity, and conceptual content is indeed 
necessarily correlated with the present-at-hand, then we can understand 
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Dreyfus’s opposition to a conceptualist account of our skilful engagement with 
the world. Of course, I want to argue that we should not make this correlation.  
Before I move on to this line of argument, I want to link the present-at-
hand a little more precisely to Dreyfus’s concern about conceiving of the human 
being’s relationship in terms of a Cartesian picture – that is, in terms of a 
detachment between the human being and the world. Dreyfus’s concern is also 
informed by a reading of Heidegger, precisely because Heidegger intends the 
present-at-hand to represent the kind of ontology that we find in Descartes’ 
subject-object model of the human relation to the world. In Heidegger’s view, 
Descartes does not allow for a conception of objects as we relate to them 
through our skilful engagement; he defines objects as substances with material 
properties – the kind of objects ‘which mathematical knowledge is exceptionally 
well suited to grasp’ (Heidegger, 1962: 129). By “mathematical knowledge”, 
Heidegger means the kind of theoretical knowledge which underpins natural 
science. Indeed, Heidegger describes our knowledge of the natural world as ‘a 
way of determining the nature of the present-at-hand by observing it’ and further 
states that it ‘lets us encounter entities within-the-world purely in the way they 
look’ (Heidegger, 1962: 88). Descartes assumes that the only “genuine access” to 
the world ‘lies in knowing, intellectio, in the sense of the kind of knowledge we 
get in mathematics and physics’ (Heidegger, 1962: 128). Thus, the human being 
is defined in terms of their capacities to describe the world in scientific terms. 
This is where the distinction between a knowing, theoretically guided subject, 
and a world of material, calculable objects arises.   
We have seen that Dreyfus wants to avoid the Cartesian picture of the 
human relationship to the world because it is phenomenologically inaccurate. 
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The kind of knowledge that is appropriate to mathematics and science clearly 
does not characterise our skilfully engaged relationship to the world. Heidegger’s 
conception of the present-at-hand and the link he makes to conceptual content 
really lies at the heart of the McDowell-Dreyfus debate, because it is under 
Heidegger’s influence that Dreyfus has come to regard conceptual content as 
implying, in McDowell’s words, ‘detached intellectual activity’ (2013: 54) of the 
kind appropriate to a scientific description of the world. McDowell’s focus on 
the relation between the mind and the world, and his appeal to conceptuality to 
make that relationship philosophically palatable, becomes, for Dreyfus, a focus 
on the present-at-hand. Dreyfus advances this view explicitly in the McDowell-
Dreyfus debate. In the chart that Dreyfus draws up for McDowell, he categorises 
conceptual content with “subject-object” intentionality and the present-at-hand 
(Dreyfus, 2013: 32; box 1.2). Dreyfus also states that McDowell thinks of the 
world in ‘largely descriptive terms, and our openness to it as distanced taking in’ 
(Dreyfus, 2013: 22). In Dreyfus’s view, conceptual content and its concomitant 
expression in linguistic judgement is directed toward material objects with 
material properties, and only possible on the basis of a detachment from contexts 
of human concern. In this way, conceptual content is incompatible with skilful 
engagement. He does not ever concede that conceptual content can perhaps 
capture the relevances and contextual aspects of the perceptual world. 
Dreyfus’s negative view of conceptual content is aggravated by 
Heidegger’s account of why conceptual content might arise - the experiential 
transition from engaging with ready-to-hand objects, to theoretically grasping 
present-at-hand objects, appears in his analysis of what he calls the unready-to-
hand (unzuhanden). This is a notion that Dreyfus draws on regularly. Heidegger 
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uses this term to refer to a disruption or a breakdown of an environmental 
situation that we were previously unreflectively engaged with. Our skilful 
engagement with the world is interrupted in some way. The classic example is a 
tool like a hammer breaking, or our finding that it is unfit for a particular task. 
These situations, for Heidegger, ‘have the function of bringing to the fore the 
characteristic of presence-at-hand in what is ready-to-hand’ (Heidegger, 1962: 
104).  
In his 1991 commentary on Heidegger, Dreyfus describes breakdown 
cases as Heidegger leaving open ‘a place for traditional intentionality’ (Dreyfus, 
1991: 70). Dreyfus states that in these cases – such as a hammer being too heavy 
for its purpose - ‘a distance opens up between the coper and what he is acting on 
which is bridged by a situation-specific concept. The coper can make the 
judgement that the hammer is too heavy’ (Dreyfus, 2013: 19). Notice that 
Dreyfus holds that an experiential detachment between a subject and an object 
occurs even in the case of a situation-specific concept. Dreyfus’s reference to 
situation-specific concepts is, I think, an attempt to carve out a middle ground in 
order to make sense of the idea that ‘unreadiness-to-hand is a “deficient mode” 
of readiness-to-hand, not a mode of presence-at-hand’ (Blattner, 2006: 58). I will 
come back to this in some detail below. Dreyfus repeats his insistence on the link 
between conceptual content and detachment with reference to Heidegger’s 
phenomenology of the unready-to-hand. When our skilful engagement with the 
world is interrupted due to a breakdown of some kind, the unreflective actor ‘no 
longer experiences his absorbed coping as pervaded by mineness, but 
experiences himself as a thinking, acting, self-aware subject distinct from its 
world’ (Dreyfus, 2013: 31).  
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We can question whether Dreyfus’s phenomenology is accurate here. 
When something goes wrong in a practical situation we are skilfully engaging 
with, is there really a qualitative shift in the content of our experience? Do we 
experience a shift from engaging with the world to theoretically describing it? 
We might consider the possibility that Dreyfus is trying to articulate some kind 
of qualitative shift because of his deep-seated suspicion about conceptuality. 
Dreyfus continues to hold that conceptual content arises only interrupts or arises 
in the interruption of skilful activity, and renders our experience explicable in 
subject-object terms: ‘[…] there is no way [conceptual content] could be 
introduced into the absorbed activity of the coper in flow without abolishing that 
activity by creating a distance between agent and world (Dreyfus, 2013: 29). 
Now, we have seen that this “distance between agent and world” is associated 
for Dreyfus with the present-at-hand, with objects that are made intelligible by 
natural science and a theoretically guided subject. Heidegger does sometimes 
tend toward endorsing this picture in his analysis of the unready-to-hand. When 
we make a judgement like “the hammer is too heavy”, Heidegger holds that the 
judgement allows us to assess the object in terms of its material properties, and 
this in turn represents a handover from the ready-to-hand to the present-at-hand 
(see Heidegger, 1962: 201). As with his previous comments on the nature of 
judgement, there again is the temptation to take Heidegger’s existential 
phenomenological lesson to be that conceptual content entails a theoretical 
description of the physical world. 
I should briefly summarise what I have said so far. Through an 
interpretation of Heidegger, Dreyfus arrives at the view that conceptual content 
is correlated with the present-at-hand – with a detached, theoretically guided 
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subject and material objects. He therefore assumes that conceptual content is 
incompatible with our skilful engagement with the world, which leads to the 
further assumption that conceptual content either interrupts or arises in the 
interruption of skilful activity.  
Now, the first problem here is that Dreyfus fails to recognise that 
conceptual content does not necessarily de-contextualise or detach objects from 
our practical or existential concerns – Dreyfus unjustifiably treats all conceptual 
content as entailing a theoretical description of material or causal properties. 
Secondly, Dreyfus’s interpretation of Heidegger simply ignores a whole raft of 
other textual evidence that suggests that Heidegger holds a far more 
philosophically innocent conception of conceptual content. McDowell is right in 
his assessment of the problem at the heart of the debate, that Dreyfus wrongly 
‘restricts operations of conceptual capacities (capacities that belong to rationality) 
to their exercise in detached intellectual activity’ (McDowell, 2013: 54), and 
refuses to make concessions to the contrary. Accordingly, we need to start trying 
to fix this mischaracterisation. We should begin throwing doubt on the view that 
the involvement of conceptual content is a Cartesian phenomenon that implies 
the interruption of skilful activity, or detachment, or a subject-object model of 
the human relationship to the world. We can do this by showing how the explicit 
involvement of conceptual content is often necessary to that skilful, engaged 






2.3 Skilful Engagement and Conceptual Involvement  
 In her essay “A Dancer Reflects”, Barbara Montero questions the idea 
that conceptual capacities, or mental capacities in general, cannot be at work in 
skilful activity. She seeks to correct Dreyfus’s position that skilful activity is a 
function of non-conceptual bodily ability, only interrupted by conceptual 
involvement. She specifically argues against what she calls the principle of 
automaticity: ‘When all is going well, expert performance significantly involves 
neither self-reflective thinking, nor planning, nor deliberation, nor mental effort’ 
(Montero, 2013: 304). This principle manifests in Dreyfus’s non-conceptual 
characterisation of unreflective action. Montero, as her title suggests, reflects on 
her experiences as a ballet dancer and notes how conceptual involvement was 
key in her skilful performances.  
Now, Montero does not claim that all intentional action entails 
conceptual involvement – and again, this is not something that I am attempting 
to argue for in this chapter. She is prepared, for example, to accept that a return 
of serve in tennis does not involve conceptual capacities. Montero instead offers 
something like a set of counter-examples to Dreyfus’s appeal to Knoblauch’s loss 
of expertise. She states that ‘even if returning a serve in grand-slam tennis does 
not involve thinking about what one is doing, performing the White Swan pas de 
deux very well might’ (Montero, 2013: 312). Montero, again, is happy to concede 
that ‘most dancers are not focusing primarily on such fine-grained details of their 
movements’ (2013: 312), and as such allows for a non-conceptual form of 
intentional action. She only argues that such mental focus does arise, and often 
arises in order to supplement skilful activity, and certainly not to interrupt it, or 
detach us from it. Montero states that mental focus and conceptual involvement 
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‘occurs even in the best performances […] for example, sometimes a very 
specific detail, such as “lift” direct at, say, my elbow, might be what is in mind’ 
(Montero, 2013: 312): 
In addition to these sorts of thoughts, there were the 
willed commands (I am going to nail that coming 
balance!), which can be seen as a form of planning – as 
well as numerous thoughts about what the other 
dancers are doing on stage […] there are thoughts about 
lighting, sets, the floor (which I recall, was often a 
major concern: Is it slippery? Is it sticky? Where is the 
bump in the tape?), and so on […] some thoughts, such 
as reaching a mark on stage, are just part of the 
performance. (Montero, 2013: 313).  
Montero’s description of her skilful activity does not correspond to 
Dreyfus’s phenomenology. Remember, Dreyfus claims that conceptual 
involvement only serves to interrupt skilful activity and move us from a state of 
engagement into a state of detachment. However, the involvement of 
conceptual capacities here is not interrupting the skilful activity. Conceptual 
involvement has not arisen because something has gone wrong, or because 
there has been an equipmental or environmental breakdown. When Montero 
thinks about the slipperiness of the stage, she is not experiencing herself as a 
subject detached from her engagement with the world. There is certainly no 
sense in which the concepts involved amount to a disinterested description of 
the immediate environment; the environment is not “cut off” from a context of 
interest, and the objects of Montero’s thought processes are not “present-at-
hand”.  
A significant problem with Dreyfus’s phenomenological account of 
conceptual involvement is that it engenders a sharp divide between 
conceptuality and skilful engagement. It tends toward a picture that only makes 
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room for conceptual involvement at certain rare points which break us out of an 
unreflectively acting stupor. As we have seen, Dreyfus describes such a 
handover as suddenly experiencing oneself as a distinct subject, detached from 
a world of material objects (see Dreyfus, 2013: 31). Montero’s analysis helps us 
to call the accuracy of this phenomenology into question. In Montero’s account 
of her time as a dancer, conceptual involvement arises in the course of skilful 
activity, not in the interruption of it. Nicholas Smith makes a valuable 
connection between the McDowell-Dreyfus debate and Mike Rose’s The Mind 
at Work (2004). Rose’s target is the societal prejudice that practical vocations are 
less intellectually demanding. Rose reveals ‘the operations of conceptual 
capacities in places where, due to ideological distortions, the denizens of 
modern societies least expect them: the carpenter’s workshop, the 
physiotherapist’s clinic, the hairstylist’s salon, and so forth’ (Smith, 2013: 172). 
Smith draws attention to a carpenter’s description of the conceptual 
involvement inherent in their activity: ‘there’s always some element of 
awareness to the work, for safety, but also because the task at hand will have its 
own demands, require its own minor adjustments’ (Rose, 2004: 78; Smith, 2013: 
172).  
We can therefore see that Montero’s analysis applies to everyday 
practices as well as expert performance. Both Montero and Smith want to draw 
attention to how conceptual content is drawn upon in skilful activity for the sake 
of that activity. It is not that conceptual involvement arises for the sake of 
providing an accurate description of the environment. It is rather that skilful 
engagement with the environment often requires this conceptual involvement. 
The role that conceptual involvement plays is not restricted to the interruption 
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of skilful engagement with the world, but is often a necessary component of 
such engagement. In the context of his assessment of Heidegger’s conception of 
assertion, or judgement, Schear notes much the same point.  
As I am wielding a hammer while hanging paintings, 
I make a series of situated judgements about whether 
the nails sufficiently protrude to serve as hooks. As I 
am salting the soup, I taste it and pass judgement 
about whether or not it needs more salt. The tasting 
and judging are essential parts of the activity of 
salting, not other than the activity. (Schear, 2007: 2)  
Dreyfus does not consider examples like these in the debate with 
McDowell. He considers only those examples where conceptual involvement, 
such as judgements, compromises our skilful engagement with the environment 
– as in the Knoblauch case. He remarks: ‘that thematising usually undermines 
expert practice suggests that thinking transforms the perceptual and social field. 
A field of forces only exists when there is no distance between the absorbed 
coper and the field’ (Dreyfus, 2013: 27). In the examples I have canvassed so far, 
conceptual involvement is not undermining expert practice. Judgements like 
“this needs more salt” do not interrupt our skilful activity, and it is difficult to 
see where a “transformation” of our perceptual field is happening in these cases. 
Positing a philosophically substantive shift in experience when conceptual 
involvement arises is simply the result of inaccurate phenomenology. We might 
say that conceptual involvement “supplements” expert practice, but this is too 
weak. The conceptual involvement in these examples is inextricable from the 
expert practice itself – as Schear says, the conceptual content here is not other 
than the activity.  
It is worth remembering here that Dreyfus thinks that non-conceptual 
unreflective skilful action is fundamental and pervasive in our everyday 
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engagement with the environment. One diagnosis might be that Dreyfus has an 
idealised conception of how human beings skilfully and unreflectively engage 
with their familiar environments. His account emphasises examples which 
demonstrate that such engagement works best when it is wholly unreflective. 
Carleton B. Christensen notes Dreyfus’s idealistic conception of the self-
sufficiency of our solely practical capacities: ‘a simplified culture in an earthly 
paradise is conceivable in which the members’ skill mesh with the world so well 
that one need never do anything deliberately or entertain explicit plans and 
goals’ (Christensen, 1997: 102; Dreyfus, 1991: 85). This is to point out that 
Dreyfus takes our unreflective, skilful engagement with the world to proceed in 
an overwhelmingly smooth and effortless manner. Christensen offers some 
basic, everyday examples of skilful engagement in order to call Dreyfus’s rose-
tinted characterisation into question: 
Such occurrences as a man stepping out in front of 
me as I ride my bike to the university are quite 
common. It is not as if they only come along every 
so often, jolting us out of absorbed coping […] 
Everyday, effortless, unthinking bike riding consists 
in dealing smoothly with things which are by their 
nature refractory to one degree or another: never 
perfect for the job, never just where they ought to be, 
always obdurate and above all capable of interacting 
with other things in unexpected but relevant ways. 
(Christensen, 1997: 102 – 103) 
Christensen’s point here is that minor difficulties and unexpected 
barriers are thrown up all the time in our skilful engagement with the world. 
Much of the time, though, we do not experience these things as interruptions or 
breakdowns, even when we have to briefly deliberate or think about our best 
course of action – in short, when conceptual involvement arises. We might 
think of walking through a busy street or town square – there might be instances 
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where the best route through the crowd is not clear. A companion might say 
something like “this way” in response to the situation. At no point here is our 
skilful engagement with the world interrupted. In his own contribution to the 
McDowell-Dreyfus debate, Robert Pippin draws attention to the way in which 
we ordinarily take our skilful engagement to involve some form of conceptual 
awareness. He emphasises that in skilful engagement, ‘I can be careless, sloppy 
lazy, or careful and extremely attentive. This is an indication of how an 
engagement is sustained and that is an indication of a structurally complex level 
of mindedness’ (Pippin, 2013: 95)25. This is an intuitive point; it is something 
we ordinarily express about skilful activity in the course of everyday life. We 
might think of telling somebody to “be careful” or to “pay attention” if they are 
acting or working in a careless manner. If we are not sufficiently focused when 
making our way through the busy market square, someone might tell us to 
watch where we are going. Christensen makes this point particularly shrewdly, 
remarking that ‘the law, if not Dreyfus, would not regard philosophical 
absentmindedness at the wheel as in any way exemplifying motoring expertise’ 
(Christensen, 1997: 103).  
What we get, then, is a picture of conceptual involvement where 
conceptual involvement is specific to the particular practical situation. Dreyfus 
does come close to conceding this point with reference to Heidegger’s 
conception of the unready-to-hand. This analysis, however, is riddled with 
confusion. Dreyfus takes a situation-specific judgement like “the hammer is too 
heavy” as an example of propositional content that is appropriate to a particular 
practical situation. Dreyfus still insists that this propositional content can only 
                                                          
25  As we will see, this point is also applicable to wholly unreflective action with no 
straightforward sense of conceptual involvement.  
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occur in the interruption of skilful engagement with the world: ‘in the face of a 
disturbance, a distance opens up between the coper and what he is acting on’ 
(Dreyfus, 2013: 19). However, he then says that this distance ‘is bridged by a 
situation-specific concept […] the coper can make the judgement that the 
hammer is too heavy’ (Dreyfus, 2013: 19). His admission that situation-specific 
conceptual involvement is possible may signal a concession that this does not 
necessarily entail detachment, the present-at-hand, or a subject-object model of 
human experience. The idea that the distance is “bridged” by a concept, 
Dreyfus notes, brings this ‘account of action into proximity to McDowell’s’ 
(Dreyfus, 2013: 19). Dreyfus is presumably happy to accept McDowell’s 
account of conceptual involvement in these cases.  
However, Dreyfus takes a situation-specific judgement like “the hammer 
is too heavy” to contrast with a non-situation specific judgement like “the 
hammer weighs five pounds” (Dreyfus, 2013: 32). As we would expect, Dreyfus 
categorises this latter judgement with the present-at-hand, insofar as it is 
conceptual content. However, he categorises situation-specific judgements with 
“motor intentional content” (Dreyfus, 2013: 32) 26 . It is unclear what the 
distinction between conceptual and motor intentional content amounts to in 
this case. Even if “motor intentional content” is supposed to signify situation-
specificity, the fact that this content is expressed, or at least expressible, in a 
linguistic judgement means that it is incontrovertibly conceptual content. Further, 
it is unclear how Dreyfus intends to sustain such a distinction. What stable 
metric could one establish for determining which judgements count as “motor 
                                                          
26 As I noted in Chapter One, my use of the term “motor intentional content” in this thesis as a 
whole is informed by Dreyfus’s use of it in (2007a). His usage of it here is very different, in line 
with his clarified view that unreflective experience cannot be characterised in terms of “content” 
at all, “motor intentional content” comes to be associated with the unready-to-hand.  
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intentional” and situation-specific, and which do not? For example, one could 
easily imagine a practical situation to which a judgement like “the hammer 
weighs five pounds” would be specific. Dreyfus should concede that conceptual 
involvement can simply be situation-specific27.  
To better understand Heidegger’s purposes, we should contextualise his 
discussion of the unready-to-hand. Heidegger’s analysis features in a section of 
Being and Time entitled “How the worldly character of the environment 
announces itself in entities within-the-world” (1962: 102). Heidegger means to 
demonstrate how the contextual structure of equipment, tasks, and existential 
concerns become explicit, or “thematic” to us. An example here is useful. 
Heidegger analyses a routine practical situation in which one finds a tool has 
gone missing: ‘our circumspection comes up against emptiness, and now sees 
for the first time what the missing article was ready-to-hand with, and what  it 
was ready-to-hand for’ (Heidegger, 1962: 105). It is through these situations that 
an environmental context we usually operate unreflectively within becomes “lit 
up” or “announces itself” (Heidegger, 1962: 105). At least one of the purposes 
of the unready-to-hand is to demonstrate how we come to have an explicit 
grasp of the contexts that we usually operate within in an unreflective manner. 
Heidegger’s conception of “interpretation” provides the underpinnings for this 
analysis. Further, pursuing Heidegger’s phenomenology here provides valuable 
evidence that conceptual involvement is not correlated with the present-at-hand.  
 
 
                                                          
27




2.4 Heidegger on Interpretation 
Leaving aside inconsistencies in Dreyfus’s analysis, the general picture 
that he attributes to Heidegger is one wherein conceptual involvement either 
interrupts or arises in the interruption of skilful engagement with the world. 
Conceptual involvement becomes correlated with the present-at-hand. In fact, 
Dreyfus misrepresents Heidegger’s view of conceptual involvement, and the 
kinds of practical situations in which conceptual involvement can arise. We 
should not attribute Heidegger a definite position on conceptual involvement 
on the basis of the narrow range of evidence we find in his discussion of the 
unready-to-hand. Heidegger’s discussion of conceptual involvement is more 
wide-ranging. In the main, his account of conceptual involvement accords with 
my overall argument in this chapter: that conceptual involvement does not 
imply detachment, is not incompatible with skilful engagement, and is in many 
cases essential to skilful engagement.  
We have seen that Heidegger’s conception of “understanding” is 
popularly taken to denote something like a non-conceptual “knowing-how” in 
relation to the range of practical situations that form our everyday lives. I have 
noted the textual evidence for this reading. Heidegger’s discussion of 
“understanding” is followed by a discussion of what he calls “interpretation”. 
Heidegger’s account of interpretation focuses on those cases in which we can 
no longer rely on our “know-how”, but where we require the involvement of 
concepts. We begin to “thematise” our experience. It is uncontentious to 
associate Heidegger’s conception of “interpretation” with “conceptualisation”. 
Heidegger makes clear that when we linguistically articulate our “interpretative” 
97 
 
experience – that is, in a proposition – the content of that proposition already 
‘lay before us as something expressible’ (Heidegger, 1962: 190). Heidegger 
compounds this point here: ‘the fact that when we look at something, the 
explicitness of assertion can be absent, does not justify our denying that there is 
any articulative interpretation in such mere seeing’ (Heidegger, 1962: 190). 
That the content of a perceptual experience is linguistically expressible means 
that it is conceptual.  
It is likely that Heidegger envisions his account of interpretation as 
underpinning his account of the unready-to-hand. Both accounts deal with 
conceptualising some aspect of a practical situation. Now, Dreyfus claims in his 
commentary that Heidegger does not discuss the “practical” use of linguistic 
propositions (Dreyfus’s example is “see you at six”). Dreyfus states that, for 
Heidegger, an “assertion” presupposes that there has been some sort of 
disturbance’ (Dreyfus, 1991: 208). This claim is inaccurate. In Heidegger’s 
discussion of interpretation, conceptualisation is not limited to equipmental or 
environmental breakdowns, as in his discussion of the unready-to-hand. 
Heidegger identifies certain common activities that he takes to involve 
interpretation: ‘preparing, putting to rights, repairing, improving, rounding-out’ 
(Heidegger, 1962: 189). Heidegger’s examples here are not as precise as we 
might like. However, he clearly has in mind activities that we would deem to be 
part of the fabric of everyday engagement with our environment. These are not 
cases where we have encountered a problem which jolts us out of our skilful 
engagement.  
Dreyfus’s interpretation of Heidegger emphasises only one particular 
type of assertion that Heidegger considers, a ‘theoretical assertion about 
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something present-at-hand’ (Heidegger, 1962: 201). It is reasonable to suppose 
that this type of assertion does entail detachment, given Heidegger’s clear 
assessment of the present-at-hand. However, Dreyfus ignores other types of 
assertions that Heidegger identifies: ‘assertions about the happenings in the 
environment, accounts of the ready-to-hand, “reports on the situation”, the 
recording and fixing the “facts of the case”, the description of a state of affairs, 
the narration of something that has befallen’ (Heidegger, 1962: 201). Perhaps 
“the description of a state of affairs” might be understood as a detached, 
theoretical judgement. However, Heidegger claims that ‘we cannot trace back 
these “sentences” to theoretical statements without essentially perverting their 
meaning’ (Heidegger, 1962: 201). Heidegger is arguing that we simply cannot 
understand the meaning of such assertions in the absence of a practical context 
where they have a function. Such assertions, for Heidegger, can articulate ‘the 
kind of interpretation which is still wholly wrapped up in concernful 
understanding’ (Heidegger, 1962: 201). Heidegger does not envision 
interpretation as representing the interruption of skilful engagement, and 
certainly does not envision it as entailing a detachment between a subject and 
an object. Schear concludes that ‘making a judgement or offering an assertion 
about something, Heidegger here insists, is a mode of concerned engagement 
with it, not a way of staring at it’ (Schear, 2008: 22).  
We may recall the testimony of the carpenter, cited by Rose. The 
carpenter’s awareness of the minor adjustments and demands that their work 
requires may plausibly entail “interpretation”, as Heidegger understands it. 
Harrison Hall is one commentator who tries to emphasise the role of 
conceptual involvement in Heidegger’s account of “circumspection”. Hall uses 
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the example of a carpenter working in an awkward space: ‘The carpenter looks 
to see that her nail is going in straight when the confined space in which she 
works alters the skilful movement with which she would routinely drive the nail’ 
(Hall, 1993: 128). Hall emphasises that such moments do not entail a shift to 
the present-at-hand, or a form of “detached” experience: ‘At no point in such 
circumspection is she just looking at the environment and noting disinterestedly 
the objective characteristics of the items perceived’ (Hall, 2003: 128). Indeed, 
one way to discount the correlation between conceptual involvement and the 
present-at-hand is to emphasise that conceptual involvement can still pertain to 
the ready-to-hand.  
Heidegger is clear that conceptual involvement can indeed pertain to the 
ready-to-hand. As such, there is no necessary connection between 
conceptualisation and the present-at-hand, for Heidegger. In cases of 
interpretation, for Heidegger, ‘the ready-to-hand comes explicitly into the sight 
which understands’ (Heidegger, 1962: 189). Now, nowhere in the McDowell-
Dreyfus debate does Dreyfus draw attention to the idea that the ready-to-hand 
can be “explicitly” perceived. Dreyfus argues that conceptualisation renders 
objects present-at-hand, focusing on Heidegger’s description of the unthematic 
nature of the ready-to-hand. However, there is clearly no sense here in which 
Heidegger conceives of the conceptualisation of the ready-to-hand as 
necessitating a transition to the present-at-hand. In making the ready-to-hand 
“explicit” through interpretation, there is no sense in which we experience a 
detached perspective on a meaningless environment. “Thematising” the ready-
to-hand, for Heidegger, involves ‘the circumspective question as to what this 
particular thing that is ready-to-hand may be’ (Heidegger, 1962: 189). This 
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question ‘receives the circumspectively interpretive answer that it is for such 
and such a purpose’ (1962: 189). The conceptualisation inherent in 
interpretation works precisely to capture the function of a particular object in 
the wider context of our skilful engagement with it. The explicitness of the 
ready-to-hand represents conceptual involvement without implying detachment, 
de-contextualisation, or theoretical description. It is clear that Dreyfus’s 
correlation of conceptual involvement and the present-at-hand is mistaken. As 
McManus puts it, we should resist the dominant temptation to ‘fixate on the 
“headline” and think that Heidegger believes that assertions as such reveal the 
Vorhanden [present-at-hand]’ (2014: 62).  
What, then, do we make of the connection that Heidegger explicitly 
makes between conceptual content and the present-at-hand? We saw Heidegger 
claim that linguistic judgement cuts off objects from the contextual significance 
in which we perceive and act upon them as ready-to-hand (1962: 201). Firstly, I 
think, we have to see that conceptual content certainly makes the present-at-
hand possible. Take the case of the unready-to-hand. Heidegger is reticent to say 
that an unready-to-hand object is devoid of readiness-to-hand. This is because he 
recognises that the object still belongs to a totality of involvements, and is still 
being conceptualised in relation to our skilful engagement. However, he also 
recognises that in certain situations we will reflect on the object’s material and 
causal properties – its presence-at-hand – and that this is not possible without 
conceptual content. In the same vein, Golob argues that Heidegger is indeed 
interested in the connection between judgements and the present-at-hand, but 
only because judgements can be subjected to a philosophical mode of analysis 
that does not focus on the judgement’s pragmatic role in engaged activity, but in 
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its logical form (2013: 53). Accordingly, Golob argues that Heidegger takes 
judgements to be correlated with the present-at-hand only when they are taken 
up by logical analysis. Such analysis would offer ‘an improved grasp of the 
inferential status of relations in general’, in contrast to ‘a particular set of relations, 
namely the social and instrumental context within which acts of assertion 
actually take place’ (Golob, 2014: 53)28.  
Heidegger appreciates the role that conceptual content and linguistic 
articulation play in our engagement with the world, but he is also aware, in 
much the same way as the later Wittgenstein, that philosophy has been guilty of 
subjecting such content to the kind of analysis that strips of it of this role. 
Dreyfus’s view on conceptual content comes down to an improper appreciation 
of what a philosophical focus on conceptual content entails. Dreyfus associates 
conceptual content with a Cartesian split between the mind and the world that 
McDowell himself is trying to overcome. In trying to overcome a Cartesian 
account of the mind, he attempts to purge any reference to mental and 
conceptual involvement, even involvement that clearly does not imply 
Cartesianism. To conclude the current line of reasoning, I want to briefly reflect 
on Schear’s diagnosis of the philosophical assumptions associated with linguistic 
judgement, and his recommendation that we rethink those assumptions: 
Our capacity for judgement, that is, must not be 
given away to the traditional modern construal of the 
subject as a being standing apart from the world. 
Judgement does not belong sealed up in a box with 
traditional epistemology, only then to be overcome, 
by the proper appreciation of Heidegger’s work […] 
After all the exercise of our capacity for judgement is 
our concerned engagement with entities at work, no 
                                                          
28 These relations are a central focus of Chapter Five.  
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less situated amid entities than our less cognitive 
skills (Schear, 2008: 37).  
 Here, I take Schear to be implicitly endorsing a particular philosophical 
approach to judgement that, again, we might associate most famously with 
analytic figures like J.L. Austin, Ryle, and the later Wittgenstein – an approach 
that assesses judgements in terms of their practical roles. I think his purpose is to 
remind those interested in Heidegger and existential phenomenology that such 
approaches do exist, and apply to the kind of conceptual content that the 
commentary on Heidegger has overwhelmingly associated with Cartesian 
epistemology. We need to acknowledge – as Heidegger in fact does – that 
conceptual content does not imply some picture of the relationship between the 
human being and the world that is anathema to an existential phenomenological 
project.  
 
 2.5 Further Implications 
 Acknowledging that our skilful engagement with the world can and 
routinely does involve conceptual content means that we ought to revisit the 
distinction Dreyfus makes between conceptual content and motor intentional 
content. Remember, this distinction is weighted so that motor intentional 
content is a necessary condition of conceptual content. That is, we must have a 
non-conceptual skilful grasp of our environment before a conceptual relation is 
possible. Dreyfus states that ‘the background condition of the possibility of 
making judgements that such and such is the case, then, must be already 
pervasively operative […] for Heidegger, what is required are non-conceptual 
coping skills that disclose a space in which things can then be encountered as 
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what and how they are’ (Dreyfus, 2013: 21). Even if we affirm that conceptual 
content is something that can arise in our skilful engagement with the world, we 
might still have to concede to Dreyfus that it is a philosophically secondary 
phenomenon.  
 In Chapter Five, I come to the problem of whether Heidegger’s 
“understanding” really is a non-conceptual form of intentionality. For now, I 
just want to briefly demonstrate how acknowledging the role of conceptual 
content in our skilful engagement with the world might begin to problematize 
Dreyfus’s claim that it is separable and derivative from motor intentional content. 
In Chapter One, we saw briefly that Dreyfus acknowledged that conceptual 
content could assist us in developing a skill or ability. Dreyfus says much the 
same thing here: ‘it might seem an argument for the pervasiveness of 
conceptuality that we often have to use concepts to find our way about in an 
unfamiliar situation’ (2013: 18). Dreyfus is drawing attention, again, to the role 
of conceptual content in acquiring and developing “know-how”. It seems, then, 
that he conceives of another role for conceptual content, besides breakdown cases. 
However, Dreyfus makes no distinction between the role of conceptual content 
in skill acquisition and the role of conceptual content in breakdown cases; they 
both represent the interruption of skilful engagement. At the very least, he sees 
no philosophically interesting distinction between them; he categorises 
“improving” and “coaching” with the “motor intentional content” of a 
judgement like “the hammer is too heavy” (Dreyfus, 2013: 32, box 1.2). Because 
he dedicates more space to the phenomenon of breakdown cases in the debate, I 
chose to focus the above discussion on that. I want to deal with Dreyfus’s 
account of skill acquisition properly in 3.3, where I can consider it within the 
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relevant philosophical literature. For now, we can accept his phenomenological 
claim that ‘our situation gradually comes to make sense to us in a non-
conceptual way as we learn our way around it […] once a skill is acquired, 
concepts used in learning the skill need play no further role’ (Dreyfus, 2013: 18). 
Now, Dreyfus clarifies that he does not think that conceptuality necessarily plays 
a role in skill acquisition – ‘our ability to act normally is usually picked up by 
imitating authorities without concepts playing any conscious role’ (2013: 18). 
However, this clarification is fatally underdeveloped.  
Take the two claims that Dreyfus makes about the relationship between 
conceptual involvement and motor intentionality. First, that conceptual 
involvement is only possible on the grounds of having a set of non-conceptual 
skills that constitute our familiarity with an environmental situation with 
something like a lecture hall. Second, that in at least some cases concepts play a 
role in developing our non-conceptual skilful grasp of a situation. Following my 
main discussion, we can also add that conceptual content can play a role in 
maintaining this grasp. Now, Dreyfus presumably holds that for those cases in 
which concepts do a play in role in the development of our skilful engagement, 
we would be able to identify a further set of non-conceptual skills which act as 
the enabling background for those concepts. However, it is a problem that his 
account does not demarcate sets of skills that would definitely not require 
conceptual involvement for their development, or types of skilful engagement 
that would definitely not require the involvement of conceptual content. To halt 
the regress, we would logically have to identify a set of skills that were acquired 
before conceptual involvement was possible – i.e. those acquired by prelinguistic 
infants. It is likely then, that a decisively non-conceptual background for 
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conceptual forms of perception and action could be the infant development of 
spatial perception and basic kinaesthetic ability. Indeed, Kelly notes that motor 
intentionality, for Merleau-Ponty, primarily refers to our ‘bodily, situational 
understanding of space and spatial features’ (2002: 377). It has been noted even 
by those with no phenomenological allegiance that the perception of space is a 
plausible candidate for non-conceptual content (see Allais, 2009).  
Perhaps, for argument’s sake, we could accept a general claim about the 
primacy of motor intentionality in the sense that our perceptual and active grasp 
of non-conceptual “space and spatial features” underpins our intentional 
relationship to the world, and never requires the involvement of conceptual 
content. This is a philosophically interesting claim, but it is some distance from 
Dreyfus’s claim that our skilful engagement with any given situation, such as a 
lecture hall, is fundamentally motor intentional. Unlike, say, the necessarily pre-
conceptual acquisition of spatial perception, Dreyfus cannot assure us that 
conceptual involvement was not present in acquiring our skilful familiarity with 
the lecture hall, and – based on what I have demonstrated in this section - cannot 
assure us that conceptual involvement plays no role in our ongoing skilful 
engagement with the lecture hall. It is unclear how Dreyfus can claim that the 
motor intentional aspects of our skilful engagement with the world always take 
explanatory priority over the conceptual aspects if he is not locating the 
acquisition of these motor intentional aspects in pre-linguistic infancy. I will 
build on this in Chapter Four, but at this stage it seems as though Dreyfus’s 
prioritisation of motor intentionality over conceptual content seems 
unsustainable if we are compelled to refer to both phenomena in our 




In this chapter I challenged Dreyfus’s claims that conceptual involvement 
interrupts, or arises in the interruption of, skilful engagement with one’s 
environment. When conceptual involvement arises, the human being’s relation 
to their environment becomes one of a disinterested subject detached from a 
world of material objects. Conceptual involvement is therefore incompatible 
with a practically engaged or absorbed perspective. Traditional “Cartesian” 
epistemology takes these instances of conceptual involvement as the default way 
in which human beings relate to their environment, and we accordingly become 
saddled with what Dreyfus calls a “mediational picture”. Dreyfus derives such a 
picture from an interpretation of Heidegger. I disputed both Dreyfus’s 
phenomenology of unreflective action and his interpretation of Heidegger. I 
argued that conceptual involvement – specifically, linguistic judgement - is 
compatible with skilful engagement and does not imply or entail a “subject-
object” model of experience. In fact, conceptual involvement is a frequently 
necessary component of our skilful engagement with the environment. This 
position correlates with Heidegger’s conception of “interpretation” in Being and 
Time. I further demonstrated how this line of thought problematizes Dreyfus’s 
claim that motor intentional content is a necessary condition of the involvement 
of conceptual content.  
However, my purpose has not been to argue that conceptual 
involvement is pervasive, or “always operative”, in unreflective perceptual 
experience and intentional action. That is, I considered the explicit involvement 
of conscious thought and judgement - which Dreyfus of course agrees to have 
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conceptual content 29 . This was the first step in breaking down Dreyfus’s 
assumptions about what conceptual involvement entails. I did not suggest how 
conceptual capacities can be “operative” in those forms of perceptual 
experience and action which do not involve conscious thought and judgement – 
that is, overtly unreflective action. The next two chapters do suggest how this 
can be the case. Excising the link between conceptual capacities and 
Cartesianism allows us to appraise how McDowell’s conceptualism can 
accommodate the unreflective, practically engaged experience that Dreyfus 
















                                                          
29 Although, as I noted, his view that “unready-to-hand” judgements have “motor-intentional” 
content complicates this. As I argued there, however, this specification, and accordingly 
Dreyfus’s revised use of “motor intentional content”, does not amount to anything.  
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3 Perception, Conceptualism, and Cartesianism 
 
3.1 Introduction 
We have seen that Dreyfus contends that an unreflectively acting agent’s 
perception should not be characterised as a conscious awareness of our 
environment – of the kind that could be articulated in an epistemic judgment. 
Dreyfus rejects the kind of conceptualist account of perceptual content that 
McDowell recommends; the mind, and specifically the operation of conceptual 
capacities, is not implicated in the kind of perception that pertains to unreflective 
action. Further, for Dreyfus, a non-conceptualist account of perceptual content 
avoids a Cartesian picture of the relationship between the human being and the 
world. This chapter assesses McDowell’s conceptualist account of perceptual 
content as it relates to his debate with Dreyfus. I demonstrate McDowell’s 
motivations for conceptualism, focusing on the requirement that our intentional 
responses to the perceived world, responses like epistemic judgements and 
actions, have a justificatory character. I go on to demonstrate how McDowell’s 
conceptualism is constitutively designed to avoid such a Cartesian picture, and 
argue accordingly that conceptualism does not distort the phenomenon of 
unreflective action.  
In 3.2 I introduce McDowell’s position in the context of a familiar 
critique of a Cartesian picture of the relationship between the human being and 
the world. McDowell’s philosophical project is in fact aimed at overcoming such 
a picture; he regards his conceptualism as an attempt to avoid what Dreyfus calls 
a “mediational picture”. Where Dreyfus attempts to undercut the mediational 
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picture with a non-conceptualist “contact theory”, McDowell affirms the role of 
conceptual capacities to avoid what Sellars calls “the myth of the given”, which 
entails the idea that we can get normatively shaped responses from non-
normative relations to non-conceptual stimuli. I detail this point in 3.3. In 3.4 I 
expound McDowell’s account of the particular way in which conceptual 
capacities are “operative” in perceptual experience. I do this by focusing on the 
components of McDowell’s account that relate to Dreyfus’s non-conceptualist 
objections and appeals to unreflective action. First, I emphasise McDowell’s 
description of the passive way in which concepts are drawn into operation. This 
gives us a sense of how conceptualism can still accommodate the unreflective 
character of the actions Dreyfus appeals to. In 3.5, I focus on McDowell’s 
account of the role of de re, or “object-dependent”, conceptual content. 
McDowell’s work here targets Cartesian assumptions about the mind’s relation 
to the world. This latter issue, I note, has a crucial relevance for the debate that I 
consolidate in the closing stages of Chapter Four. This chapter provides an 
account of how a conceptualist account of perception can avoid Dreyfus’s 
objections. Further, it provides a framework for understanding the practical 
significance of conceptual content.  
 
3.2 McDowell and the Cartesian Tradition 
For McDowell, holding that the content of perceptual experience is 
conceptual enables us to ‘credit the experience of rational subjects with the 
epistemological significance it intuitively has’ (McDowell, 2013: 41). McDowell 
is committed to the idea that human beings derive knowledge of the world 
through their experience of it, and that our empirical beliefs and judgements can 
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be justified by our experience of the world 30 . McDowell therefore remains 
committed to a form of empiricism. Dreyfus denies that the perceptual 
experience pertaining to unreflective action plays such an epistemological role. 
In many cases, the unreflectively acting agent may not be consciously aware of 
many features of their environment, even those features directly relevant to their 
current activity: ‘when we are ready to leave a familiar room we not only do not 
need to think that the door affords going out. We need not even respond to the 
door as affording going out. Indeed, we needn’t apprehend the door at all’ 
(Dreyfus, 2013: 18).  
Further, Dreyfus takes the epistemological motivation behind 
McDowell’s conceptualist account of perception to necessarily imply a picture 
wherein ‘we are never merged with the world […] We always stand over against 
it bringing our subjective perspective to bear on an independent objective reality’ 
(Dreyfus, 2013: 17). That is, a conceptualist account of perception commits 
McDowell to the mediational picture: ‘he still accepts the Cartesian separation 
between the world and the perceivers and agents to whom the world is given’ 
(Dreyfus, 2013: 17). Dreyfus takes McDowell’s conceptualism to be informed by 
Cartesian assumptions about the role of the mind. For Dreyfus, a Cartesian 
framework is present in any account of the relationship between the human 
being and the world that emphasises the role of conceptual capacities. Such an 
account, cannot, by definition, escape the mediational picture.  
                                                          
30
This commitment - which has something seemingly truistic about it – contrasts, for example, 
with an “inferentialism” argued for by McDowell’s colleague Robert Brandom, who argues that 
there is no need for a conception of experience which plays a transcendental role in justifying our 
beliefs (see Brandom, 1994). As I am going to discuss McDowell’s debt to Sellars, it is worth 
noting that McDowell and Brandom disagree over whether Sellars wants to retain a place for 
some form of empiricism in his philosophy after his comprehensive critique of its traditional 
assumptions (see McDowell, 2009c).   
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McDowell’s philosophical project, however, is constitutively aimed at 
avoiding the kind of Cartesian picture that Dreyfus thinks he is committed to. In 
Chapter One, I noted that both Dreyfus and McDowell want to vindicate some 
form of “common sense”, “natural”, or “default” picture of the human being’s 
relationship to the world that traditional philosophical frameworks struggle to 
provide. Further, McDowell recognises that affirming a role for conceptual 
capacities can indeed cause difficulties of a Cartesian sort. Dreyfus & Taylor’s 
diagnosis of the mediational picture clearly resembles McDowell’s own 
understanding of a Cartesian picture of the mind-world relation:  
 In a fully Cartesian picture, the inner life takes 
place in an autonomous realm, transparent to the 
introspective awareness of its subject; the access of 
subjectivity to the rest of the world becomes 
correspondingly problematic, in a way that has 
familiar manifestations in the mainstream of post-
Cartesian epistemology (McDowell, 2001: 236).  
McDowell takes the Cartesian distinction between a subject and object to 
entail ‘a self-contained subjective realm, in which things are as they are 
independently of external reality’ (McDowell, 1998: 241). McDowell argues that 
the right way forward is to dismantle such a Cartesian framework, and 
undermine the assumption of an autonomous inner realm. In papers that predate 
Mind and World, we can find him stating that his work seeks to ‘undermine 
pervasive and damaging prejudices in the philosophy of mind’ (McDowell, 1984: 
294). McDowell’s project, in an important respect, mirrors Dreyfus & Taylor’s 
phenomenologically informed goal of overcoming Cartesianism. It is important 
to note another crucial similarity. McDowell does not take his project to be 
narrowly epistemological – that is, he argues that the relevant question is not 
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simply ‘How is it possible for there to empirical knowledge?’ (1994: xiii). The 
philosophical difficulties are more basic than that approach allows: 
It is true that modern philosophy is pervaded by 
apparent problems about knowledge in particular. 
But I think it is helpful to see those apparent 
problems as more or less inept expressions of a 
deeper anxiety – an inchoately felt threat that a way 
of thinking we find ourselves falling into leaves 
minds simply out of touch with the rest of reality, 
not just questionably capable of getting to know 
about it. (McDowell, 1994: xiii)  
Dreyfus might be concerned that McDowell only wants to bypass 
Cartesian difficulties about knowing the world, and that there may still be a 
remnant of Cartesianism in the assumption that human beings are primarily 
knowers insofar as it implies some disengaged, neutral perspective that simply 
formulates judgements about an environment. However, McDowell is clear that 
is the human being’s very access or relation to external reality that is the issue.  
The concern, above, is that Cartesian philosophy of mind “leaves minds 
simply out of touch with the rest of reality”. This is a concern about our 
conception of intentionality, a concern about how our intentional content bears 
substantively on a world external to our minds. We can therefore contextualise 
McDowell’s talk of ‘our unproblematic openness to the world’ (McDowell, 1994: 
155), which we have seen Dreyfus quote approvingly (Dreyfus, 2005: 45). 
Maximilian DeGaynesford characterises McDowell’s project in terms of 
intentionality, asserting it to be ‘about whether our experience is even of the 
world, whether our thoughts are even directed onto the world, whether we even 
speak about the world’ (2004: 10). DeGaynesford argues that it is appropriate to 
characterise McDowell’s project as ‘fundamentally concerned with 
intentionality’, in that it is ‘about whether our experience is even of the world, 
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whether our thoughts are even directed on the world, whether we even speak 
about the world’ (2004: 10). Tim Thornton usefully links McDowell’s critique of 
Cartesianism to these concerns about intentionality here: 
McDowell aims to show how Cartesian scepticism 
is the result of a picture of the mind that separates 
mental states and the world. This division leads to a 
loss of the world rather than merely doubts about the 
possibility of knowledge of the world, because even 
when beliefs are true, on this picture, the mind never 
reaches as far as the world. (Thornton, 2004: 164) 
The Cartesian picture of internal mental states separated from the states 
of affairs they supposedly represent does not only cause problems for our 
conception of empirical knowledge, but for intentionality. Indeed, McDowell 
has said that his aim is to become ‘philosophically comfortable with 
intentionality’ (McDowell, 2009a: 3). That is, McDowell wants to overcome a 
Cartesian framework of the mind-world relation by making sense of intentional 
content.  
Importantly, McDowell is clear that a conceptualist account of 
intentional content can cause difficulties of a Cartesian shape. In Mind and World, 
McDowell uses Donald Davidson’s “coherentism” to represent the kinds of 
problems that arise from emphasising conceptual capacities. Elsewhere, 
Davidson speaks about the need to re-establish unmediated touch with the 
familiar object whose antics make our sentences and opinions true or false’ 
(Davidson, 1973: 198). This is a good description of the sort of picture of the 
relationship between the human being and the world that we want to secure. 
McDowell does note that such a concern should make the project of Mind and 
World ‘fully congenial to Davidson’ (1994: 138). However, in “A Coherentist 
Theory of Truth and Knowledge” (1986), Davidson argues that external states of 
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affairs play only a causal role in justifying our empirical beliefs. The key slogan 
here is that ‘nothing can count as holding a reason for a belief except another 
belief’ (Davidson, 1986: 310). External states of affairs (Davidson’s “familiar 
object”, for instance) do not play a role in our framework of beliefs. In Mind and 
World, McDowell expresses what such a position entails: ‘we risk losing our grip 
on how exercises of concepts can constitute warranted judgements about the 
world […] what we wanted to conceive as exercises of concepts threaten to 
degenerate into moves in a self-contained game’ (McDowell, 1994: 5). There is 
no justificatory relation between the external world, and our framework of beliefs. 
McDowell sometimes puts this in terms of a “constraint” – what we want is a 
picture of the external world constraining what we can believe about it, a picture 
of how our thought owes something to how the world really is. A coherentist 
picture is in some sense a specific version of a mediational picture. Such a 
picture ‘does not accommodate any external constraint on our activity in 
empirical thought and judgement’ (1994: 8). What we end up with is an 
autonomous space of beliefs that are only purportedly empirical.  
It is crucial to recognise that McDowell identifies an underlying dualism 
of normative phenomena and a modern conception of natural phenomena. 
According to scientific naturalism, natural phenomena can be exhaustively 
explained by the resources of science. In McDowell’s terms, natural phenomena 
belong the explanatory space of “the realm of law”. However, we cannot 
understand normative phenomena – such as conceptual thought – by placing it 
in this explanatory space. Conceptual thought is characterised by justificatory or 
inferential relations, rather than the causal relations of the realm of law. The 
explanatory “space of reasons”, therefore, ‘collects rational items together 
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(concepts, premises, conclusions etc.) with a layout appropriate to those items 
(inference, justification, etc.)’ (DeGaynesford, 2004: 23). McDowell recognises 
that the space of reasons and the realm of law are difficult to reconcile; that ‘the 
structure of the space of reasons stubbornly resists being appropriated within a 
naturalism that conceives nature as the realm of law’ (McDowell, 1994: 73). 
Beyond the sort of “detachment” entailed by a Cartesian “subject-object” model, 
there is a danger of conceiving of our conceptual capacities and their operation 
as ontologically distinct from the natural world.  
McDowell’s view is that our modern conception of the natural is far too 
narrow, and should be expanded to admit normative items. An important aspect 
of this move is conceiving of the operation of conceptual capacities – including 
their epistemic role - as a natural propensity of human beings. It is in this way 
that we can vindicate Aristotle’s conception of the human being as a rational 
animal. As DeGaynesford puts it, ‘it is gaining the correct stance on the natural 
order which assures of our openness to the world in experience […] conversely, 
all current illusions luring us away from openness ultimately resolve into a 
handful of views about the natural’ (2004: 45). While I do not agree that 
McDowell could put his project into “a handful of views about the natural”, it is 
true that a satisfactory picture of the relationship between the human being and 
the world shows us how to accommodate conceptual thought within the natural 
world, as well as showing us how conceptual thought is constrained by natural 
states of affairs. I will return to this particular dualism in 3.4, revisiting it 
intermittently.  
So, McDowell and Dreyfus share a concern that an emphasis on the role 
of conceptual capacities can imply a Cartesian picture of the relationship 
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between human being and the world. Dreyfus thinks that this implication is 
necessary – any account of intentionality that appeals to capacities belonging to 
the mind remains beholden to a Cartesian framework. As such, McDowell’s 
conceptualism is necessarily committed to a Cartesian or mediational picture. As 
we have seen, Dreyfus’s phenomenological non-conceptualism takes the route of 
bypassing or undercutting the idea of “mediation” by appealing to the idea that 
non-conceptual perceptual and bodily capacities are reliably and directly “keyed 
on” to our familiar environment. This entails a “contact” theory. The motor 
intentional content that pertains to unreflective action is directly in contact with 
the world, and is not susceptible to the difficulties encountered by conceptual 
forms of intentionality. For McDowell, however, this is an unacceptable route. 
McDowell argues that the satisfactory picture we want to secure will necessarily 
involve a role for conceptual capacities. Dreyfus’s appeal to something “non-
conceptual” in securing this relation is not fit for that purpose, because non-
conceptual content cannot secure the normative constraint that is required. 
McDowell’s view here is decisively shaped by Sellars’ critique of “the myth of 
the given”.  
 
3.3 The Perceptual “Given” 
Here, I outline a critique of any strategy which seeks to undercut the role 
of conceptual capacities by appealing to what I will refer to as a “perceptual 
given”. I do this in order to demonstrate why affording a role to conceptual 
capacities is crucial, and accordingly to highlight the central problem with 
Dreyfus’s appeal to motor intentional content. McDowell’s debt to Sellars is 
decisive here. In “Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind” (1956), Sellars states 
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that his goal is to dismantle ‘the framework in which traditional empiricism 
makes its characteristic claim that the perceptually given is the foundation of 
empirical knowledge’ (1963: 134). Understanding the problems with such a 
notion of the “perceptually given” allows us to understand why McDowell 
wants to affirm the role of conceptual capacities. This leads us to the 
conceptualism and naturalism that McDowell presents in Mind and World, which 
aims to leave behind both a Cartesian framework and the framework of 
traditional empiricism. 
What, then, is the ‘claim that the perceptually given is the foundation of 
empirical knowledge’? (Sellars, 1963: 134). The idea that empirical knowledge 
requires a foundation naturally follows from a consideration about the 
justification of empirical judgements, or beliefs. An empirical judgement can be 
related to another judgement. That is, one can justify a judgement through an 
inferential relation to another judgement. This latter judgement is justified in 
relation to another such judgement. Of course, the problem with this picture of 
justification is that we end up with a chain or network of judgements which ends 
up being either circular – a judgement is at some stage repeated – or infinite – 
there is always a judgement in need of further justification. The important thing 
here is that the justification for empirical judgements or beliefs operates in a 
seemingly autonomous sphere – we should recognise the mediational or 
Cartesian elements of this picture. From the perspective of traditional 
empiricism, it makes sense to halt the regress by appealing to a justificatory 
foundation for the whole framework of judgements. In doing so, we are able to 
demonstrate how the justification for our empirical beliefs is genuinely empirical, 
and not operating in a framework that never quite makes justificatory contact 
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with the external world. The idea is that there is some kind of empirical 
judgement or belief that is directly caused by a perceptual experience. Some 
aspect of the world is “given” to us through perception, without us needing to do 
any inferential work to justify our belief about it. There is no “mediational” 
element.  
The “perceptually given”, for Sellars, might be something like a basic 
visual experience of some basic physical property. Sellars remarks that the 
traditional empiricist regards ‘a sensation of a red triangle as the very paradigm 
of empirical knowledge’ (1963: 134). Russell’s conception of “knowledge by 
acquaintance” is a prime example of this empiricist line of thought.31 Russell 
states that knowledge by acquaintance entails being “directly aware” of 
something in a way that amounts to knowledge of that thing. Crucially, Russell 
claims, this awareness proceeds ‘without the intermediary of any process of 
inference or any knowledge of truths’ (Russell, 1997: 46). It might seem, 
therefore, that we can simply bypass the mediational problem by holding that we 
have at least some unmediated awareness of the external world. Knowledge by 
acquaintance entails being “directly aware” of some aspect of the world. Russell 
tends to emphasise our primary acquaintance with sense-data: ‘the first and most 
obvious example is sense-data [...] When I see a colour or hear a noise, I have 
direct acquaintance with the colour or the noise’ (Russell, 1951: 153). These 
basic sorts of unmediated acquaintances provide the justificatory foundation for 
our framework of empirical knowledge; Russell accordingly states that ‘all our 
knowledge, both knowledge of things and knowledge of truths, rests upon 
                                                          
31 I have chosen the example of Russell here because it has further relevance to my discussion of 
McDowell’s conceptualism in 3.5.  
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acquaintance as its foundation’ (Russell, 1997: 48). A picture of acquaintance is 
in line with a broadly Humean empiricist tradition. This line of thought may not 
escape from a Cartesian picture, in Dreyfus & Taylor’s view – our knowledge is 
still largely characterised in terms of goings on internal to the mind – but it does 
seem to secure what McDowell refers to as “external constraint”, our thought 
making direct contact with the external world. McDowell provides a clear 
articulation of this initial picture of the “perceptual given” and the 
epistemological advantages it entails: 
The idea is that when we have exhausted all the 
available moves within the space of concepts, all the 
available moves from one conceptually organised 
item to another, there is still one more step we can 
take: namely, pointing to something that is simply 
received in experience. (1994: 6) 
 Again, it should be emphasised that the traditional empiricist takes these 
basic perceptual experiences to be foundational in the sense that they do not 
depend on any pre-existing knowledge, or possession of concepts, or any sort of 
conceptual abilities. All that is required for this foundational knowledge are the 
sort of perceptual capacities that we share with animals (see Sellars, 1963: 131). 
McDowell therefore states that ‘in traditional empiricism, experience is taken to 
yield noninferential knowledge in a way that presupposes no knowledge of 
anything else’ (2009b: 222). Elsewhere, McDowell notes that ‘having something 
Given to one would be being given something for knowledge without needing to 
have capacities that would be necessary for one to be able to get to know it’ 
(McDowell, 2009c: 256). Here we have our first sense of how such an appeal to 
the perceptual given might be wrong-headed. McDowell adds: ‘And that is 
incoherent’ (McDowell, 2009c: 256). 
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 It is useful to have a final, particularly clear example of how this picture 
of empirical knowledge and the perceptual given hangs together. Robert 
Brandom’s exegetical work on Sellars provides a helpful description of how the 
appeal to the perceptual given bears out in the case of someone judging that 
there is a “STOP” sign in front of them: 
[...] it is because there is a red object with an 
octagonal facing surface in front of me that I find 
myself with a sensing of a red-and-octagonal sense 
content. It is because I have such a sense content 
that I acquire the non-inferential belief that there is 
a red and octagonal object in front of me. And it is 
because I have this belief, together perhaps, with 
other beliefs, that I am justified in the further 
inferential belief that there is a stop sign in front of 
me. (Brandom in Sellars, 1997: 127) 
 It is Sellars’ goal in “Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind” to 
demonstrate the fatal incoherence of such a picture. Sellars distinguishes 
between two kinds of capacity that must be in play in order to acquire empirical 
knowledge from perceptual experience. First, the perceiving subject must have 
what Brandom calls a “reliable differential responsive disposition”. In the case of 
perceiving a red object, one would have to possess the disposition, or capacity, to 
be responsive to the perception of a red object in a way that reliably differentiates the 
redness of the object from other colours. Traditional empiricism assumes that 
this capacity is a necessary and sufficient condition for empirical knowledge.  
Brandom states that ‘if we strip empiricism down to its core, we might identify it 
with the insight that knowledge of the empirical world depends essentially on the 
capacity of knowing organisms to respond differentially to distinct environing 
stimuli’ (2002: 524). Acknowledging this capacity seems to secure the idea that 
something perceptually given, like the redness of an object, can provide us with 
knowledge that doesn’t rely on an internal framework of justification. The 
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responsiveness, in this case, would be the eliciting of a linguistic response like 
“this is red-and-octagonal”, which would then serve as an externally derived 
premise that provides the justificatory grounds for our internal framework of 
knowledge along with other such premises.  
 However, Sellars’ overall point is that while the capacity to reliably 
respond to different stimuli is a necessary condition of empirical knowledge, it is 
not a sufficient one. The correlation between a linguistic response “this is red” 
and the state of affairs is not sufficient to attribute the responsive subject with 
knowledge. Firstly, the capacity to have one’s responses correlated or reliably 
causally associated with states of affairs is not distinctly human; a thermometer 
has the capacity to reliably discriminate between different temperatures (see 
Sellars, 1963: 167). Along precisely the same lines, Brandom remarks that ‘a 
parrot could be trained to respond to the visible presence of red things by 
uttering the noise “That’s red”’ (Brandom, 2002: 515). The capacity in question 
is specifically natural. It seems possible, on this line of thought, to conceive of 
knowledge in naturalistic terms, where knowing is simply a matter of something 
in the world having a causal impact on one’s sensory capacities. However, it 
only makes sense to attribute knowledge in cases where the subject can specify 
the relevant justification. The idea that the causal relation between some 
empirical state of affairs and our sensory capacities also entails a justificatory 
relation seems dubious. A parrot’s ability to reliably respond to red objects does 
not entail knowledge, because there is no question of the parrot’s being able to 
justify their response. Sellars regards the idea that attributions of knowledge can 
be reduced to physical facts as a ‘radical mistake – a mistake of a piece with the 
so called naturalistic fallacy in ethics’ (Sellars, 1963: 131). That a subject’s 
122 
 
response is reliably causally associated with a state of affairs does not mean it 
ought to be, or is justified in being.  
 This is why McDowell remarks that ‘the idea of the Given offers 
exculpations where we wanted justifications’ (1994: 8). In a satisfactory picture 
of the human relationship the world, the idea of having direct access to the 
world, or unproblematic openness to the world, comes with the caveat that we 
must also make sense of the idea that we are not simply beholden to causal 
impacts on our sensory capacities. McDowell puts this in terms of the difference 
between being “exempt from blame” and having some modicum of 
responsibility in accepting the world as our perceptual experience presents it to 
us. We are otherwise only open to the world in the same sense as animals. This 
is the basic problem with Dreyfus’s idea that non-conceptual, “motor 
intentional”, perceptual experience and action secures a kind of “contact” with 
the world. The concern is simply that such “contact” does not carry with it any 
sense in which our “reliable responses” to our environment – whether those 
responses are unreflective actions or epistemic judgements - entail anything that 
the perceiving and acting agent has any say in. Sellars’ critique of the given, and 
McDowell’s appropriation of that critique, pertain to intentional responses in 
general. I say much more about this point in Chapter Four, particularly as it 
relates to intentional action.  
 I want to consolidate Sellars’ critique with reference to one particular line 
of thought in his essay. Now, the traditional empiricist would prefer to construe 
the “perceptually given” in terms of something appearing, looking, or seeming to be 
green. The relevant sort of verbal response would be “x looks green”, rather than 
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“x is green”. The former construal is immune to the epistemic doubt of the latter, 
because while one can doubt that x is green, one cannot doubt that something 
looks green. Knowledge of how things look, then, is the prime candidate to act as 
the justificatory foundations for our framework of empirical knowledge. This is a 
mistake, for Sellars, and his analysis provides us with sufficient grounds for 
rejecting the idea that we can explain knowledge of the external world with 
reference to non-conceptual content. Sellars imagines a situation in which “John” 
works in a tie shop and routinely uses statements like “x is green” to describe the 
colour of ties (Sellars, 1963: 143). It is only after someone demonstrates to John 
that the specific lighting conditions in the store distort the appearances of colour 
that he learns to use statements of the form “x looks green”. For Sellars, “looks” 
claims are derivative of “is” claims because one only begins to utilise looks 
claims when one has acquired a reason to doubt their experience. Characterised 
in terms of doubt, such experiences cannot then serve as any sort of 
epistemological foundation. Sellars argues that “looks claims” entail a 
withdrawal of endorsement: the statement “X looks green to Jones” differs from 
“Jones sees that x is green” in that whereas the latter both ascribes a 
propositional claim to Jones’ experience and endorses it, the former ascribes the 
claim but does not endorse it (Sellars, 1963: 145) 32.  
 What I want to emphasise here is Sellars ascription of a propositional 
claim to a subject’s perceptual experience, which he clarifies here: 
For to say that a certain experience is a seeing that 
something is the case, is to do more than describe 
the experience. It is to characterize it as, so to speak, 
making an assertion or claim and – which the point 
I wish to stress – to endorse that claim’ (1967: 144) 
                                                          
32 He switches from the “John” of the story to a general perceiving subject “Jones”. 
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 Here Sellars is opposing a straightforwardly naturalistic construal of the 
role that perceptual experience plays in our acquisition of empirical knowledge. 
A necessary condition of our deriving knowledge from perceptual experience is 
that we endorse what perceptual experience presents us with (in the above quote, 
Sellars construes the idea that perceptual experience “presents us” with a state of 
affairs as the perceptual experience “making a claim” about that state of affairs). 
Again, the idea is that the perceptual given presents us with the basic premises 
that provide an external and foundational justification for our framework of 
empirical knowledge. In the case of those basic perceptual experiences that are 
supposed to serve as the foundation for empirical knowledge, crucially, we have 
to understand what it takes for the perceiving subject to be able to endorse what 
the experience presents them with. For Sellars, a response like “this is green” or 
“x is red” must not only be reliably correlated with green or red objects, but the 
reliability must ‘in some sense be recognized by the person’ (Sellars, 1963: 168). 
For traditional empiricism, ‘to know what it is for something to be green’, or to 
possess the concept “green” is just a matter of having one’s response “this is 
green”, reliably correlated with or caused by a perception of a green object. This 
is the epistemological picture of the given. Sellars responds: 
Not only must the conditions be of a sort that is 
appropriate for determining the colour of an object 
by looking, the subject must know that conditions of 
this sort are appropriate. And while this does not 
imply that one must have concepts before one has 
them, it does imply that one can have the concept of 
green only by having a whole battery of concepts of 
which it is one element. (Sellars, 1963: 147 – 148) 
 The supposedly foundational status of the perceptual given is scuppered 
by the necessary involvement of conceptual capacities. In order for any 
perceptual experience to result in knowledge, an existing conceptual framework 
125 
 
needs to be in place. Knowing something “by acquaintance” is only possible if 
one possesses the concepts to know that one’s acquaintance might appropriately 
be described as “knowing” in the first place. Sellars therefore provides a critique 
of the perceptual given that requires us to affirm a primary role for conceptual 
capacities. The natural capacity to be reliably responsive to different aspects of 
the perceived environment is a necessary, but not sufficient condition for 
knowledge. We also have to posit conceptual capacities. Natural and conceptual 
capacities are necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for knowledge. They are 
also necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for the kind of relationship to the 
world that human beings enjoy.  
 McDowell’s philosophical project is decisively influenced by Sellars’ 
critique of the given. In Mind and World, McDowell describes the 
epistemological appeal to the perceptual given as ‘the idea that the space of 
reasons, the space of justifications or warrants, extends more widely than the 
conceptual sphere’ (McDowell, 1994: 7). That is, our conceptual activity can 
take justificatory cues from something outside of the sphere of concepts. Sellars’ 
critique convinces McDowell that this cannot be the case. However, 
McDowell’s conceptualism is also driven by the essential limitation of Sellars’ 
position. By accepting a critique of the given, we arrive at a picture of 
intentionality that must afford a primary role to conceptual capacities. However, 
the familiar threat of a “mediational”, or “Cartesian” picture arises once more. 
That is, in McDowell’s terms, the threat that there is no external constraint on 
our framework of beliefs returns. The external world, conceived simply in terms 
of causal impacts on sensory capacities, plays no justificatory role in our 
conceptual thought.  
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 McDowell states that ‘it can seem that if we reject the Given, we merely 
reopen ourselves to the threat to which the idea of the Given is a response, the 
threat that our picture does not accommodate any external constraint on our 
activity in thought and judgement’ (McDowell, 1994: 9). The concern again 
arises that our conceptual thought is not ‘recognizable as bearing on reality at all’ 
(McDowell, 1994: 9). We once again become committed to a Cartesian 
separation between the contents of the mind, and the external world. We are 
then in danger of what McDowell calls an “interminable oscillation” between 
the mediational picture and the appeal to a perceptual given. When we realise 
the problems with conceptual capacities, ‘we come under pressure to recoil back 
into appealing to the Given, only to see all over again that it cannot help’ 
(McDowell, 1994: 9). McDowell’s project in Mind and World is to escape this 
“interminable oscillation”, or as he also remarks, ‘to find a way to dismount 
from the seesaw’ (McDowell, 1994: 9). He does this by clarifying the way in 
which concepts figure in perceptual experience in a way that doesn’t lapse into a 
Cartesian picture of the mind.33  
 
3.4 Passivity and Second Nature 
So far, we have seen that McDowell shares a concern with Dreyfus about 
the way in which the philosophical tradition has pictured the relationship 
between the human being and the world. Both Dreyfus and McDowell want to 
affirm a picture where the human being is in direct contact with the external 
world, or is “open” to the world in a substantive sense. Dreyfus claims that an 
                                                          
33 He also clarifies the way in which concepts figure in intentional action in the same way, but I 




appeal to conceptual capacities necessarily causes an unsatisfactory “mediational 
picture” that is underwritten by Cartesian assumptions about the mind and its 
contents. We have seen that McDowell acknowledges that Dreyfus’s concern is 
not unfounded. However, McDowell argues that we must appeal to conceptual 
capacities on pain of an epistemologically incoherent appeal to a perceptual 
given. We end up in a situation where one ends up rejecting one unsatisfying 
position, only to endorse the other – and this process repeats itself. McDowell 
attempts to resolve this “interminable oscillation” by making important 
clarifications about the role of conceptual capacities in perceptual experience. I 
want to start with a central aspect of McDowell’s conceptualism that is of clear 
and crucial relevance to his debate with Dreyfus. McDowell specifies that 
concepts are drawn “passively” into operation, and draws upon a Kantian 
epistemology to make this clear.  
In Mind and World, Kant’s account of the relationship between sensory 
capacities and conceptual capacities becomes decisive for McDowell. For Kant, 
we have to conceive of empirical knowledge as being constituted by a co-
operation of two faculties of the human mind. Human first have a faculty of 
“sensibility”, which is responsible for receiving sensory information, or intuitions. 
Kant describes this faculty in terms of its receptivity – it passively receives 
information through sensory capacities. Human beings also have a faculty of 
“understanding”, which is responsible for applying concepts to these intuitions. 
Kant describes this faculty in terms of its spontaneity – its active freedom to apply 
concepts (see Kant, 2007: 86). Kant states that ‘To neither of these powers may a 
preference be given over the other. Without sensibility no object would be given 
to us, without understanding no object would be thought’ (Kant, 2007: 86). Kant 
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concludes this passage with the famous slogan: ‘thoughts without intuitions are 
empty, intuitions without concepts are blind’ (Kant, 2007: 86). Kant therefore 
rejects the idea that a perceptual “given” – intuition – is a sufficient condition of 
empirical knowledge.  
This is a clear precursor to Sellars own critique of the given; Sellars in fact 
acknowledges the Kantian impulse in his thought, apparently claiming that we 
want to move philosophy from its Humean phase into its Kantian phase (Rorty 
in Sellars, 1997: 32)34. McDowell argues that the way in which to “dismount the 
seesaw” between givenness and coherentism is to remind ourselves of the 
‘original Kantian thought […] that empirical knowledge results from a co-
operation between receptivity and spontaneity’ (McDowell, 1994: 9). Crucially, 
McDowell specifies that we must affirm that ‘receptivity does not make an even 
notionally separable contribution to the co-operation’ (McDowell, 1994: 9). This 
results in the view that perceptual experience is never a matter of bare intuition, 
but conceptual in the first instance: ‘our perceptual relation to the world is 
conceptual all the way to the world’s impact on our receptive capacities’ 
(McDowell, 2007a: 338).   
In this way, McDowell recognises that it may sound “off-key” to ‘speak 
of exercising conceptual capacities at all’, because the term “exercising” suits ‘an 
activity, whereas experience is passive’ (McDowell, 1994: 10). His claim is 
therefore this:  
In experience one finds oneself saddled with content. 
One’s conceptual capacities have already been 
brought into play, in the content’s being available to 
one, before one has any choice in the matter. The 
content is not something one has put together 
                                                          
34 This is anecdotal, thus the citation of Rorty.  
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oneself, as when one decides what to say about 
something (McDowell, 1994: 10).  
Conceptual involvement is not some sort of afterthought that we bring to 
bear on non-conceptual perceptual experience. Although McDowell follows 
Sellars in thinking that a perceptual experience of some state of affairs has the 
same conceptual content as an explicit judgement about that state of affairs, 
conceptual capacities are not at work in the same way. In the case of an 
empirical judgement, ‘there would be a free responsible exercise of the 
conceptual capacities’, whereas in the perceptual case ‘they would be 
involuntarily drawn into operation under ostensible necessitation from an 
ostensibly seen object’ (McDowell, 1998b: 458). Experience is a matter of 
passively taking in some state of affairs. McDowell means to insist on the 
“minimal point” that ‘how one’s experience represents things to be is not under 
one’s control’ (McDowell, 1994: 11). There is, therefore, a sense of “givenness” 
in McDowell’s conceptualist account of perceptual experience. The perceptual 
experience of mature human beings just already is conceptual. McDowell 
therefore prioritises perceptual experience, and accords it the status of a 
“tribunal”, acting as an external constraint on our conceptual thought. In 
perceptual experience, McDowell states, what one takes in is ‘that things are thus 
and so’: ‘That things are thus and so is the content of the experience, and it can 
also be the content of a judgement [...] so it is conceptual content’ (McDowell, 
1994: 26). McDowell emphasises how this picture secures his “external 
constraint” on our empirical thought in a way that is justificatory rather than 
causal: ‘Experience enables the layout of reality itself to exert a rational influence 
on what a subject thinks’ (McDowell, 1994: 26). This involves McDowell’s 
conception of second nature.  
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A satisfactory picture of the relationship between the human being and 
the external world shows us how to accommodate conceptual thought within the 
natural world, and vice versa. Otherwise, we are still committed to some 
Cartesian view in which our conceptual capacities and the thought they enable 
stand in a dualistic opposition to the natural world, understood in the scientific 
terms of perceptual experience, ‘what one takes in is that things are thus and so’ 
(McDowell, 1994: 26). That is, one perceives a state of affairs in the world that is 
expressible in propositions: ‘That things are thus and so is the content of the 
experience, and it can also the content of a judgement [...] So it is conceptual 
content’ (McDowell, 1994: 26). This means that there is no difference, for 
McDowell, between ‘the sort of thing one can think, and the sort of thing that 
can be the case’ (McDowell, 1994: 27). McDowell takes this to be a truism, 
something that ‘cannot embody something metaphysically contentious, like 
slighting the independence of reality’ (McDowell, 1994: 27). McDowell argues 
that we should not conceive the natural world in terms of the realm of law, 
understood in scientifically naturalistic terms.  
What is natural, for McDowell, is not exhausted by scientific conclusions: 
‘if we identify nature with what natural science aims to make comprehensible, 
we threaten, at least, to empty it of meaning’ (McDowell, 1994: 70 – 71). For 
McDowell, the natural world as it impinges on our sensory capacities has the 
kind of structure apt for conceptualisation – in this way, it makes perfect sense to 
hold that our perceptual experience is always already conceptual, insofar as it 
will always have the sort of structure that finds expression in language. This 
becomes more plausible as McDowell comes to clarify what he takes “conceptual” 
to entail. Thornton rightly sees McDowell identifying the content of experience 
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in perception with ‘the same sort of items that constitute the layout of reality’ 
(2004: 217). This insight is one that Dreyfus doesn’t think bears out 
phenomenologically. For McDowell, however, concepts do not figure as 
“mediating entities” at all in McDowell’s picture – acquiring a concept is simply 
acquiring the ability to judge how the world appeared in perceptual experience 
all along. Indeed, coming to be able to recognise the “layout of reality”, that 
things are thus and so, depends on the acquisition of the relevant concepts, which 
we acquire as we are socialised into a linguistic community. This is to be 
inculcated into the space of reasons.  
As we have seen, the space of reasons – the space of concepts, inferential 
relations, justifications, judgements, knowledge, and so on – seems to have a 
certain autonomy from the natural world conceived as the realm of law 
(scientific naturalism). Our natural, “animal” being seems disconnected from 
those aspects of our being that belong to the space of reasons. McDowell appeals 
to an Aristotelian notion of “second nature” to offset this idea (McDowell, 1994: 
84). The idea is that our inculcation into the space of reasons – our acquisition of 
a language – is part of a human being’s nature. The basic idea here is that 
conceptual capacities are natural capacities, they are not something “alien” to the 
natural world. If we conceive of our conceptual capacities as a natural propensity, 
these capacities already give us a “foothold” in the realm of law (McDowell, 
1994: 85). McDowell says that by conceiving of our conceptual capacities in this 
way, ‘we can say that the way our lives are shaped by reason is natural, even 
while we deny that the structure of the space of reasons can be reintegrated into 
the layout of the realm of law’ (1994: 88). Now, it is important to see that 
McDowell wants a unified, rather than dualistic, conception of the human 
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being’s relationship to the world – I have provided a brief sketch of the way in 
which he approaches this from a naturalistic point of view here. The importance 
of such a unified picture is thrown into sharper relief when we contrast it to 
Dreyfus’s own account of perceptual experience, and crucially when we compare 
the accounts each philosopher gives of human action. It can seem that Dreyfus’s 
insistence on the non-conceptual nature of our perceptual experience and action 
returns us to the dualistic separation of conceptual and natural capacities. I will 
emphasise this point further in Chapter Four.  
Now, Dreyfus’s critique of McDowell’s conceptualism partly turns on the 
idea that conceptualism is not a good fit for the sort of perceptual experience 
involved in unreflective action, because there is no kind of thought process that 
could entail conceptual capacities. However, we can see here that it is important 
to McDowell that concepts are not only operative at the level of a thought 
process, but also in the sort of passive experience that might belong to 
unreflective action. McDowell makes this point in the debate a number of times. 
Here is a typical passage: 
Dreyfus thinks the very idea of conceptual capacities, 
as I exploit in this claim brings into my picture of 
experience a detached self, standing over against and 
contemplatively oriented towards an independent 
reality. But this has no basis in the way the idea of 
conceptual capacities figures in my picture. 
(McDowell, 2013: 41).  
 We saw in Chapter Two that Dreyfus is wrong to take conceptual 
involvement to necessarily entail a Cartesian detachment between the human 
being and the world. There, I explored conceptual involvement at the explicit 
level, where conceptual content arose in linguistic judgements or conscious 
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thought. Of course, McDowell agrees with Dreyfus that one does not actively 
consider the conceptual content inherent in one’s perceptual experience. Even in 
a distinctly unreflective experience, McDowell claims, one is put into a position 
to be able to judge that things are as one’s perceptual experience presents them to 
be. For McDowell, this requires that the perceptual experience is conceptual. 
This turns on the idea that articulating one’s perceptual experience does not 
entail a qualitative handover of intentional content. McDowell states that ‘If a 
perceptual experience is world-disclosing […] any aspect of its content is present 
in a form in which it is suitable to constitute the content of a conceptual capacity’ 
(McDowell, 2007a: 346). This amounts, for McDowell, to the Gadamerian 
thought that ‘if a distinctively human relation to the world is in the space of 
linguistically expressible thought, it is pervasively conceptual’ (McDowell, 2007a: 
346).  
Of course, this jars with Dreyfus’s conception of motor intentional 
content; Dreyfus claims that practically engaged perceptual experience is 
characterised by what I have called “affective content”, which does not have any 
sort of conceptualizable form (Dreyfus, 2007a: 360). Of course, affective content 
is particularly phenomenologically distinctive; Dreyfus describes it in terms of 
“attractions and repulsions”, “lines of force”, and so on. I treat this distinctive 
content from a conceptualist perspective in Chapter Four. What I want to dwell 
on here is Dreyfus’s denial that our perceptual experience has any sort of content 
in which the ordinary environmental objects that we are dealing with figure (see 
Dreyfus, 2013: 18). Crucially, Dreyfus does not think that practically engaged 
perceptual experience is characterised by any sort of awareness of our 
environment, and certainly no awareness that could be construed in terms of 
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perceiving environmental objects; he draws on Heidegger’s description of an 
affording object “withdrawing” from our attention (Dreyfus, 2013: 18; 
Heidegger, 1962: 99). Dreyfus states that the phenomenology shows that ‘the 
world we are drawn into when we are absorbed in coping does not stand over 
against us as a set of facts that can be captured in propositions but rather is 
directly lived by the absorbed coper as a shifting field of attractions and repulsions’ 
(Dreyfus, 2013: 17 - 18). Again, I want to appraise the idea of perceptual content 
as “attractions and repulsions” separately, and assess the idea that unreflective 
perceptual experience is a mode where the agent is not consciously aware of, or 
“taking in” features of the environment.  
I first want to point out that McDowell’s conceptualist account of 
perception, broadly conceived, is not an unorthodox position in contemporary 
philosophy. Even in “Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind”, Sellars seems to 
endorse what looks to be a full-blooded conceptualism about perceptual 
experience, insofar as perceiving some state of affairs is a matter of 
conceptualisation. Sellars view is that is that perception entails intentional states 
that resemble empirical claims. Further, Sellars argues that an epistemological 
critique of the perceptual given forces us to ‘recognise that instead of coming to 
have a concept of something because we have noticed that sort of thing, to have 
the ability to notice a sort of thing is already to have the concept of that sort of 
thing, and cannot account for it’ (Sellars, 1963: 176). The way in which Sellars 
describes the “ability to notice a sort of thing” implies concepts are not only 
involved in our ability to derive knowledge from experience, but involved in any 
perceptual experience that could give rise to knowledge. In this way, Brandom 
takes Sellars to be arguing that ‘all awareness is a conceptual affair’ (2002: 539). 
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McDowell similarly claims that when Sellars talks about states of knowing, or 
epistemic states, this simply means “concept-involving” perceptual experiences 
(McDowell, 2009a: 8). Indeed, McDowell comes to see that Sellars’ conception 
of experiences as “containing claims” is very much like the one he proposes in 
Mind and World, where he unfortunately does not recognise the likeness to Sellars’ 
position (McDowell, 2001: 179).  
However, we don’t necessarily need to take an epistemological route to a 
conceptualist conclusion. Alex Byrne remarks that it isn’t unreasonable to think 
that ‘conceptualism should be the default position’ (Byrne, 2010: 245). Byrne 
notes that it is intuitive to think that ‘perceiving is very much like a traditional 
propositional attitude, such as believing or intending’ (Byrne, 2010: 245). In my 
introduction, I drew attention to the idea that perceiving might be construed as 
an intentional state, and as such has propositional content composed of Fregean 
senses35. All Byrne is emphasising here is that perception is always of something, 
always about or directed toward something, and as such has intentionality. Just as 
we believe, or know, or think that “the tree is green”, we perceive that “the tree is 
green”. On a reasonable understanding of what perceiving entails, then, it seems 
natural to attribute conceptual content to it. However, I noted Brandom’s 
remark that awareness is a conceptual affair, and Dreyfus denies that practically 
engaged perceptual experience is a matter of awareness.  
Referring to Dreyfus’s emphasis on Heidegger’s description of objects 
“withdrawing”, Doyon notes that the implication here is that Heidegger thinks 
that ‘familiar objects do not appear at all in everyday background coping’ (Doyon, 
                                                          
35 I should note here that I am only expressing the philosophically orthodox characteristics of an 
intentional state – Dreyfus’s non-conceptual, non-propositional conception of an intentional 
state is not a standard way to understand intentionality.  
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2015: 123)36. Even in phenomenological terms, this claim seems implausible. 
Specifying that perceptual experience can be unreflective does not entail that we 
only experience those affective “forces” that Dreyfus describes. In Chapter Two, 
I discussed Dreyfus’s phenomenology of breakdown cases, where the agent’s 
unreflective action is interrupted. In Dreyfus’s view, this entails that there is a 
qualitative shift in the intentional content of one’s perceptual experience. I said 
that it was difficult to see where such a qualitative shift from non-conceptual 
“unawareness” to conceptual awareness was As Siegel notes, if this were actually 
the case, then ‘our conscious lives would be interrupted with waking but blank 
durations, like seizures sprinkled throughout the day, triggered by habitual 
actions like putting away a tennis racket, filling up one’s tea kettle, or opening 
the mailbox’ (Siegel, 2014: 60).  
In my view, it is actually difficult to distinguish those experiences in 
which Dreyfus argues that objects simply don’t feature on any conscious level, 
from those experiences where they manifestly do. Siegel also articulates 
something like this concern here: ‘It’s a familiar occurrence that we complete a 
habitual action, realize afterward we were paying little attention to what we were 
doing, and yet can still remember how other parts of the scene looked as we were 
completing it’ (Siegel, 2014: 60). My point is that remembering how the scene 
looked reveals no difference in how it looked in the course of unreflective 
experience. It is difficult to establish a set of criteria telling us exactly where the 
qualitative shift from non-conceptual, non-representational content to conceptual 
representational content takes place. Relatedly, it is difficult to establish how 
                                                          
36 In Chapter Five, I argue that this is not Heidegger’s view, and that Heidegger’s position can 
reasonably described as a conceptualist. 
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bringing a conceptual capacity to bear on some feature of a previously 
unreflective experience changes how it figured for us in that experience.  
This, in fact, is the point of McDowell’s claim that ‘features of the 
environment are perceptually present to us in a way that provides us with 
opportunities for knowledge’ (McDowell, 2013: 42). Conceptual capacities are 
able to capture the content of our perception without distorting the distinctive 
character of our experience, even our unreflective ones. This point becomes 
crucial to my argument in the closing stages of Chapter Four, where I consider 
the distinctive character of motor intentional content. To prepare the ground for 
that argument, it is necessary to appraise McDowell’s clarified notion of 
conceptual content.    
 
 3.5 De Re Conceptual Content 
Dreyfus argues that McDowell cannot overcome traditional 
philosophical conceptions of intentionality simply by clarifying the role of 
conceptuality; ‘one can stipulatively redefine the traditional mentalistic terms 
any way one pleases but one can’t at the same time claim one is overcoming 
traditional philosophy’ (Dreyfus, 2007b: 376). Dreyfus has no grounds for this 
rebuke. Even if Dreyfus’s phenomenological objections to McDowell’s form of 
conceptualism hold, McDowell would still in principle be able to claim a 
significant step beyond “traditional” ways of conceiving the involvement of 
concepts. We have already seen that McDowell specifies the “passivity” of the 
way in which concepts are drawn into operation in perceptual experience. It is 
crucial to secure McDowell’s notion of perceptual demonstrative thought, and 
the concomitant notion of object-dependent, or de re, conceptual content. 
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In the closing stages of Chapter Four, I utilise McDowell’s refined 
conception of what it means for some content to be conceptual in order to offer a 
resolution to the McDowell-Dreyfus debate. Essentially, McDowell takes issue 
with the idea that something counts as “conceptual” only if pertains to a 
linguistically codified definite description. McDowell’s objection to this idea is 
in play in Mind and World and the McDowell-Dreyfus debate, but his substantive 
arguments and their implications are drawn out properly in papers preceding 
Mind and World. McDowell states that he wants to ‘undermine pervasive and 
damaging prejudices in the philosophy of mind’ (McDowell, 1984: 294). This 
amounts to undermining a Cartesian conception of the way in which concepts 
“mediate” between the mind and the external world. Grasping McDowell’s 
point here provides us with a way of avoiding a Cartesian picture without having 
to appeal to a non-conceptual “given”.   
 Focusing on the “object-dependence” of a singular demonstrative thought 
complements McDowell’s project of showing how worldly states of affairs 
“constrain” our conceptual thought, and works to undermine a mediational 
picture of the relationship between the human being and the external world. 
Russell’s contrast between knowledge by description and knowledge by 
acquaintance becomes relevant here. Knowledge by description corresponds to 
conceptual content which is not dependent on the presence or existence of some 
state of affairs. “Conceptual content” on a Russellian view entails a definite 
description which specifies the application of a concept to an object: ‘whenever a 
thought is directed at a particular object, part of its content is given by a 
specification of the object in general terms: conceptual terms […]’ (McDowell, 
1994: 105). For example, the concept “table” would entail a general description 
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of a set of properties which are necessary and jointly sufficient for a particular 
object to be the subject of a proposition or thought which has the concept as a 
constituent. This requires that conceptual content is understood as wholly 
“predicative”, as McDowell puts it, or linguistically codifiable. Frege puts this 
requirement as the idea that ‘the complete expression of the thought’ entails only 
‘the mere wording, as it can be preserved in writing’ (Frege, 1978: 10; cited in 
McDowell, 1998a: 216) McDowell. Fregean senses, understood as concepts 
pertaining to a referent, or object, are associated with this descriptive and 
linguistic model of conceptual content. However, one can grasp the conceptual 
content of a proposition or thought without it being related to a particular object. 
Russell therefore conceives of conceptual content – of knowledge by description, 
or Fregean senses – as object-independent37. McDowell describes this picture in 
“De Re Senses” (1984) as follows:  
‘[…] it is commonly believed that a Fregean 
philosophy of language and thought can represent an 
utterance, or a propositional attitude, as being about 
an object only by crediting it with a content that 
determines the object by specification, or at least in 
such a way that the content is available to be thought 
or expressed whether the object exists or not’ 
(McDowell, 1998a: 214). 
Here, McDowell emphasises that possessing some conceptual content 
does not necessarily relate one to some state of affairs in the external world. 
McDowell sees in this understanding of conceptual content the threat of a 
mediational picture, the idea of an autonomous Cartesian realm of thoughts.  
                                                          
37 I am of course omitting a full account of Russell’s theory of descriptions, which entails the idea 
that (most) singular propositions do not actually refer, but are existentially quantified definite 
descriptions. This solves the problem of how singular propositions that have no referent are 
meaningful. See Russell’s “On Denoting” (1905).  
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 Knowledge by acquaintance, in contrast, corresponds to propositions 
which do pick out some specific state of affairs in the world, in such a way that 
makes them dependent on that state of affairs. Russell argues that the only such 
propositions are demonstratives of the form “this x” or “that x”. Further, the only 
kind of demonstratives that Russell thinks are genuinely object dependent – that 
is, entail acquaintance with a particular object – are those that refer to some 
sense datum1. As Thornton puts it, ‘in singular thought the mind makes contact 
with the world without a description. Instead, the object itself, singled out in this 
case through perception, plays the role of fixing the subject matter of the thought’ 
(Thornton, 2004: 142 – 143). One way of putting this is that singular thoughts 
cannot simply belong to an autonomous, interior mental space consistent with a 
Cartesian picture. That these demonstratives are meaningful guarantees contact 
with the world. Gareth Evans defines a “Russellian” singular thought as ‘of such 
a kind that it simply could not exist in the absence of the object or objects which 
it is about’ (Evans, 1981: 71). We can see that there are resources here for a 
generalisable way of avoiding a Cartesian picture of the conceptual realm, where 
the descriptions entailed by conceptual content can, in McDowell’s terms, 
degenerate into a ‘frictionless spinning in a void’, where the lack of friction 
describes the lack of a justificatory relation to, or justificatory dependence on, 
some state of affairs in the world (McDowell, 1994: 66).  
 In McDowell’s view, the right way to develop this line of thought about 
object-dependence is to first of all lift Russell’s restriction of acquaintance to 
include ordinary objects, rather than just sense-data: ‘we can extract the notion of 
acquaintance from that epistemological framework, and apply it to at least some 
perceptual relations between minds and ordinary objects’ (1998b: 231). Russell 
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places such a restriction on epistemic acquaintance in order to avoid the 
possibility of being acquainted with an object that was in fact illusory. Russell 
does not think that acquaintance with sense-data suffers from this sceptical 
problem (see Sellars’ discussion of “looks”, above). McDowell argues that we 
should not expect our capacity for perceptual knowledge to be absolutely 
infallible, and we should not allow the possibility of fallibility to force us to 
disregard the “epistemic status” of our ordinary perceptual experience 
(McDowell, 1998b: 231)38.  
Secondly, McDowell needs to deal with the possible objection that an 
appeal to Russellian singular propositions is simply an appeal to a perceptual 
given. On the face of it, this seems straightforward to deal with – we simply have 
to say that singular demonstrative thoughts draw on our conceptual capacities. 
However, a concern then arises that the conceptual content is then independent 
of the object in a way that returns us a Cartesian framework. Take what 
McDowell says in Mind and World:  
A perceptual demonstrative thought surely homes in 
on its object not by containing a general 
specification, with the object figuring in the thought 
as what fits the specification, but by virtue of the 
way this sort of thinking exploits the perceptible 
presence of the object itself (1994: 105).  
It is difficult to see how this could be the case. The specification entailed 
by the conceptual content is not dependent on the perceptible presence of the 
object, as Martin points out here: ‘the very same demonstrative thought or 
utterance could have occurred on an occasion on which there was no appropriate 
                                                          
38 I should note here that I am not going to focus on epistemological scepticism, as nothing in the 
McDowell-Dreyfus debate turns on it – appeals to radical scepticism are not part of Dreyfus’s 
objections to McDowell’s conceptualism. All that matters here is that McDowell can 
demonstrate that conceptual capacities do not necessarily imply Cartesianism.  
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object to be thought about’ (Martin, 2002: 195). It also looks as though there 
could be two visually distinct perceptual experiences that have the same 
conceptual content. The necessary relation to an individual object seems to be 
lost, and we no longer have a convincing conception of object-dependent 
conceptual thought.  
There is a way out of this impasse. By focusing on thoughts and 
propositions, it may seem as though McDowell has lost sight of perceptual 
experience, and how conceptual capacities are in operation there. However, 
McDowell’s discussion is still focused on how the content of perceptual 
experience is of a conceptual form prior to reflective thought and the articulation 
of experience into propositions. This feeds into McDowell’s answer to the 
problem of how singular demonstrative thoughts can be genuinely object-
dependent and yet still be conceptual. The sort of perceptual experience of the 
world that human beings have contains content that is expressible, whether 
expressed or not – it is conceptual content. Take a case in which one’s experience 
of an individual object in a particular environmental context is expressible in a 
demonstrative - “that hammer”. The demonstrative locates the object in the 
particular spatio-temporal environmental context that one experiences it as being 
in. McDowell describes the way in which demonstrative identification of an 
object ‘depends on the subject’s locating the object; location matters because 
where the object is, at a particular time, is fundamental to its being the particular 
object (of its kind) that it is’ (McDowell, 1990: 155).  
Now, the concept “hammer” is a constituent of the demonstrative. 
“Hammer” is not object-dependent because its content does not depend on the 
“perceptible presence” of the object. However, the particular environmental context 
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that individuates the instance of the hammer is also a constituent of the 
demonstrative, necessarily expressed in the very form of the proposition “that x”. 
This makes the demonstrative genuinely object-dependent, because the “that” 
only has content in the context of our demonstratively pointing out an object. 
We might think that the contextual component of the demonstrative is non-
conceptual. On this account, the content of our perceptual experience ‘cannot be 
fully captured by inner representations because [it depends] on non-descriptive 
contextual links to worldly objects’ (Thornton, 2004: 150). Of course, it looks as 
though we are allowing a perceptual “given”, in the form of the contextual link 
to the object, to determine our empirical thinking. However, the idea that we 
have a genuinely conceptual grasp of such a context - our particular perspective 
on the object, the object’s particular spatial location, the object’s particular 
temporal location – is the problem. It might seem that this requires us to possess 
a concept or set of concepts that entail a Russellian definite description. Such a 
description would have to account for the particularity of every specific context 
we could possibly experience, which is of course an unacceptable conclusion.  
This problem directly relates to a compelling objection to McDowell’s 
conceptualism. As above, the objection is that McDowell’s conceptualism 
implies that we must have a conceptual repertoire equal to the visual complexity 
of our perceptual experience, including perspectival properties 39 . A common 
example here is our perceptual experience of colour. One reason for thinking that 
perceptual experience cannot be wholly conceptual is that our experience of 
colour isn’t exhausted by the relatively narrow range of colour concepts one like 
                                                          
39 I stay with the perceptual modality of vision for simplicity – the same considerations apply to 
hearing, taste, and so on.  
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is likely to have. A representative of this objection may be found in the work of 
Gareth Evans40:  
One consideration that impresses Evans is the 
determinacy of detail that the content of experience 
can have. He claims that this detail cannot all be 
captured by concepts at the subject’s disposal. “Do we 
really understand the proposal that we have as many 
colour concepts as there are shades of colour that we 
can sensibly discriminate?”(McDowell, 1994: 56; 
Evans, 1982: 229).  
For McDowell, this line of thought stems from a wrongheaded view of 
how perceptual experience is conceptual, and more generally what it means for 
something to count as “conceptual”. McDowell here is pushing back here against 
the view that something can only be conceptual if it entails a general 
specification, a definite description. He starts by asking why we should accept 
‘that a person’s ability to embrace colour within her conceptual thinking is 
restricted to concepts expressible by words like “red” or “green” and phrases like 
“burnt sienna”?’ (McDowell, 1994: 56). We could say precisely the same thing 
about the sorts of environmental contexts that one perceptually experiences 
particular objects as belonging to. McDowell notes that ‘it is assumed in advance 
that the role of intuition in their constitution prevents us from counting these 
capacities as (purely) conceptual’ (McDowell, 1994: 59). This is important – 
Dreyfus’s notion of “motor intentional content”, which he holds to be non-
conceptual, might be understood in terms of the “intuition” that McDowell is 
discussing here.  
                                                          
40 It is important to note that McDowell’s response to Evans here is actually made possible by 
Evans’s work on Fregean senses. I have largely omitted talking about senses in favour of simply 
talking about conceptual content. However, McDowell formulates this line of thought in 
reference to Evans’s view that Fregean senses are not limited to Russellian definite descriptions 
(see Evans, 1982; McDowell, 1986). On the subject of non-conceptual content, McDowell takes 
Evans to have simply taken a wrong turn on an otherwise correct route. Indeed, McDowell says 
in Mind and World that ‘It is easy to recast Evans’s main contentions, even about perceptual 
demonstrative thought, without mentioning non-conceptual content’ (1994: 106). 
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Now, there is no doubt that we do perceptually experience specific shades 
of colour and objects in specific environmental contexts, and that we can refer to 
these through demonstratives. McDowell states that ‘one can give linguistic 
expression to a concept that is exactly as fine-grained as the experience, by 
uttering a phrase like “that shade”, in which the demonstrative exploits the 
presence of the sample’ (1994: 57). The demonstrative “this hammer” exploits 
the object’s being perceived in a particular context. What matters here is whether 
this content can be preserved beyond the experience itself. If so, McDowell 
argues, then ‘what we have in view is genuinely recognizable as a conceptual 
capacity’ (1994: 57). We can see this by thinking about the role in which such a 
demonstrative can play in inferential thought.  
Take two different demonstratives of the same linguistic form that each 
express different perceptual experiences – “this hammer”. The perceiving subject 
can both grasp and distinguish between these two demonstratives because they 
are able to judge the different truth conditions – we know the differing contexts 
in which the demonstrative had direct application, even though we do not have 
the linguistic resources to provide definite descriptions. These demonstratives 
might serve as quite different premises in our inferential thought41. McDowell 
emphasises the way in which demonstrative concepts depend on the memory of 
the relevant perceptual experience:  
In the presence of the original sample, “that shade” 
can give expression to a concept of a shade; what 
ensures that it is a concept [...] is that the associated 
capacity can persist into the future, if only for a 
short time, and that, having persisted, it can be used 
also in thoughts about what is by then the past, if 
                                                          




only the recent past [...] even in the absence of a 
sample, the capacity goes on being exploitable as 
long as it lasts, in thoughts based on memory: 
thoughts that are not necessarily capable of 
receiving an overt expression that fully determines 
their content. (McDowell, 1994: 57) 
We can substitute “that shade” for “that object”, understanding this latter 
demonstrative to pick out an object in a particular environmental context that 
can be preserved beyond the perception of this state of affairs. Our perceptual 
experience has object-dependent conceptual content in that such content is 
expressible in ways that can capture its specificity, and the expression only has 
content - or meaning - in the light of the “perceptible presence” of a particular 
object. In McDowell’s early treatment of this issue, he takes issue with the idea 
that Fregean senses are equivalent to Russellian definite descriptions. He cites 
Frege’s disagreement with this equivalency (this is to use the quote from Frege 
above in full):  
‘In all such cases the mere wording, as it can be 
preserved in writing, is not the complete expression of 
the thought; the knowledge of certain conditions 
accompanying the utterance, which are used as means 
of expressing the thought, is needed for us to grasp the 
thought correctly’ (Frege, 1977: 10). 
 McDowell states that Frege ‘is writing of thoughts which are not 
completely expressed by words abstracted from contexts of utterance, but he is 
precisely not conceding that the thoughts are not completely expressed’ 
(McDowell, 1984: 285). The important thing is how the context of the 
perceptually experienced object ‘contributes to the expression of a fully 
expressible but nevertheless de re thought’ (McDowell, 1984: 285).  
This object-dependency of McDowell’s conceptualism is crucial. 
Specifying the passivity of the way concepts are operative in perceptual 
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experience gets us so far, but demonstrating how we can conceive of relevant 
concepts as genuinely object-dependent shows us how we can escape a Cartesian 
framework of thinking about the relationship between the human being and the 
world. It helps us to eschew an account of conceptual content which is inherently 
“mediational”, wherein we have a realm of descriptive content which floats free 
from a necessary relation to any aspect of external reality. It is worth noting that 
these object-dependent concepts, thoughts, and propositions play a “structurally 
basic” in McDowell’s conceptualism:  
It is from precisely those simple experiences 
expressed by perceptual demonstrative thoughts that 
concepts derive. These experiences provide 
identifying reference to the basic items about which 
we think and talk and whose totality makes up the 
world’ (DeGaynesford, 2004: 142).  
 In a Cartesian framework, we have to bridge a gap between a complete 
propositional description that does not depend on the object, and the object itself. 
The content of de re thought, on the other hand, is only graspable through the 
perceptible presence of the object. The “structurally basic” nature of de re thought 
allows us to conceive of the conceptual realm of something substantively in 
touch, or in “contact” with the external world. McDowell notes that 
‘countenancing de re Fregean senses […] yields thought which are both de re and 
part of the thinker’s cognitive world’ (McDowell, 1984: 293 – 294). Fulfilling 
both of these criteria reveals that McDowell is charting a course out of the 
oscillation of “givenness” and “coherentism” prior to the project of Mind and 
World. Thornton makes the important point that securing an idea of object-
dependent concepts ‘helps reveal the fallacious underpinnings of a Cartesian 
picture of the mind as an internal realm separated from the rest of the world’ 
(Thornton, 2004: 142). We should dismiss a concern that McDowell’s 
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conceptualism belongs to a Cartesian picture, insofar as we understand that as a 
philosophically unsatisfactory conception of a realm of thoughts disconnected 
from a world of objects. 
I have focused here on the way in which McDowell understands 
conceptual content to avoid a Cartesian framework for thinking about the way in 
which conceptual content relates to the “external” world. I should say that 
McDowell’s work on this issue becomes relevant when thinking about the 
distinction between “knowing-how” and “knowing-that”, and is utilised by 
Gascoigne & Thornton (2013) and Stanley & Williamson (2011), as we will see 
in Chapter Four. In fact, McDowell’s clarification that “conceptual” is not 
equivalent to “general linguistic specifications” is crucial for offering a resolution 
to the debate with Dreyfus. We saw that Dreyfus utilises a conception of “motor 
intentional content”, which he argues cannot be the made the subject of a 
proposition (see Dreyfus, 2007a: 360). McDowell, in my view, does not exploit 
this clarification enough. I therefore return again to this line of thought in 
Chapter Four.  
  
 3.6 Conclusion 
In this chapter I have shown that McDowell’s understanding of the 
operation of conceptual capacities does not commit him to a Cartesian picture of 
intentional content. In fact, McDowell’s conceptualism is constitutively designed 
to avoid such a picture, alongside avoiding that incoherent appeal to the 
“perceptual given”, identified by Sellars. McDowell has similar philosophical 
motivations to Dreyfus, to articulate a satisfactory picture of the relationship 
between the human being and the world. McDowell departs from Dreyfus, 
149 
 
crucially, in holding that non-conceptualism could not secure such a picture. 
The point here, therefore, was to further undermine Dreyfus’s assumptions 
about the nature of the operation of conceptual capacities – that such operation 
implies a detached subject characterised by an internal realm of mental activity.  
I therefore focused on McDowell’s notion of the passive way in which 
conceptual capacities are drawn into operation in perceptual experience, which 
he distinguishes from their operation in deliberative judgement. I noted that 
McDowell’s conceptualism simply makes sense of the intentional nature of 
perceptual experience. I appraised Dreyfus’s notion that in unreflective 
experience the agent simply has no awareness of the kind that would require the 
operation of concepts, concluding that his phenomenology here was flawed. I 
then went on to provide an account of de re singular thought, which can be 
expressed in demonstrative propositions. I did this firstly in order to consolidate 
the anti-Cartesian nature of McDowell’s conceptualism. In Chapter Five, I 
demonstrate how this line of thought concerning demonstrative conceptual 
content can provide a resolution to the principal and pervasive disagreement of 









4 Consolidating Conceptual Involvement 
 
 4.1 Introduction 
 Since the close of my first chapter, I have tried to call Dreyfus’s 
assumptions about the “operation” of conceptual capacities into question. 
Dreyfus takes an appeal to conceptual involvement to imply some commitment 
to a Cartesian or “mediational” picture of the relationship between the human 
being and the world. Through his assumption that conceptual involvement must 
entail reflection or conscious thought, he argues that it is by definition 
incompatible with unreflective action. In Chapter Two, I demonstrated that 
conceptual involvement of the explicit kind, formulated in a conscious thought, 
or a judgement, does not entail the interruption of skilful engagement or a 
detachment between the human being and the world – in many cases, 
conceptual involvement plays a necessary role in such engagement. In Chapter 
Three, I provided the motivations behind McDowell’s conceptualist account of 
perception – and intentional responses in general. I clarified the way in which 
McDowell understands concepts to be drawn passively into operation, without 
involving reflective judgements, in an object dependent manner.  
 In this chapter, I focus on how conceptual capacities are in operation in 
unreflective action that does not feature the sort of explicit conscious thought, 
reflection, or judgement that I dealt with in Chapter Two. That is, I am now in a 
position to provide a synoptic picture of how conceptualism can accommodate 
the phenomenon of unreflective action and the distinctive “motor intentional” 
content that Dreyfus highlights through his phenomenology. The topic of 
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perception therefore remains crucial here; both Dreyfus and McDowell conceive 
of unreflective action as responsiveness to one’s perceptual content, but of course 
disagree over how the response and the content should be characterised.  
McDowell’s clarification about the nature of conceptual content in 3.5 becomes 
crucial. This chapter should be understood as consolidating a conceptualist 
account of intentionality, perceptual experience, and intentional action, and 
providing a resolution to the principle, pervasive disagreement of the McDowell-
Dreyfus debate.  
 In 4.2, I critically assess Dreyfus use of phenomenological methodology. 
Dreyfus claims that if conceptual capacities do not show up at the 
phenomenologically descriptive level, they are not operative or involved. I 
demonstrate that Dreyfus unjustifiably discounts the idea that conceptual 
capacities might form part of the “background” he appeals to. I relate this to the 
distinction between “descriptive” and “normative” accounts of conceptual 
involvement. I go on to argue that the intentional nature of unreflective action 
means that we must ascribe possession of the relevant concepts to the agent. 
This line of thought makes sense of McDowell’s first claim that unreflective 
action is a matter of “realising practical concepts”. In 4.3, I consider 
McDowell’s second claim that unreflective action should be understood as 
“responsiveness to reasons”. I therefore return to Bengson’s question of how 
perceptual experience can be said to “produce” unreflective action. I 
concurrently clarify why McDowell recommends this normative characterisation. 
In 4.4, I appraise Dreyfus’s critique of McDowell’s two claims, which involves 
his appeal to “motor intentional content”, which I have construed as a relation 
between the “knowledge-how” of appropriate bodily responses and “affective” 
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perceptual content. Drawing on McDowell’s appeal to demonstrative conceptual 
content, I conclude that although such content is phenomenologically distinctive, 
it can only play an appropriately normative role in virtue of being integrated into 
a framework of operative conceptual capacities. I conclude in 4.5, summarising 
how the principle disagreement of the McDowell-Dreyfus debate can be resolved 
through the line of thought I have presented in this chapter.  
 
 4.2 Intentions, Phenomenology, and Conceptual Involvement 
 McDowell makes two claims about the nature of intentional action in the 
debate, both of which he takes to apply to unreflective action. The first claim is 
that an unreflective action is a “realisation” of a practical concept, or a concept 
of a thing to do (McDowell, 2013: 49). The second claim is that intentional 
action is a matter of ‘responsiveness to reasons’ (see McDowell, 2007a: 340, for 
example). In this section, I want to focus on the first claim, that unreflective 
entails the “realisation” of practical concepts. Of course, Dreyfus argues that this 
claims distorts the phenomenon of unreflective action, and that there is no such 
conceptual content at work in our unreflective activity (see Dreyfus, 2007a: 360). 
 In response to Dreyfus’s view that conceptualism cannot accommodate 
the phenomenon of unreflective action, or “embodied coping”, McDowell writes 
that ‘I do not have to ignore embodied coping, I have to hold that, in mature 
human beings, embodied coping is permeated with mindedness’ (McDowell, 
2007a: 339). He therefore holds that conceptual capacities are “operative” in 
unreflective action. McDowell means to undermine what he calls a 
“disenchanted” account of intentional action (see McDowell, 1994: 88). Rietveld 
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recognises that conceiving of unreflective action as nevertheless conceptual is 
McDowell’s ‘way of making sure that unreflective action is not misunderstood 
as a brute causal event’ (Rietveld, 2010; 186). In one sense, McDowell is 
concerned to distinguish the action of human beings from “non-rational” 
animals. We saw that McDowell follows Sellars in critiquing the idea of the 
“myth of the given”: the idea that something non-conceptual can intelligibly 
cause us to have conceptual knowledge. This idea, roughly speaking, cannot 
account for the justificatory component of knowledge. I said that Sellars’ critique 
applies not only to those epistemic intentional responses, but to intentional 
responses in general – including unreflective actions. In my first chapter, I 
emphasised that the intentional nature of an action signalled that the action was 
agential, that the unreflectively acting agent could take responsibility for their 
action. If we do not attribute any form of conceptual understanding to the agent, 
however, it does not seem as though the agent stands in any justificatory relation 
to their action, their actions simply being caused42. For McDowell, if we separate 
out the conceptual capacities of the human being from those capacities that are 
in play in intentional, skilful bodily movements, we end up with a familiar, 
philosophically unsatisfying dualism of mind and body, or reason and nature.   
McDowell therefore remarks that ‘it comes to seem that what we do, 
even in those actions we think of as bodily, is at best to direct our wills, as it 
were from a distance, at changes of states in those alien objects’ (McDowell, 
1994: 91). We find an early indication of McDowell’s view of action in Mind and 
World. We have seen that McDowell refers to a Kantian configuration of 
concepts and intuitions to provide a conceptualist account of perception. 
                                                          
42 This point has additional force in the context of McDowell’s conception of unreflective action 
as “responsiveness to reasons”, which I appraise in 4.3.  
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McDowell attempts to apply this configuration to an account of intentional 
action:  
Kant says “Thoughts without content are empty, 
intuitions without concepts are blind”. Similarly, 
intentions without overt activity are idle, and 
movements of limbs without concepts are mere 
happenings, not expressions of agency […] 
intentional bodily actions are actualizations of our 
active nature in which conceptual capacities are 
inextricably implicated (McDowell, 1994: 89).  
 It is worth pointing out here that McDowell’s specification that 
‘intentions without overt activity are idle’ is directed against conceptions of 
intentional action that attempt to conceive the “intentional” component as part 
of a ‘specially conceived interior realm’, that takes the ‘guise of inner items, 
pictured as initiating bodily goings-on from within’ (McDowell, 1994: 90). He 
associates the idea that intentions are ‘shut out from the realm of happenings 
constituted by movements of ordinary natural stuff’ with the assumptions made 
by a Cartesian philosophy of mind (McDowell, 1994: 90; 90n2). McDowell is 
therefore sympathetic to Dreyfus’s emphasis on the embodied, skilful way in 
which human beings engage with the world, and the anti-Cartesian motivation 
behind that emphasis. However, he argues that we need to understand those 
embodied skills as ‘expressions of agency’ in order to discount the idea that they 
simply belong to what he calls the realm of law – and accordingly conceived of 
as “brute causal events” - rather than the space of reasons. McDowell wants 
essentially, to ‘hold on to the idea that the natural powers that are actualized in 
the movements of our bodies are powers that belong to us as agents’ (McDowell, 
1994: 91). In the debate with Dreyfus, McDowell partly expresses this point in 
that first claim that an unreflective action is nevertheless a matter of realising a 
practical concept, or a concept of thing to do. (McDowell, 2013: 49). I want to 
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assess how we can make sense of this idea of “realising” a practical concept by 
taking a route through Dreyfus’s denial that conceptual capacities could be 
operative in unreflective action, in that way.  
I want to begin by highlighting two important aspects of Dreyfus’s 
argument, helpfully articulated by Gottlieb. First, Dreyfus claims that ‘for 
concepts to contribute to experience, reflection must be involved’ (Gottlieb, 2011: 
345). Gottlieb calls this Dreyfus’s “general assumption” because ‘Dreyfus fails to 
defend it and he takes the assumption to hold for all concepts’ (Gottlieb, 2011: 
345). This assumption of Dreyfus’s should by now be familiar to us. In the 
previous chapter, I demonstrated how McDowell takes perception to have 
conceptual content without the involvement of reflection. The assumed 
necessary connection between conceptual involvement and reflection informs 
Dreyfus’s phenomenological conclusions about the involvement of concepts in 
unreflective action. Dreyfus emphasises that conceptual involvement – in the 
form of reflection, or conscious thought – does not show up at the 
phenomenologically descriptive level. Phenomenological description does not 
include reference to the involvement of concepts. There is a further assumption, 
on Dreyfus’s part, that this sort of phenomenological description has the final 
say on an account of what is contained in a particular experience. Gottlieb 
argues that Dreyfus is committing what he calls the phenomenological fallacy: ‘the 
phenomenological fallacy is to make negative existential claims (e.g. there is no 
x) when all that is licensed by the method are positive descriptive assertions 
about appearances or manifestations in consciousness or experience’ (2011: 350). 
That is, Gottlieb argues that Dreyfus is not entitled to conclude that concepts are 
not “operative” in unreflective action simply on the basis of phenomenological 
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description: ‘Dreyfus makes the move from “it does not appear 
phenomenologically” to “it is not there, operative, or does not contribute’ 
(Gottlieb, 2013: 350). In fact, it is important to question whether Dreyfus’s 
methodology in this particular case counts as phenomenological in a stricter, 
substantive sense. The concern might be that – when it comes to the question of 
conceptual involvement – Dreyfus lapses into a weak, rudimentary form of 
phenomenology that essentially equates to “a description of experience”.  
I want to anticipate a later stage of my argument by noting that this sort 
of phenomenology can bring out some substantive conclusions. Dreyfus’s 
contentious account of the motor intentional content of perception – “attractions 
and repulsions” – relies on detailed phenomenological description. Gascoigne & 
Thornton’s impatience with Dreyfus’s prioritisation of phenomenological 
accuracy is worth drawing attention to here. They consider Dreyfus’s 
phenomenological conclusion that “mindedness” is not involved in unreflective 
action, remarking that ‘talk of being “true to the phenomenon” is one of those 
irritating methodological tics inherited from the phenomenological tradition’ 
(2013: 156). Their critique begins with the idea that something unreflective and 
non-conceptual cannot be articulated in a reflective and conceptual 
phenomenological description, especially in the light of Dreyfus’s claim that 
conceptual involvement interrupts or scuppers skilful engagement: ‘if reflection 
destroys the skilful coping of the expert then reflection destroys the very 
phenomenon that one is aiming to describe in a phenomenology of expertise!’ 
(2013: 157). I agree with Gascoigne & Thornton that reflection does not 
“destroy” skilful coping, as I demonstrated in Chapter Two. They are right that 
Dreyfus’s example of Knoblauch is scant evidence for this claim. However, I am 
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unsure of Gascoigne & Thornton’s claim that if experience is non-conceptual, 
then Dreyfus is barred from offering a phenomenological description that would 
conceptualise such experience. They explain that it is ‘not clear what it would 
mean to be “true” to some nonconceptual “given”’, and that ‘it is not evident 
how one would know that one’s description satisfied a criterion of truth’ 
(Gascoigne & Thornton, 2013: 157). There are two strands to a counter-
objection to Gascoigne & Thornton.  
First, we have to distinguish a positive specification of what is contained 
in an experience, from a negative specification – what is not contained in the 
experience. In this case, Dreyfus makes the negative specification that concepts 
are not involved in unreflective experience. Such a negative specification is 
surely immune to Gascoigne & Thornton’s objection. Otherwise, we would 
disbar ourselves from ever even considering whether an aspect of our experience is 
non-conceptual, and no other non-conceptualist – from, say, the analytic domain 
– has been expected to restrict themselves in this way. It also seems possible to 
make a positive specification of purportedly non-conceptual experience. There 
can be different types of purportedly non-conceptual content. For example, our 
perception of space is a popular candidate for non-conceptual content (see Allais, 
2009; Kelly, 2003). Experiencing a pain, or another sensation, may also 
reasonably count as non-conceptual content. Discriminating between these types 
of non-conceptual content is to offer a positive specification of the relevant non-
conceptual experience. I say more about the place of these purportedly non-
conceptual elements in the closing stages of this chapter.  
Dreyfus’s wish to be “true to the phenomenon” is not as trite as 
Gascoigne & Thornton make out. Their goal in Tacit Knowledge is to show how 
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apparently non-conceptual abilities (“knowledge-how”) entail conceptually 
structured knowledge. They utilise the same kinds of examples as Dreyfus; those 
distinctive instances of unreflective action where the involvement of concepts or 
“knowledge-that” is unclear. The account of knowledge-how that Gascoigne & 
Thornton argue for is an attempt to be true to these distinctive phenomena. The 
crux of the McDowell-Dreyfus debate is Dreyfus’s puzzlement over how we 
would characterise an unreflective intentional action as conceptual when we do 
not refer to the involvement of concepts at a descriptive level. It is uncharitable 
to dismiss this as an “irritating methodological tic” when Gascoigne & Thornton 
spend a great deal of time figuring out exactly how to make this characterisation 
while remaining “true to the phenomenon”.  
Although I disagree with Gascoigne & Thornton’s dismissive perspective 
on Dreyfus’s phenomenological methodology, I agree with Gottlieb that it 
causes him certain problems in the debate. Gottlieb argues that we cannot rely 
on the kind of phenomenological description that Dreyfus uses in establishing 
whether concepts are operative in unreflective action, or not.  
Dreyfus’s phenomenological analysis does not allow 
him to move a level of generality where the conditions 
contributing to the possibility of absorbed action in 
general can be specified, conditions that designate 
some role for conceptuality and the I. The move to a 
further level of generality would consist in recognizing 
what does appear in a phenomenological description 
of experience, and then specifying at a more general 
level of analysis not available to phenomenological 
description the conditions required for the possibility 
of that phenomenon. (Gottlieb, 2011: 350).  
That is, Dreyfus’s phenomenological methodology, amounting as it does 
to a simple description of experience, does not attempt to specify the constitutive 
conditions for that experience. Gottlieb is exactly right in his recommendation 
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that we must enquire after conditions of possibility. However, Gottlieb implies 
that such a level of generality is distinct from phenomenological methodology. 
This is not the case; a significant strand of phenomenology has transcendental 
purport. Phenomenology can seek to establish the conditions of possibility for a 
particular form of experience, or intentional state. Now, we needn’t insist on a 
transcendental approach that meets the methodological demands of either 
Husserl or Heidegger. What I want to point out is that Dreyfus is selective about 
where he exploits such an approach. Where Dreyfus allies himself with any such 
transcendental approach, he does so with reference to Heidegger.  
Dreyfus argues for the apparently Heideggerian claim that non-
conceptual bodily and perceptual capacities provide a foundation, or 
“background” upon which conceptual intentionality is possible. We should 
recall that Heidegger refers to this primary mode of intentionality as 
“understanding”. Dreyfus claims that Heidegger ‘primarily wants to describe 
what makes the concepts necessary for relating mind and world themselves 
possible’ (Dreyfus, 2013: 19). Crowell & Malpas note that Heidegger ‘clearly 
follows Kant in his idea that what distinguishes philosophical enquiry from 
empirical science its concern with “a priori” conditions of experience, that is, 
conditions that do not themselves derive from experience’ (2007: 4). They note 
his departure from Kant in a way that chimes with Dreyfus’s interpretation: 
‘Equally clearly, however, he rejects Kant’s idea that these conditions stem from 
a faculty of pure reason’ (Crowell & Malpas, 2007: 4). Dreyfus recognises that 
Heidegger and McDowell agree that making propositional judgements requires 
certain “a priori conditions”, but that ‘they differ as to what these a priori 
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For McDowell making judgements requires 
operative concepts that correspond to a 
propositionally structured totality of facts. For 
Heidegger what is required are non-conceptual 
coping skills that disclose a space in which things can 
then be encountered as what and how they are. 
(Dreyfus, 2013: 21).   
Dreyfus takes the “a priori conditions” of propositional judgements to be 
those non-conceptual bodily and perceptual capacities through which the human 
being is already intentionally “familiar” with its environment. Dreyfus appeals to 
Heidegger’s description of the possibility of making a propositional judgement 
about a badly positioned blackboard in a lecture room. For this possibility to 
arise – to recognise the board is badly positioned - we must first have become 
familiar with the lecture room as a ‘meaningful mini-world’ through ‘the 
cumulative skill we have built up through our attending and giving lectures over 
the years. It is this know-how that orients us in the lecture room and enables us 
to deal with the things in it’ (Dreyfus, 2013: 20; see Heidegger, 1995: 343). 
Presumably, then, such “cumulative skill” is a condition of possibility for our 
familiar, unreflective experience and action as well as those experiences in which 
we make propositional judgements43. That is, Dreyfus recognises that we can 
explain certain intentional states with reference to conditions of possibility.  
As I showed in Chapter Two, Dreyfus recognises that conceptual 
capacities can play a role in acquiring the familiarity with a particular situation 
                                                          
43
 Clearly, there is some confusion here; in the cited passages, Dreyfus seems to regard 
unreflective practically engaged experience as itself a background for conceptual intentionality, 
and as itself requiring a background of the relevant perceptual and bodily capacities. My view is 
that Dreyfus identifies the technical sense of “background” with the non-conceptual perceptual 
and bodily familiarity with a particular situation that makes our practical engagement with that 
situation possible.  The practical engagement itself does not form a background in a strict sense, 
but is simply a more primary phenomenon than, say, making conceptual judgements. I disagree 
with this account, of course; my view is that we develop such a familiarity by practically 
engaging and making conceptual judgements, which is a point I make in Chapter Two, and I am 
concerned to make here.   
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required for our unreflective engagement with it. He argues that ‘we often have 
to use concepts to find our way about in an unfamiliar situation’ (Dreyfus, 2013: 
18). However, ‘our situation gradually comes to make sense to us in a non-
conceptual way as we learn [sic?] our way around in it’ (Dreyfus, 2013: 18). Then, 
of course, we get the familiar picture of unreflective action, where ‘once our 
situation becomes familiar our skilled dispositions respond directly to the 
solicitations of the relevant affordances’ (Dreyfus, 2013: 18). It is unclear, then, 
why possession of the relevant conceptual capacities does not form a part of the 
background Dreyfus appeals to above. Gottlieb notes that if Dreyfus’s 
phenomenological argument ‘can be used to undermine the role of concepts, it 
can also be used to discount the role of skills […] when I unreflectively act, I 
have no phenomenological awareness of the contribution of skills, but this does 
not license me to discount their general contribution’ (Gottlieb, 2013: 350).. We 
can acknowledge that “skilled dispositions” may take over from the explicit 
involvement of conceptual capacities. However, referring to our possession of 
those conceptual capacities helps us, first, to make sense of how we are able to 
recognise and respond to the specifics of the familiar situation, and, second, to 
make sense of how those habitual skills are at the same time ‘expressions of 
agency’ (McDowell, 1994: 89). I will treat both of these ideas in some detail 
below. For now, I simply mean to highlight how Dreyfus’s recognition that 
intentional states have “conditions of possibility” should allow him to 
countenance the involvement of conceptual capacities at the transcendental level. 
That is, it should allow him to at least entertain McDowell’s claim that practical 
concepts are “realised” in unreflective action. However, Dreyfus is unjustifiably 
selective in his use of a “background” for intentional states.  
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I said that referring to our possession of conceptual capacities can make 
sense of how our habitual skills, or “bodily dispositions”, are at the same time 
‘expressions of agency’ (McDowell, 1994: 89). In order to draw this out, we 
should first briefly attend to unreflective activities that don’t have a distinctly 
embodied aspect. In fact, there are unreflective activities that clearly entail the 
involvement of conceptual capacities. For example, we might think of the 
unreflective and immediate way in which certain people can do complex 
mathematical problems. Rouse recognises that engaging in conversation or 
speech can be an unreflective activity, and as such represents ‘clear analogs to 
Dreyfus’s examples of blitz chess […] we sometimes speak very rapidly, so much 
so that we cannot explicitly think about what we want to say’ (Rouse, 2013: 256). 
In fact, Dreyfus cites McDowell’s similar description of a “master orator”: The 
orator does not think before speaking, nor even while speaking; his speech is his 
thought. (Merleau-Ponty, 2002: 209). However, Dreyfus uses this description in 
service of the argument that conceptual involvement compromises expertise. In 
the case of the orator, the sort of conceptual involvement that entails conscious 
thought and reflection may well compromise their expert performance. There is 
surely a way in which conceptual capacities are involved in this case – the orator 
is using language and forming complex propositional sentences. Such an ability 
by definition depends on the orator’s possession of the relevant conceptual 
capacities. We should recall Dreyfus’s “general assumption”, that ‘for concepts 
to contribute to experience, reflection must be involved’ (Gottlieb, 2011: 345). 
Unreflective performances such as oratory are a clear counter-point to the 
assumption. It may the case that Dreyfus would accept that an orator’s 
performance involves conceptual capacities. It is clear, though, that he would 
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refuse to generalise this point to include those distinctively bodily forms of 
unreflective action which he appeals to.  
At this point, it is important to clarify our definition of “conceptual”. 
Rouse argues that Dreyfus is operating with a different definition of “conceptual” 
to McDowell. Rouse notes that ‘one of the most important dividing lines among 
philosophical accounts of the conceptual domain is whether to provide a 
descriptive or a normative account of conceptually articulated content’ (Rouse, 
2013: 250). Dreyfus’s phenomenological descriptions, for Rouse, are only 
‘relevant challenges to descriptive accounts of the conceptual domain’ which he 
defines as the view that ‘to use a concept is to have something in mind, or 
something causally implicated in what one does’ (Rouse, 2013: 252)44. Rouse 
accepts that concepts on this descriptive account are not operative on the basis of 
Dreyfus’s phenomenology of unreflective action. Indeed, Dreyfus’s 
phenomenology persuasively shows that token mental states in which concepts 
feature descriptively are often not in play. Rouse goes on to introduce a 
“normative” account of the conceptual domain. Normative approaches hinge on 
the idea that intentional states or actions are evaluable with reference to 
conceptual norms:  
[…] whether certain [conceptual] representations or 
structures are actually contained or causally 
efficacious in a particular thought or action then does 
not matter, but only whether that thought or action is 
sufficiently accessible and potentially responsive to 
conceptual assessment’ (2013: 251).  
                                                          
44 Rouse takes Jerry Fodor’s Concepts to be representative of descriptive accounts: ‘in Fodor’s 
specific version, conceptual use involves having token mental states that possess representational 
content’ (Rouse, 2013: 250). See also Margolis (2007) for a contrast between a mental 
representation theory of concepts, and an abstract object theory of concepts.  
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On the normative approach, there is no connection between conceptual 
involvement and reflection. Concepts do not have to be “causally efficacious” to 
be operative in unreflective action, and we should not be surprised when the 
relevant concepts do not turn up at the phenomenologically descriptive level. 
Rouse notes that while Dreyfus emphasises the unreflective way in which chess 
and baseball players perform, John Haugeland – a former student of Dreyfus – 
engages in ‘the exact opposite use of chess and baseball examples’ (Rouse, 2013: 
252). Haugeland understands these unreflective activities in terms of the 
distinctive conceptual abilities of human beings: ‘playing a game governed by 
constitutive standards is a non-trivial achievement; dogs and ordinary monkeys, 
for instance, are utterly incapable of it’ (Haugeland, 1998: 253). The unreflective 
actions of the blitz chess player, for instance, are assessable with reference to the 
rules of that game.  
McDowell’s claim that unreflective action is a matter of “realising” 
concepts should, in my view, be understood as actions “manifesting” possession 
of the relevant concepts. What I want to say here is that unreflective action 
manifests the agent’s grasp or possession of the relevant rules and standards of a 
certain activity. Rouse articulates the relevant conceptualist picture of intentional 
action here: 
No nonhuman animal can play chess, because no 
animal grasps the relevant concepts; animals can’t 
recognize pieces and moves, the legality of those 
moves, or their strategic significance toward winning 
or losing. Moreover, players’ perceptual and 
practical skills at recognizing positions and making 
moves must be responsive and accountable to those 
concepts and the norms they articulate (Rouse, 2013: 
252; see Haugeland, 1998: 241 – 247). 
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 In the same way we ascribe an agent possession of those concepts that 
are the constituents of intentional states like believing, and indeed perceiving, so 
too can we ascribe concept-possession to agents intentionally acting, whether 
unreflectively or otherwise. I made clear in Chapter One that the unreflective 
actions under discussion in the debate are nevertheless intentional. I noted, 
however, that the unreflective nature of those actions makes it difficult to 
account for that intentional component. In order to make sense of how an 
unreflective action is an expression of agency, an action the agent is responsible 
for, we must emphasise how the action manifests the agent’s conceptual 
understanding. One way of putting this is that intentional actions are only 
explanatorily intelligible in the light of the agent’s possession of the relevant 
concepts.  
We can apply this line of thought to a distinctly “embodied” activity like 
playing tennis. In Chapter One, I described the professional tennis player’s return 
of a fast serve as a paradigmatic case of skilful unreflective action. On the 
normative model of conceptual involvement, we can specify that the activity of 
tennis involves those actions being intelligible only in relation to particular 
conceptual standards, and as such manifests a grasp of various concepts. 
Unreflectively returning a fast serve manifests a conceptual understanding of the 
rules of tennis, including the understanding of where one has to return the ball to 
in order for it to be a successful return of serve. Further, the agent manifests at 
least some broad concepts of strategic purpose; unreflectively returning to the ball 
to an area of the court where an opponent is weak, for example. We can also 
construe this in epistemic terms; we can ascribe the unreflectively acting agent 
knowledge that the opponent is weak in a particular area of the court. 
166 
 
Although Gottlieb references the conceptual standards which must govern 
unreflective activity, he is mainly focused on McDowell’s latter claim about 
practical concepts. Gottlieb makes the basic claim that once we characterise an 
action as intentional, the content of the intention contains a practical concept 
(Gottlieb, 2011: 349). Dreyfus agrees that unreflective action can be characterised 
as intentional, and even considers the possibility that ‘in so far as a basic action 
like eating dinner or going for a walk is concerned, there will always be an “I” 
planning and initiating the overall action’ (2007b: 374) – but fails to recognise he 
commits himself to here. The very intentions involved in an unreflective action 
entail the concepts of those basic actions in a way that makes the unreflective 
action itself intelligible only as a manifestation of the possession of those 
concepts. As Gottlieb says: ‘If the intention does not require attention or 
reflection, then neither does the content of that intention’ (Gottlieb, 2011: 349). 
Gottlieb notes that there can be various practical concepts entailed by someone 
acting on their intention to make a chess move: ‘the first-order practical concept 
involves the physical moving of the piece to the position the piece should land on 
the board, say moving the pawn one space forward. The second-order practical 
concept might be accomplishing checkmate’ (Gottlieb, 2011: 349). The idea of 
“manifesting” or “realising” these sorts of conceptual capacities should not be 
associated with any process of reflection or thought. To affirm the role that one’s 
possession and grasp of the relevant concepts plays in intentional, intelligent, 
skilful activity, one need not also posit ‘inner items, pictured as initiating bodily 
goings-on from within’ (McDowell, 1994: 90). Dreyfus’s assumption that 
conceptual capacities can only be operative in unreflective action in the form of 
some mental event is therefore mistaken. Without positing the operation of the 
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relevant conceptual capacities, we are unable to account for the intentional 
component of the unreflective action.  
In the debate, McDowell provides the example of a person unreflectively 
catching a frisbee, perhaps so fast she does not immediately recognise the object 
as such – such an action may run close to being “autonomic”, or a genuine case 
of non-intentional bodily reflex. However, McDowell specifies that there is still a 
concept being “realised”, or “manifested” here: ‘Even if she does not have the 
concept of a Frisbee, there is a concept that she is realizing, perhaps the concept 
of catching this’ (McDowell, 2013: 48)45. McDowell recognises that this is a 
‘limiting case of practical rationality at work’, in the sense that the reason the 
person might give for catching the Frisbee might be ‘No particular reason; I just 
felt like it’ (McDowell, 2013: 49). McDowell’s account of the operation of 
conceptual capacities in unreflective action is only fully specified by bringing his 
account of “realising” practical concepts together with his account of 
“responsiveness to reasons”. The Frisbee-catching agent’s manifestation of a 
practical concept is inextricable from the reason for acting in the way they did. 
We must move on to appraise McDowell’s second claim, that unreflective action 
is a matter of “responsiveness to reasons”.  
 
4.3 Reasons and Unreflective Action 
My aim from here is to explicate McDowell’s account of unreflective 
action as “responsiveness to reasons” in relation to his account of “realising 
practical concepts”, and then assess how his completed conception of the 
                                                          
45  Note that McDowell is relying on demonstrative conceptual content here; this becomes 
decisive in 4.4.  
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operation of conceptual capacities might accommodate Dreyfus’s notion of 
“motor intentional content”. I want to make sure that my discussion is framed in 
terms of the question I highlighted in Chapter One, that of how perception can 
be said to produce intelligent, or intentional, action (Bengson, 2016: 26). As I 
noted, this question captures the unreflective nature of how we largely act in 
response to our environment. Bengson notes that ‘perceiving things to be a 
certain way may in some cases lead directly to action of a certain kind […] there 
is no intervening conscious steps or transitions […] one perceives, and, 
straightaway, one acts – not mindlessly, but intelligently’ (2016: 26).  
We have seen that Dreyfus’s conception of motor intentional content 
provides some answer to this question46. Dreyfus’s view is that our skilful bodily 
dispositions are reliably keyed on to the stimuli of our developed perceptual 
capacities. McDowell’s view, on the other hand, is that the content of our 
perceptual experience entails reasons for the agent to act in a particular way; 
unreflective action is a matter of “responsiveness to reasons”. This depends, of 
course, on his conceptualist account of perceptual content. Affirming 
conceptualism does not only work to secure the epistemic significance of 
perception. The conceptual content of a practically engaged agent is, for 
McDowell what allows them to immediately and unreflectively respond in an 
intelligent manner.  
It is important to return to McDowell’s Aristotelian naturalism here. I 
previously outlined McDowell’s appropriation of an Aristotelian conception of 
“second nature” in relation to the human being’s perceptual experience of the 
                                                          
46  Again, neither Dreyfus nor McDowell are responding directly to this question of how 
perception produces intentional action, but I think that their positions in the debate are partly 
intelligible as answers to this question.  
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world. McDowell’s account of second nature is supposed to capture the way in 
which the development of conceptual capacities is intelligible as a natural 
propensity of the human being. McDowell clarifies that the operation of 
conceptual capacities ‘is to be understood in close connection with the idea of 
rationality […] conceptual capacities are capacities that belong to their subject’s 
rationality’ (McDowell, 2007a: 338). Our conceptual capacities, and the 
concomitant abilities for rationality and reasoning, are developed through 
maturation in a linguistic community. This characterisation has the advantage of 
accommodating conceptual capacities, and the normative character of human 
thought, within the natural world. Acquisition of the relevant concepts is 
essential to becoming “open” to the layout of reality, to being able to see, and to 
know, that things are ‘thus and so’ (McDowell, 1994: 18). Now, McDowell is 
clear that he derives this conception of “second nature” from Aristotle’s 
discussion of ethical behaviour.  
In the opening stages of the debate, both Dreyfus and McDowell draw on 
Aristotle’s conception of the phronimos, the possessor of practical wisdom, the 
“moral expert”. Through proper education and practice, the phronimos becomes 
habituated into responding appropriately to ethical situations. There is therefore 
a close connection to second nature. For McDowell, just as acquiring and 
developing conceptual capacities allows one to become sensitive to empirical 
states of affairs, so too does it allow one to become sensitive to the ethical 
dimension of life. McDowell puts this as follows: ‘The ethical is a domain of 
rational requirements, which are there in any case, whether or not we are 
responsive to them. We are alerted to these demands by acquiring appropriate 
conceptual capacities’ (McDowell, 1994: 82). That is, our responsiveness to the 
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ethical requirements of a given situation is dependent on our acquisition of the 
relevant concepts. McDowell understands the cultivation of ethical behaviour as 
a cultivation of rationality. Forman writes that ‘to feel the force of ethical 
demands is, then, constitutive of the ethical character one acquires through the 
proper ethical training, an ethical character that is therefore a second nature’ 
(2008: 569). “Feeling the force of ethical demands” means being responsive or 
sensitive to reasons for acting in a particular way. This conception of ethical 
behaviour informs McDowell’s thinking about non-ethical forms of action, and 
applies to unreflective practical activity: ‘If we generalize the way Aristotle 
conceives the moulding of ethical character, we arrive at the notion of having 
one’s eyes opened to reasons at large by acquiring a second nature’ (McDowell, 
1994: 84). Further, he writes: ‘Moulding ethical character […] is a particular case 
of a general phenomenon: initiation into conceptual capacities, which includes 
responsiveness to other rational demands besides those of ethics’ (McDowell, 
1994: 84). The acquisition of a second nature results in ‘habits of thought and 
action’ in general (McDowell, 1994: 84). McDowell’s picture of intentional 
action centres around the idea that one acts in response to reasons, or “rational 
demands”, thanks to one’s acquisition of the relevant concepts. Further, 
responding to a reason need not entail reflection – one can respond immediately 
and unreflectively to a reason.  
Throughout the debate, McDowell argues that his account does not entail 
or imply a detachment from a practical situation, or a loss of engagement in 
activity. McDowell does not want to play down those embodied, engaged, and 
unreflective aspects of how human beings relate to their environment that 
Dreyfus highlights. McDowell does not attempt to dispute Dreyfus’s 
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phenomenology. Rather, McDowell attempts to correct Dreyfus’s understanding 
of how conceptual capacities can be “operative” in unreflective action in the way 
that he claims. For McDowell, it is not the case that ‘someone can be acting for 
a reason only if her action issues from distanced critical reflection of the 
situation in which she is acting’ (McDowell, 2013: 46). Rationality, for 
McDowell, is not an antonym to unreflective engagement, as it is for Dreyfus. 
Rather, unreflective engagement is rationality at work. It may have been helpful 
for McDowell to refer to his earlier work on virtue and reason. There, 
McDowell is keen to emphasise that we should not see the workings of 
rationality in virtuous action as ‘a balancing of reasons for and against’ 
(McDowell, 1979: 335). The refined ability that a phronimos possesses allows 
them to immediately recognise that the perceived situation mandates some 
particular action. Such a recognition is described by McDowell in a way that 
accommodates its unreflective aspect: ‘some aspect of the situation is seen as 
constituting a reason for acting in some way; this reason is apprehended, not as 
outweighing or overriding any reason for acting in other ways which would 
otherwise be constituted by other aspects of the situation […] but as silencing 
them’ (McDowell, 1979: 335).  
McDowell’s insistence that unreflective action should be explained in a 
‘way that turns on the idea of responsiveness to reasons as such’ (McDowell, 
2006: 236) is designed to avoid the danger that human intentional action is 
simply a matter of mechanistic responsiveness to stimuli; that perceptual stimuli 
simply cause the human being to act in a particular way. Responsiveness to 
reasons as such means that one responds to a reason in virtue of its being a reason, 
responding to a reason qua reason. Responding to a reason as such means that 
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one responds to it in terms of its being something that can favour one course of 
action over another. McDowell takes the case of an animal fleeing from danger: 
[…] fleeing is a response to something that is in an 
obvious sense a reason for it: danger, or at least what 
is taken to be danger. If we describe a bit of 
behaviour as fleeing, we represent the behaviour as 
intelligible in the light of a reason for it (McDowell, 
2007c: 2).  
 We can of course specify that the animal fled for a reason – for example, a 
deer flees because it hears the sound of a gunshot. However, the animal did not 
respond to the gunshot as a reason for their action – the gunshot was not taken by 
the deer to favour a particular course of action. That is to say, although the 
animal acted for a reason, the reason itself did not figure in their action. The deer 
has an ingrained disposition to flee – it is caused to flee – by a stimulus such as the 
sound of a gunshot. McDowell accordingly specifies that an animal’s fleeing is 
not a response to a reason as such. For an action to be a response to a reason qua 
reason:  
[…] we would need to be considering a subject who 
can step back from an inclination to flee, elicited 
from her by an apparent danger, and raise the 
question whether she should  be so inclined – whether 
the apparent danger is, here and now, a sufficient 
reason for fleeing (McDowell, 2007c: 2).  
 In characterising an intentional action as a response to a reason as such, 
we are specifying that the response stands in some justificatory relation to the 
stimulus one is responding to. That is, the stimulus can be evaluated in terms of 
whether it justifies the action, whether it counts in the action’s favour, or in fact 
counts against the action. The stimulus has a normative status in that its 
justification of a particular action can be evaluated. Take a person who flees 
what they take to be a dangerous situation. They may realise that the situation 
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was not, in fact, a dangerous one, and the aspects of the situation they were 
responding to did not justify their response. Now, if we take the intentional 
action of “fleeing” here to be simply caused by the relevant aspects of the situation, 
we cannot make sense of the agent’s recognition that their action was mistaken. 
Of course, this all entails that the perceived aspect of the situation was 
conceptual – if it is not the conceptual content of perception that the intentional 
action responds to, then the intentional action is not in response to a reason, and 
the agent’s action cannot stand in a justificatory relation to the perceptual 
stimulus. There is therefore a necessary connection, for McDowell, between 
one’s intentions and one’s perceptual content. McDowell describes this as a ‘sane 
account of what acting for a reason is’ (McDowell, 2013: 48). 
 In order to offer a clear sense of what a “complete” conceptualist account 
of the relationship between perception and action looks like, we can look to 
Bengson’s own account of how perceptual content “produces” intentional action. 
As we have seen, McDowell draws from Aristotle’s conception of the phronimos, 
a virtuous agent who responds immediately and appropriately to the perceived 
particulars of a given situation. For McDowell, developing into such a virtuous 
agent depends on refining one’s perceptual capacities through one’s inculcation 
into the space of reasons – that is, through acquiring the relevant concepts. 
Bengson’s account can be read as charting the contours of McDowell’s 
Aristotelian conception of the development of the phronimos. For Bengson, the 
conceptual content of perception can contain what Bengson calls “actionable 
concepts”, our possession of which entails our being “poised” to perform a 
particular intentional action upon perception of the relevant situation with the 
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relevant features. That is, we have a disposition to act that is predicated upon our 
possession of relevant conceptual capacities.  
One example here might be the actionable concept ‘my being in immediate 
danger’ – our possession of this concept entails being ‘in a position to perform 
certain actions (e.g., fleeing or fighting) in a way that one who fails to understand 
this concept is not’ (Bengson, 2016: 39). That is, possessing the concept of being 
in immediate in danger in some sense necessarily entails a connection to a possible 
action. Bengson also provides the example of perceiving a “weary, pregnant 
woman standing on public transport” (2016: 46). The conceptual content here 
may be “actionable” if one’s grasp of it also entails grasping that a particular 
response is merited. Bengson is clear that the connections between the 
conceptual content of perception and the relevant concepts of acting are norm 
governed – in the case of responding to the weary, pregnant woman standing on 
public transport, we can understand the concept of, say, giving up one’s seat to 
her as owing to a concomitant grasp of a social or ethical norm (Bengson, 2016: 
46). We should therefore recall that in order for us to make sense of the 
“intentional” component of unreflective action, we have to attribute the agent 
possession of the relevant concepts, including the rules and norms that govern 
the activity that they are engaging in.  
What we have here is a justificatory relation between a perceptual 
experience, the, content of which is conceptual, and intentional action. To use 
Bengson’s example, the perceptual content “there is a weary, pregnant woman 
standing on this subway train” bears a normative relation to a practical concept 
of “giving one’s seat up”, a concept which McDowell would describe as being 
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“realised” when one unreflectively acts in response to that perceived situation. 
Further, a conceptual understanding of certain social norms and ethical precepts 
are similarly indispensable in our account of the relationship between 
unreflective action and perceptual content. Bengson’s account provides a 
compelling picture of the internal mechanics of how McDowell’s two claims, 
about “realising” practical concepts and responding to reasons, are necessarily 
related.  
Dreyfus objects, firstly, to McDowell’s picture of responsiveness to 
reasons on the basis that ‘it does not follow that, once we have gotten past the 
learning phase, these reasons in the form of habits still influence our wise actions’ 
(Dreyfus, 2005: 51). Dreyfus’s main contention in this case is that an appeal to 
rationality cannot account for the way in which an expert – ethical or otherwise 
– can respond appropriately to highly specific situations. For Dreyfus, 
conceptual rationality could only figure in the guise of general rules for acting. 
McDowell’s notion that one is “realising” practical concepts cannot account for 
the specific ways in which an agent must respond to a given situation. One 
cannot have a practical concept for every such unreflective response. Dreyfus 
argues that the notion of “responsiveness to reasons” ignores the way in which 
developed perceptual capacities give rise to a kind of content which cannot be 
construed as “facts” or “states of affairs”, which he calls “motor intentional 
content”. I now move on to assess Dreyfus’s phenomenological non-





4.4 Assessing Motor Intentional Content 
So far, I have demonstrated McDowell’s claims that unreflective action 
can be conceived of as first manifesting – or “realising” practical concepts, and 
second as responsiveness to reasons. In arguing that intentional action is only 
intelligible in the light of the agent’s grasp of the relevant concepts, I undermined 
Dreyfus’s assumption that the operation of conceptual capacities necessarily 
entails reflection or conscious thought. Further, understanding unreflective 
action in this way enables us to understand the clear normative, agential 
component of such action. Dreyfus argues that neither of McDowell’s claims can 
accommodate the phenomenon of unreflective action, and his own conception of 
“motor intentional content” is better suited to do so. In this final stage, I provide 
a critique of Dreyfus’s conception of motor intentional content. I argue that 
although such content indeed plays a central role in our practically engaged 
experience, it can only play this role in virtue of being integrated into an 
operative conceptual framework. In providing this critique, I show how we can 
resolve the principle and pervasive disagreement of the McDowell-Dreyfus 
debate. I want to begin by focusing on Dreyfus’s basic critique of McDowell.  
 Dreyfus objects to McDowell’s picture of an unreflectively acting agent 
responding to reasons on the basis that ‘it does not follow that, once we have 
gotten past the learning phase, these reasons in the form of habits still influence our 
wise actions’ (Dreyfus, 2005:51). Dreyfus argues that an appeal to rationality 
cannot account for the way in which an unreflectively acting expert – ethical or 
otherwise – can respond appropriate to highly specific situations. Firstly, the 
notion of “responsiveness to reasons” ignores the way in which developed 
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perceptual capacities give rise to a kind of “motor intentional content” which 
cannot be construed as “facts” or “states of affairs” that could represent reasons 
for one’s actions. Further, McDowell’s notion that one is “realising” practical 
concepts cannot account for the specific ways in which an agent must respond to 
a given situation. One cannot have a practical concept for every unreflective 
response. For Dreyfus, conceptual rationality could only figure in the guise of 
general rules for acting that are not tailored to the specific situation that one is 
engaging with and responding to.  
 McDowell describes this basic understanding of rationality here: ‘Dreyfus 
pictures rationality as detached from particular situations – as able to relate to 
particular situations only by subsuming them under content determinately 
expressible in abstraction from any situation’ (McDowell, 2007a: 339). Dreyfus 
therefore takes issue with McDowell’s appropriation of Aristotle. For Dreyfus, 
the Aristotelian phronimos is best described by Heidegger’s own reading of the 
concept. Dreyfus quotes Heidegger as follows: 
[The phronimos]… is determined by his situation in 
the largest sense… The circumstances, the givens, 
the times and the people vary. The meaning of the 
action… varies as well… It is precisely the 
achievement of phronesis to disclose the [individual] 
as acting now in the full situation within which he 
acts. (Heidegger, 1997: 101; quoted in Dreyfus, 2005: 
51).  
 In Dreyfus’s estimation, the Heideggerian phronimos becomes ‘a master at 
responding to the specific situation […] phronesis shows that socialization can 
produce a kind of master whose actions do not rely on habits based on reasons to 
guide him’ (Dreyfus, 2005: 45 – 46). Crucially, Dreyfus specifies that the 
phromimos’s ‘perceptions and actions at their best would be so responsive to the 
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specific situation that they could not be captured in general concepts’ (Dreyfus, 
2005: 51). Dreyfus therefore takes McDowell’s interpretation of Aristotle to clash 
with Heidegger’s – McDowell’s corrects Dreyfus on this point, as we will see 
directly below. First, it is important to clarify the non-conceptualist account that 
Dreyfus takes to characterise the “the achievement of the phronimos”. Dreyfus 
describes unreflective perceptual experience as having motor intentional content, 
or what I have suggested might be described as “affective” content, operating as 
it does on the level of bodily feeling. Dreyfus describes this content in terms of 
“attractions and repulsions”, “lines of force”, and “bodily tension”, and in 
general being “drawn” to act in a particular way. Accordingly, such content is 
bound up with the bodily skills of the perceiving agent, the embodied 
“knowledge-how” which governs the agent’s response to the specific situation. I 
will recapitulate Dreyfus’s description of this process:  
As the agent acquires skills, these skills are 
“stored”, not as representations in the mind, but 
as more and more refined dispositions to respond 
to the solicitations of more and more refined 
perceptions of the current situation’ (Dreyfus, 
1999: 1).  
 It is this through a non-conceptualist account of this process that Dreyfus 
claims to be able to preserve the situation-specific responses that are inherent in 
unreflective action. McDowell’s account of the relationship between perception 
and action is unable to capture the distinctive kind of affective content at work in 
our unreflective experience, and is unable to capture the distinctive form of 
situation-specific “know-how” at work in our unreflective bodily responses. I will 
further specify the details of this process and its perceptual and active 
components as I proceed through my critique.  
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 I want to give a brief overview of how McDowell responds to Dreyfus. 
This provides us with a sense of the general strategy of my critique. McDowell 
corrects Dreyfus’s understanding of the Aristotelian influence on his thinking: ‘I 
reject the idea that the content of practical wisdom, as Aristotle understands, can 
be captured in general prescriptions for conduct, determinately expressible 
independently of the concrete situations in which the phronimos is called to act’ 
(McDowell, 2007a: 340). In fact, McDowell takes the achievement of the 
phronimos to possess a cultivated ability to recognise the unique situation as 
respond to it accordingly. It is the specifics of the situation that represent reasons 
for the phronimos to respond as they do. It is important to note that reasons, for 
McDowell, many not be specifiable ‘independently of the concrete situation’ 
(McDowell, 2007a: 340). McDowell emphasises that to think otherwise is to fall 
into a ‘hopeless conception of the domain of language, and thereby of the 
domain of the conceptual’ (McDowell, 2007a: 342). What McDowell is referring 
to here is that traditional, Cartesian misapprehension of what conceptual content 
entails. In Chapter Three, I focused on McDowell’s work on de re conceptual 
content, where McDowell argues that the content of singular demonstratives, 
directed not just at sense-data but at ordinary states of affairs, do not entail a 
Russellian definite description where the content is linguistically codified 
independently of its reference to that states of affairs. In Mind and World, 
McDowell articulates this line of thinking:  
‘A perceptual demonstrative thought surely homes 
in on its object not by fitting a general 
specification, with the object figuring in the 
thought as what fits the specification, but by virtue 
of the way this sort of thinking exploits the 
perceptible presence of the object itself’ 
(McDowell, 1994: 105). 
180 
 
 A central theme of the final stage of this chapter is to bring this line of 
thought about demonstrative conceptual content to bear on the principle and 
pervasive disagreement of the McDowell-Dreyfus debate. Essentially, the goal 
here is to disprove Dreyfus’s claim that ‘no “aspect” of motor intentional content 
is “present” in a “form” which is “suitable to constitute the contents of 
conceptual capacities”’ (Dreyfus, 2007b: 360). I want to focus first on the 
“knowledge-how” which is characteristic of our skilful bodily responses. In this 
way, I want to return to the epistemic, Rylean approach to unreflective action 
that I took in 1.3. 
 
  Bodily Ability and Knowing-How 
 It useful here to refer to Foster-Wallace’s description of how the 
development of one’s bodily skilful responses outstrips any propositional 
knowledge of how to act. Foster-Wallace refers to the development of our skilful 
bodily responses in terms of refining the “kinaesthetic sense”: 
Refining the kinaesthetic sense is the main goal of 
the extreme daily practice regimens we often hear 
about […] Hitting thousands of strokes, day after day, 
develops the ability to do by “feel” what cannot be 
done by regular conscious thought […] a sense of 
each change’s effects that gets more and more acute 
even as it recedes from consciousness (Foster-
Wallace, 2006).  
 We must supplement Foster-Wallace’s description here with the 
specification that such a “kinaesthetic sense” in in service of an overall 
intentional action. Given what I concluded in 4.2, we can specify that a 
particular action, even when it is being performed with a high level of 
unreflective expertise, manifests possession of a concept of an action like 
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“serving to an opponent’s backhand”. Dreyfus hints that he could possibly 
concede this point to McDowell, but emphasises that no such concept-possession 
could capture the way in which the intention is carried out. In Dreyfus’s view, the 
knowledge-how involved in unreflective action represents an abdication of 
responsibility to the body – we might recall Merleau-Ponty’s description of an 
expert typist, where the relevant knowledge is ‘in the hands, which is 
forthcoming only when bodily effort is made’ (Merleau-Ponty, 2002: 166). 
McDowell points out that the knowledge-how on display in master-level chess 
need not rely on any reflection on what to do – i.e. what overall course of action 
to take – or how to do it. After the fact, the chess master can answer the relevant 
“Anscombean” questions about what they were doing and why they were doing 
it. In providing such answers, McDowell claims, the chess-master gives 
‘expression to knowledge he already had when he was acting in flow’ (McDowell, 
2013: 46). Dreyfus disputes that the knowledge involved could be abstracted out 
from the state of flow that the chess-master finds themselves in: ‘when we want 
to describe the activity that contributes to the basic action but is not in itself a 
basic action, we find we don’t experience an ego doing it’ (Dreyfus, 2007b: 374). 
For Dreyfus, the skilful way of acting here belongs to a sphere inaccessible by 
rational capacities. That is, it does not belong to the space of reasons in any 
sense47. What we need to do is demonstrate how the knowledge-how manifested 
in one’s skilful bodily response might be brought into the space of reasons, and 
accordingly the realm of the conceptually expressible.  
                                                          
47 The question then arises of whether the skilful way of acting belongs to the realm of law, of 
causal scientific explanation, for Dreyfus. Dreyfus does hold that there is a normativity inherent 
in his account which represents a middle ground between McDowell’s explanatory space. I deal 
with this normativity in relation to Dreyfus’s account of perceptual experience.  
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 We should therefore return to the epistemic approach I took in Chapter 
One. There, I demonstrated how Ryle argues that “knowing-how” to do 
something is not a matter of possessing any conceptually structured knowledge. 
Recent “intellectualist” approaches to knowledge-how, however, dispute the 
orthodox Rylean position here. Such approaches deny that knowing-how to do 
something – such as returning a world-class serve – in a non-conceptual form of 
knowledge. Stanley & Williamson’s “Knowing How” (2001) has been 
particularly influential in this regard. I should note that Stanley & Williamson do 
not refer to Dreyfus or any phenomenological account of unreflective action. 
Ryle attacks approaches to intentional action where intentional action ‘is a 
process introduced and somehow steered by some ulterior act of theorising’ and 
is ‘guided by the consideration of a regulative proposition’ (Ryle, 1945: 1 – 2). 
Ryle’s regress argument is a central line of attack against that account. As we 
saw, Ryle identifies a regress wherein the consideration of a “regulative 
proposition”, or rule, would require a further such act, and this latter act would 
itself require a further act, and so on48. Of course, we know that Dreyfus further 
argues that the consideration of rules simply does not show up in 
phenomenological descriptions of unreflective action.  
 First, Stanley & Williamson undercut the regress argument – they deny 
that the ascription of a conceptual form of knowledge would require the reflective 
consideration of conceptual rules: ‘it is simply false that manifestations of 
                                                          
48 Stanley & Williamson express the regress as follows, where ‘the content of knowledge how to 
F is, for some φ, the proposition that φ(F), and where “C(p) denotes ‘the act of contemplating 
the proposition that p’: ‘Suppose that Hannah Fs. By premise (1), Hannah employs the 
knowledge-how to F. By RA, Hannah employs the knowledge that φ(F). So, by premise (2), 
Hannah C(φ(F))s. Since C(φ(F)) is an act, we can reapply premise (1), to obtain the conclusion 
that Hannah knows how to C(φ(F)). By RA, it then follows that Hannah employs the knowledge 




knowledge-that must be accompanied by distinct acts of contemplating 
propositions’ (Stanley & Williamson, 2001: 415). The phenomenological insight 
that conceptual capacities are not in play in that descriptive sense that Rouse 
highlights is perfectly acceptable to the intellectualist. Stanley & Williamson cite 
Carl Ginet to make this point:  
I exercise (or manifest) my knowledge that one can 
get the door open by turning the knob and pushing it 
(as well as my knowledge that there is a door there) 
by performing that operation quite automatically as I 
leave the room; and I may do this, of course, without 
formulating (in my mind or out loud) that 
proposition or any other relevant proposition (Ginet, 
1975: 7). 
 As we have seen, McDowell prefers to describe intentional action in terms 
of “realising” conceptual capacities. McDowell’s description of the chess master 
giving ‘expression to knowledge he already had when he was acting in flow’ 
(McDowell, 2013: 46) makes this point in epistemic terms. Ryle’s identification 
of a regress does not apply to this sort of moderate intellectualism. As such, 
Stanley & Williamson point out that only if the intentional action really did 
require a prior act of considering a rule that a regress would take hold. They deny 
that conceptual knowledge must be attributed in this way. Attributing conceptual 
knowledge to an unreflectively acting agent means, rather, that ‘knowledge is 
thought of as encoded in a propositional form for the speaker, whether 
consciously or unconsciously’ (Gascoigne & Thornton, 2013: 56). Such a 
specification is in line with the point I have made throughout this chapter. 
Unreflective action can be understood as a manifestation of concept-possession, 
rather than an instance of those concepts being reflectively drawn upon, or 
“causally efficacious”, in the action itself. Stanley & Williamson therefore reject 
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what Gottlieb calls Dreyfus’s “general assumption” about the relationship 
between conceptual involvement and reflection or conscious thought.  
 We should recall the issue of situation-specificity. For Dreyfus, the 
context-dependent way in which an agent can unreflectively respond with an 
appropriate and skilful bodily action shows that the agent’s possession of any 
conceptual knowledge can only play a limited role. Unreflective action depends 
on responding to a unique situation in a specific way. One’s repertoire of 
conceptual knowledge, for Dreyfus, is not equal to all of these unique situations 
or specific responses. The right response is rooted in a non-conceptual bodily 
ability, which is a result of something like Foster-Wallace’s development of a 
“kinaesthetic sense”. For McDowell’s part, he denies that the knowledge that 
informs one’s unreflective response ‘can be captured in general prescriptions for 
conduct, determinately expressible independently of the concrete situations in 
which the phronimos is called to act’ (McDowell, 2007a: 340). Stanley & 
Williamson similarly deny that conceptual knowledge is limited to context-
dependent specifications of rules. Their account works to assuage Dreyfus’s 
concerns that conceptual articulation cannot ever capture situation-specificity. 
Stanley & Williamson’s candidate for conceptually structured knowledge-how is 
a certain type of proposition. These propositions capture ‘ways of engaging in 
actions’ (Stanley & Williamson, 2001: 427). These “way of engaging in actions” 
are ‘properties of token events’ (Stanley & Williamson, 2001: 427). We can 
understand this on the model of an overall intentional action – a token event – 
and the specific way in which that overall intention is carried out – the property 
of that event. This focus on particular ways of engaging in actions represents a 
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promising attempt to accommodate the situationally sensitive bodily skills that 
Dreyfus emphasises.  
 To be clear, the “token event” should be understood as an intentional 
action that, given what I concluded in 4.3, manifests the agent’s possession of the 
relevant practical concept. In epistemic terms, it manifests the conceptual 
knowledge of what one is trying to do, and what one is trying to achieve. The 
possibility of ascribing conceptual knowledge of the “property” of that token 
event, of the way of engaging in the overall intentional action, is what is up for 
debate here. Stanley & Williamson’s move is to propose that demonstrative 
propositions can capture these properties of intentional actions. Recall 
McDowell’s appeal to demonstrative conceptual content in undermining 
Cartesian assumptions about the role of the mind. The non-conceptualist might 
argue that our conceptual capacities are outstripped by the fine-grained content 
of perceptual experience. In response, McDowell argues that demonstrative 
propositions can capture fineness of grain, such as “that shade of colour”. I will 
recapitulate the details of this line of thought as their relevance arises.  
 Now, Stanley & Williamson claim that demonstrative propositions can 
apply similarly to “fine-grained” actions, so to speak. Just as a perceiving agent 
might use a demonstrative proposition like “that shade of colour” to articulate 
the content of a perceptual experience that she does not have a linguistically 
codified concept for, so too can she use a demonstrative proposition like “that 
way of riding a bicycle”, or even “this is the way to return that kind of serve” to 
articulate a way of engaging in a token intentional action. Further, just as the 
demonstrative proposition “that shade of colour” has its content in virtue of what 
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McDowell refers to as the ‘perceptible presence of the [shade of colour] itself’ 
(1994: 105), the demonstrative proposition “that way of riding a bicycle” has its 
content in virtue of the perceptible presence of the practical demonstration of the 
action. Thus, Stanley & Williamson hold that an ascription of knowledge like 
“Hannah knows how to ride a bicycle” is true if Hannah knows that a particular 
practically demonstrated way of riding a bicycle is a way for her to ride a bicycle 
(Stanley & Williamson, 2001: 426). There is a certain kind of knowledge, then, 
that is only articulable in the presence of a practical demonstration. Crucially, 
this articulation brings a way of acting, or a way of responding, into the realm of 
conceptual thought. We can ascribe the unreflectively acting agent knowledge-that 
one can return a serve in this or that particular way. Knowledge-how is therefore 
a kind of knowledge-that. I will draw out some of the philosophical details and 
implications here presently. I first want to address an important objection that 
might arise here, particularly from Dreyfus’s non-conceptualist perspective. 
 An intellectualist account relies on the practical demonstration of ways of 
acting. Stanley & Williamson hold that an ascription of knowledge like “Hannah 
knows how to ride a bicycle” is true if Hannah knows that a particular practically 
demonstrated way of riding a bicycle is a way for her to ride a bicycle (Stanley & 
Williamson, 2001: 426). That is, there is a certain kind of knowledge that is only 
articulable in the presence of a practical demonstration. Again, recall 
McDowell’s comments on perception of shades of colour, that ‘in the presence of 
the original sample, “that shade” can give expression to a concept of a shade’ 
(McDowell, 1994: 57). Gascoigne & Thornton defend a similar account of the 
knowledge on display in unreflective action (they call it “tacit knowledge”): 
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Tacit knowledge is practical knowledge or know-
how. Further, in some sense at least, it resists being 
put into words […] it does have a content, but not 
one that can be captured in context-independent or 
purely linguistic terms. The articulation of the 
content requires practical demonstration. But […] 
this does not imply that the content lies outside the 
space of concepts (Gascoigne & Thornton, 2013: 
191).  
 As in McDowell’s account of demonstrative propositions, this rests upon 
the idea that something’s being “conceptual” does not mean that it is equivalent 
to a definite description. Content can be “conceptual” without falling under a 
generic linguistic specification. Again, we should pay attention to McDowell’s 
claim that the content of a demonstrative is ‘genuinely recognizable as a 
conceptual capacity’ in that ‘the associated capacity can persist into the future, if 
only for a short time, and that, having persisted, it can be used also in thoughts 
about what is by then the past’ (1994: 57). The temporal persistence of the 
demonstrative’s content means, as Gascoigne & Thornton point out, that the 
content can ‘play a role in reasoning – via inferences, for example – and thus 
count as genuinely conceptual’ (2013: 62). As I noted in my discussion of 
perception, two linguistically identical demonstratives can serve as quite different 
premises in reasoning. I will exploit this idea further below, when I discuss the 
non-propositional character of affective content, and how such content belongs 
nevertheless to the conceptual realm.  
Following Merleau-Ponty, Dreyfus holds that the knowledge on display 
in unreflective action is inseparable and un-abstractable from a set of embodied 
skills that are accompanied by that “kinaesthetic sense” that Foster-Wallace 
describes. Again, Dreyfus holds that ‘embodied skills, when we are absorbed in 
enacting them, have a kind of content which is nonconceptual, non-
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propositional, non-rational (even if rational means situation-specific), and non-
linguistic’ (Dreyfus, 2007a: 360). Dreyfus’s point here has force against this 
“intellectualist” account of knowledge-how, which relies on demonstrative 
conceptual content which expresses ways of acting that are being practically 
demonstrated. We should make a distinction between the conceptual knowledge 
of an observer, who doesn’t have the ability to perform the action being 
practically demonstrated, and the knowledge-how of the practitioner, who does 
have the requisite ability. Bengson & Moffett refer to the “couch potato” 
watching sports to emphasise this distinction, noting that it causes problems for 
the intellectualist’s demonstrative account of knowledge-how:  
[… ] it might be suggested that one result is that any 
couch potato can know how to throw a perfect spiral 
because he knows, on the basis of watching 
television that that is the way John Elway (who has a 
distinctive throwing style) throws a football’ (2007: 
52).  
 Bengson & Moffett therefore speak to the concerns of Dreyfus when they 
note that ‘a way of throwing a perfect spiral involves a significant number of 
kinaesthetic properties, and thus it is reasonable to think that no purely 
perceptual demonstrative concept or set of concepts could constitute a correct 
and complete conception of a way of doing so’ (2007: 52). A “kinaesthetic 
property”, I take it, might refer to something like a very particular tension in 
one’s arm when setting up to throw the football – that is, something that is not 
observable but available only to the demonstrator. The couch potato’s 
knowledge that John Elway’s way of throwing a football is a way to throw a 
“perfect spiral” is not the same kind of knowledge that John Elway himself 
possesses. Stanley & Williamson account for this distinction through “practical 
modes of presentation” (see Stanley & Williamson, 2001: 429). Gascoigne & 
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Thornton note that ‘what the practical mode of presentation is designed to 
capture is the connection between practical knowledge-how and ability’ (2013: 
71)49. The “practical mode of presentation” is the sense – to refer to its Fregean 
heritage - associated with the way of acting when the demonstrative is issued 
from the first person perspective of the agent engaging in that way of acting (see 
Stanley & Williamson, 2001: 428). Thus the demonstrative issued from the 
perspective of the observer has a different sense, and thus a different conceptual 
content, from the perspective of the agent engaging in the way of acting. Thus, 
the conceptual content of knowledge-how need not be codifiable in a way that 
can be shared with another person without informational loss – the knowledge 
can be distinctly personal.  
The demonstrative issued under this practical mode of presentation 
therefore includes those relevant kinaesthetic properties that only the agent 
engaging in the way of acting can experience. To paraphrase McDowell, the 
demonstrative “exploits” the “perceptible presence” of the various kinds of 
kinaesthetic properties involved in, say, setting up for a return of serve. We can 
easily imagine a tennis player in training, who finally arrives at a particularly 
effective way of returning a serve – a way, of course, that involves subtle 
arrangements, tensions, and movements of limbs – and concluding that “this is 
the way to return a serve” 50. The demonstrative would conceptualise exactly 
what it would need to conceptualise in preserving that way of acting in the 
                                                          
49 There is a disagreement in the literature on whether knowledge-how always entails ability – 
Stanley & Williamson deny that there is a necessary connection. In context, Gascoigne & 
Thornton here are pointing out that Stanley & Williamson’s appeal to practical mode of 
presentations may commit them to the connection that they deny. For a discussion of the issue, 
Bengson & Moffet’s “Know-how and concept possession” (2007) is directly concerned with the 
“puzzle” of why ‘some know-how attributions entail ability attributions while others do not’ (31).  
50  To bolster the possible situation-specificity of a way of acting; the tennis player may be 
practicing a way of returning a particular type of serve - one with a particular, speed, spin, or 
trajectory - perhaps one that they know an upcoming opponent will utilise.  
190 
 
player’s memory. Indeed, simply the fact that player would remember the 
relevant practical technique means that a conceptual capacity is being brought to 
bear on that technique, and the knowledge is encoded in a propositional form 
available to the player. We should recall McDowell’s claim that the content of a 
demonstrative is ‘genuinely recognizable as a conceptual capacity’ in that ‘the 
associated capacity can persist into the future, if only for a short time, and that 
having persisted, it can be used also in thoughts about what is by then the past’ 
(McDowell, 1994: 57). The temporal persistence of the demonstrative’s content 
means, as Gascoigne & Thornton point out, that the content can ‘play a role in 
reasoning – via inferences, for example, and thus count as genuinely conceptual’ 
(2013: 62). As I noted in 3.5, two linguistically identical demonstratives can 
serve as quite different premises in reasoning – precisely because they have quite 
different referents that are nonetheless preserved in the content of the 
demonstrative.  
 Another example may help here. Foster-Wallace remembers a 
particularly good shot that Federer managed to make in an almost insuperably 
difficult situation against Andre Agassi: ‘what Federer now does is somehow 
instantly reverse thrust and sort of skip backward three or four steps, impossibly 
fast, to hit a forehand out of his backhand corner, all his weight moving 
backward, and the forehand is a topspin screamer down the line past Agassi at 
net’ (Foster-Wallace, 2006). Everything in this description, the speed, the 
situation-specificity, the distinctly bodily expertise, represents what Dreyfus 
attempts to capture in his non-conceptualist, motor intentional account of 
unreflective action. What I have tried to show here is that Federer is manifesting 
knowledge of a way to get out of that situation. Of course, the demonstrative 
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form of conceptual knowledge needn’t be expressed, or even consciously 
entertained by the player. As McDowell describes in the case of the chess master, 
if they do entertain or express their conceptual knowledge in the relevant 
demonstrative, they give ‘expression to knowledge [they] already had when 
[they] were acting in flow’ (McDowell, 2013: 46). Federer might identify 
through the use of a demonstrative that what he did was a way of hitting a 
winner from that position – and this is to bring what he did into the conceptual 
realm. This cannot be a trivial conceptualisation. The way of acting here needs 
to be identified in order for it to be able to serve as a premise in the kind of 
reasoning that must surely go along with any human intentional activity where a 
level of competence is required. If Federer had been in that same situation and 
engaged in a way of acting that resulted in him losing the point, then a 
conceptual identification of how he responded to that situation would be 
essential. That he can engage in a certain line of substantive reasoning – “that 
way of responding to that situation didn’t work, perhaps I should try this” – 
presupposes that the ways of acting here are conceptually available, and that 
their conceptual availability is essential.  
 I want to consider one final objection. It may seem as though ascribing an 
agent the conceptual knowledge that “that is a way of acting” only comes into 
play when one needs to step back and reason about one’s actions, as in my 
example of Federer. There might be a concern that the ascription of such 
knowledge does not make any difference to the execution of the bodily skills 
themselves. That is, the knowledge is in some sense explanatorily idle in an 
account of unreflective action. Now, McDowell tentatively endorses Dreyfus’s 
claim that ‘the body knows what movements to make’ (McDowell, 2007b: 368). 
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He states that such a claim is acceptable as long as it only means that the agent 
‘does not need to determine the specific character of the limb movements 
involved in exercising a skill’ and that ‘she can leave that determination to her 
ingrained bodily habits’ (McDowell, 2007b: 368). I agree; we of course cannot 
downgrade the importance of bodily skill in accomplishing any sort of practical 
activity. The importance of possessing conceptual knowledge-how does not, 
however, carry the implication that such knowledge governs the bodily activity. 
Nevertheless, I do think McDowell’s account here is incomplete, and we can 
stretch his conceptualism further.  
 I want to highlight that knowing how to engage in a way of acting belongs 
to a conceptual framework presupposed by one’s acting intentionally in the first 
place. In acting intentionally, one “realises” a concept of a thing to do, as well as 
a conceptual understanding of the rules and norms of the activity one is engaging 
in. That is to say, the way of acting bears a normative relation to the overall 
action itself. I want to make the related point that one manifests knowledge of 
the reliability of the bodily skill involved in carrying out an intention. In leaving 
the determination of ‘the specific character of the limb movements involved in 
exercising a skill’ to one’s ‘ingrained bodily habits’ (McDowell, 2007b: 368), one 
manifests knowledge that those bodily habits have some degree of reliability. 
One also manifests knowledge that the particular way of utilising one’s bodily 
skills has a degree of appropriateness. My point here is that the conceptual 
knowledge that “that is the way to respond to this situation” is in the first instance 
integrated into a framework of concepts that is presupposed in acting 
intentionally. In acting intentionally, whether unreflectively otherwise, one 
manifests a conceptual grasp of one’s embodied skills and their role in the 
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relevant practical activity. McDowell claims that ‘when a rational agent catches a 
frisbee, she does not do that […] by realizing concepts of contributory things to 
do(McDowell, 2007b: 369). My point is that the concept “this is a way of 
catching a Frisbee” must be part of the conceptual framework that the overall 
intentional action manifests, because the agent must have a conceptual 
understanding of the skills that contribute to their intentional action.  
 At this point, we should recall Dreyfus’s claim that ‘embodied skills, 
when we are absorbed in enacting them, have a kind of content which is 
nonconceptual, non-propositional, non-rational (even if rational means 
situation-specific), and non-linguistic (Dreyfus, 2007a: 360). I have taken an 
epistemic approach here to show that our embodied skills, our ways of 
unreflectively responding to practical situations, can be brought within the realm 
of conceptual though - on a clarified view of what it means for something to be 
conceptual. Indeed, I have endeavoured to show that our embodied skills entail 
conceptual knowledge that is utilised in reasoning, and is integrated in a 
conceptual framework that is manifested in our intentional practical activity. Of 
course, for both McDowell and for Dreyfus, the embodied, skilful way in which 
we respond to practical situations is dependent upon our perceptual experience 
of those situations. In providing a conceptualist account of the knowledge-how 
entailed by embodied skills, I hope to have prepared the ground for assessing 
Dreyfus’s notion of the motor intentional content of perceptual experience. 
 
 Affective Content and Reasons for Acting 
We have seen that McDowell wants to characterise unreflective action in 
terms of “responsiveness to reasons” – that is, that our actions are responsive to 
194 
 
perceived states of affairs that therefore represent reasons for our actions. 
McDowell insists on this characterisation in order to preserve the normative, 
agential component of unreflective action. Dreyfus, however, argues that 
unreflective, practically engaged experience is constituted by “motor intentional 
content” which cannot be construed as representing reasons for one’s 
unreflective responses (see 2007a: 361). Dreyfus states that ‘the world we are 
drawn into when we are absorbed in coping does not stand over against us a set 
of facts that can be captured in propositions but rather is directly lived by the 
absorbed coper as a shifting field of attractions and repulsions’ (Dreyfus, 2013: 
18). Crucially, this shifting field of attractions and repulsions do not figure in 
unreflective activity as reasons for an agent’s unreflective responses. The 
“attractions and repulsions” here are figuring for the agent below the level of 
conscious awareness. Dreyfus utilises distinctive phenomenological descriptions 
of this “affective” sort of perceptual experience. Dreyfus’s phenomenology 
depicts the chess master playing lightning chess as being ‘directly drawn by the 
forces on the board to make a masterful move’ (Dreyfus, 2013: 35). Similarly, he 
cites Merleau-Ponty’s description of the football player: ‘for the player in action 
the soccer field is not an “object”. It is pervaded by lines of force […] and is 
articulated into sectors (for example, the “openings” between the adversaries), 
which call for a certain mode of action’ (Merleau-Ponty, 1966: 168). Dreyfus 
generalises these sorts of phenomenological descriptions as depicting the agent 
being “drawn” on a bodily level to respond in a certain way, or feeling a 
“tension” which is resolved by responding in a certain ways (see Dreyfus, 2007c: 
107, cited below). 
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We can then identify three familiar claims that Dreyfus derives from 
these phenomenological descriptions. First, the claim that ‘no “aspect” of motor 
intentional content is “present” in a “form” which is “suitable to constitute the 
contents of conceptual capacities’ (Dreyfus, 2007a: 360). Secondly, the claim 
that bringing conceptual thought to bear on motor intentional or affective 
content transforms the content, ‘thereby making it available for rational analysis 
but no longer capable of directly motivating action’ (Dreyfus, 2007a: 360). This 
claim should be explicitly related to Dreyfus’s further claim that affective content 
cannot be construed in terms of reasons that the agent is responding to:  
Tensions cannot be described but only felt as directly 
drawing the master to respond. They are what 
Merleau-Ponty calls motivations, which are neither 
reasons nor causes. Such motivations are not 
available as reasons when the master reflects but are 
only embodied in the action itself’ (Dreyfus, 2007c: 
107)  
 Attempting to conceptualise something like the “lines of force” that the 
master experiences on a chess board neutralises their motivating force for the 
agent. Here we should note Dreyfus’s specification that although the “tensions” 
are not reasons, neither are they causes. Dreyfus attempts to highlight a 
normativity in his account of motor intentional content that may not be 
immediately apparent. I have repeatedly noted that McDowell is concerned to 
avoid picturing unreflective action as what Rietveld calls a ‘brute causal event’ 
(Rietveld, 2010: 186), or what I have called “flatly causal”. In  a causal picture of 
unreflective action, one’s natural bodily dispositions are simply caused to 
respond in particular ways, and any sense of human agency is lost. The kind of 
perceptual content involved in Dreyfus’s account seems to represent a non-
conceptual “given” that causes an intentional response. In 3.3 I showed how 
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Sellars’ critique of the given exposes the philosophical incoherence of such an 
account, and in 4.3 I showed how that critique bears out in terms of intentional 
responses in the shape of unreflective actions. Dreyfus acknowledges that a non-
conceptualist account of the relationship between perception and action is indeed 
vulnerable to a concern about “disenchantment”, as McDowell puts it (1994: 88). 
Dreyfus remarks that ‘it seems that either one is pushed around like a 
thing by meaningless physical and psychological forces, or else one’s reasons, 
explicit or implicit, motivate one’s actions’ (Dreyfus, 2005: 56). Dreyfus takes 
there to be a third explanatory option here, an option between the “space of 
reasons”, and the “realm of law”. Explaining an intentional action in terms of a 
causal relationship between a perceptual stimulus and bodily response – “pushed 
around like a thing” – places it squarely within the realm of law. Of course, 
McDowell’s account places intentional action in the space of reasons. Dreyfus 
argues that unreflective action belongs to the “space of motivations” (Dreyfus, 
2005: 56), echoed by O’Connaill (2014). Dreyfus attempts to demonstrate how 
his account avoids positing a flatly causal relationship between unreflective 
perceptual experience and our practical responses. That is, Dreyfus has his own 
method for avoiding the “myth of the given” that does not involve affording a 
crucial role to the operation of conceptual capacities: ‘We must accept the 
possibility that our ground-level coping opens up the world by opening us to a 
meaningful Given – a Given that is nonconceptual but not bare’ (Dreyfus, 2005: 
55). Dreyfus therefore owes us a coherent account of how affective content can 
be both non-conceptual and meaningful, and how the relevant aspects of a 
practical situation can be perceptually “given” without standing in a flatly causal 
relation to our actions. The issue here is how a non-conceptual perceptual 
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experience can stand in a genuinely normative relation to a skilful bodily 
response. In Bengon’s terminology, the question becomes how a non-conceptual 
perception can “produce” a genuinely intentional, agential action.  
I will first consider Dreyfus’s attempt to secure a normative component to 
his picture of the interrelation between affective content and the skilful bodily 
response. This component arises again at the level of bodily feeling. Now, it 
essential to an agent engaged in a skilful activity – whether this be a matter of 
expert performance or everyday “coping” – that they can and do recognise 
mistakes or shortcomings in their actions. Rouse points out the importance of 
recognizing mistakes, citing the errors that a grandmaster absorbed in the flow of 
a chess game might make, in relation to Dreyfus’s non-conceptualist account of 
unreflective action: ‘Dreyfus’s account of skilled coping as ground-floor 
nonconceptual intentionality cannot recognize them as errors, but only as 
responses that are abnormal for grandmasters’ (Rouse, 2013: 254). An error in 
Dreyfus’s non-conceptualist account would be more like a glitch in the grand-
master’s programming, or ‘design limitations in their trained cognitive 
orientation’ (Rouse, 2013: 254). A grandmaster’s error would not be an 
normatively evaluable failure to appreciate one course of action over another, or 
to recognise that that they failed to consider certain reasons to adopt another 
strategic route. On Dreyfus’s account, it comes to seem as though the 
grandmaster could not have acted any differently.  
Dreyfus attempts to offset this possible reading of his phenomenology. 
Dreyfus argues that the agent’s understanding of the appropriateness of their 
actions – whether they ought to be acting in this way, or not – is an understanding 
operating on the level of affective content. Dreyfus argues that ‘the experience of 
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coping going well or badly is a kind of normativity that does not require an ego’s 
representation of conditions of satisfaction’ (Dreyfus, 2013: 31). Dreyfus often 
refers to this kind of normativity as the unreflectively acting agent ‘sensing a 
tension’ that draws them back to an optimal way of engaging in the overall 
intentional action (Dreyfus, 2013: 31). However, when the performance is sub-
optimal, or ‘when coping runs into some sort of resistance or breakdown that 
blocks it […] the absence of tension […] gives way to an overall background 
sense that things are not going well’ (Dreyfus, 2013: 31). Dreyfus’s account of 
normativity amounts to a kind of bodily intuition that our engaged activity is 
going either optimally or sub-optimally, and that our actions are an immediate 
response to this intuition. For Dreyfus, then, any normative component to the 
experience should be construed in terms of affective content, which 
phenomenology can only inadequately describe in terms of feeling “tensions” 
that draw the body to correct its course of skilful engagement, or to maintain it.  
However, this way of securing normativity is clearly flawed. It is still 
bodily ability that “decides” when a performance is not going well, and it is 
bodily ability that therefore triggers the involvement of the conceptual capacities 
of the agent. The agential component to the action can only arise when the body, 
so to speak, has done all it can. On Dreyfus’s account, the agent themselves does 
not decide when to assume responsibility of their non-conceptual activity. The 
unreflective action can still be understood in distinctly causal terms – one’s non-
conceptual, affective perception that an action is proceeding sub-optimally stands 
in a causal relation to the body’s correction of the action. Nothing about the 
account provided here makes it clear how an unreflectively acting agent is not 
just being ‘pushed around like a thing’ (Dreyfus, 2005: 56). Dreyfus seems to 
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misunderstand what an ascription of normativity entails. The idea that the body 
“knows” whether an action is optimal or suboptimal can only be a limited 
metaphor, as McDowell notes (McDowell, 2007b: 368). Our bodily skills do not 
themselves have the kind of agency which implies the possibility of normative 
assessment. On an account in which conceptual capacities are not operative, the 
affective “sense that things are not going well” and the resulting bodily response 
could only entail a causal relation. As I will demonstrate below, the only way to 
make sense of this in a normative sense is to admit the involvement of conceptual 
capacities.  
We should recall Dreyfus’s references the explanatory role of science, 
early in the debate; Dreyfus argues that unreflective action can be explained with 
an accurate model of the brain. If the kind of “affective” content and its relation 
to bodily responses is, in the end, explicable by the relevant account of 
neurophysiology, then Dreyfus’s attempt to show how it does not belong to the 
realm of law is in any case fruitless. As such, it is not possible to ascribe a 
normatively assessable “understanding” of the perceived situation to our bodily 
skills. Dreyfus’s account of motor intentional content in general does not make 
clear how we can characterise the resulting actions as genuinely intentional, in 
the sense of agential or justifiable. The role that affective content plays is simply to 
trigger an ingrained bodily response. We can imagine an animal experiencing 
precisely the same kind of affective content – “feeling drawn” toward food. As 
Bengson notes, Dreyfus’s account of solicitations straightforwardly implies that 
any resulting action would be ‘a reflexive, conditioned, or non-voluntary 
response to perceptual stimuli’ (Bengson, 2016: 35). Therefore, Dreyfus’s picture 
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of perception does not explain ‘how subsequent action could be Intelligent, nor 
how perception could lead directly to it’ (Bengson, 2016: 37).   
Further, we should assess Dreyfus’ notion that motor intentional content 
represents a meaningful given. It is edifying to recall Gibson’s theory of 
affordances, on this basis. For Gibson, a practically engaged agent perceives 
environmental opportunities for action (Gibson, 1986). Importantly, Gibson 
takes such perception to be of something meaningful, or perhaps “value-laden”. 
His conception of affordances derives from gestalt psychologists such as Koffka 
(1935) and Lewin (1929), who ‘recognized that the meaning or the value of a 
thing seems to perceived just as immediately as its colour’ (Gibson, 1986: 138). 
Koffka describes the meaningfulness of perception in terms of its having a 
“demand” or “invitation” character. For example, ‘the postbox “invites” the 
mailing of a letter, the handle “wants to be grasped” and things “tell us what to 
do with them”’ (Koffka, 1935: 353). The immediacy of this kind of meaningful 
perception might fit Dreyfus’s conception of the meaningful “given” that 
produces intentional action. However, we should pay attention to Gibson’s 
specification that the meaningfulness of these perceptual affordances is not 
intelligible as ‘an unconscious set of response tendencies’ (Gibson, 1986: 138). 
Dreyfus departs from Gibson’s picture of meaningfulness because he effectively 
does take the meaningfulness of perception to be a matter of an “unconscious set 
of response tendencies”. Dreyfus is clear that we ‘need not even be aware of the 
solicitations […] as solicitations’ (2013: 18). Gibson’s focus on the 
meaningfulness of perceptual affordances seems to be lost.  
My view is that Dreyfus’s account of perceptual content doesn’t represent 
a meaningful given, even in a phenomenological sense. We can acknowledge that 
201 
 
something like “affective content” avoids picturing perception as bare, 
unstructured, sensory impingements. By itself, however, this is simply a 
phenomenological platitude. In Dreyfus’s picture, affective content doesn’t 
necessarily depend on our finding it intelligible, or meaningful, or even being 
aware of what it is that is affecting us. Dreyfus seems to address this point here: 
‘clearly, what is given to the chess master in his experience of the board isn’t a 
bare Given […] In being solicited to respond to a chess-position, the chess master 
has a take on “the layout of reality”. It follows that he can be mistaken’ (Dreyfus, 
2005: 55). I think the sentiment Dreyfus’s expresses here is right – but it is hard 
to see how it could be construed in his non-conceptualist terms. Siegel remarks 
that the affective content in Dreyfus’s account  ‘does not account for the 
experience of solicitation per se […] nothing in the ebb and flow of tension and 
relief reflects the experience of [objects and situations] soliciting one to perform 
an action that will relieve the tension one feels in that situation’ (Siegel, 2014: 
24). In other words, the affective content doesn’t bear any necessary relation to a 
state of affairs. In principle, one could experience precisely the same affective 
content in two very different practical situations. Crucially, this point means that 
we can describe such content as “intentional” only in a weak sense. We should 
recall that Dreyfus thinks affective content enables a “contact theory”, where the 
human being has direct access to their environment without conceptual 
mediation. However, this “direct access” or “contact” is underwhelming if it 
only guarantees contact with something. We should conclude that Dreyfus’s 
account does not provide us with a substantively meaningful given, nor does it 
preserve the normativity and agency of intentional action. Dreyfus’s account 
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entails a causal, non-normative relation between perceptual stimulus and bodily 
response.  
Now, this does not mean that we have to deny the existence of something 
like affective content. There is no doubt that the perceptual experience of 
practically engaged agents can feasibly described in terms of being “solicited” or 
“drawn” to respond in a particular way. Such content surely does play a crucial 
role in the way in which human beings relate to their environment. I want to 
draw on a suggestion made by Susanna Siegel, which she does not herself 
develop. To make sense of Dreyfus’s phenomenology, Siegel suggests, we might 
hold that affective content entails ‘psychologically more complex responses to 
the situation that involves some type of understanding of what the situation 
demands’ (Siegel, 2014: 24). In line with what I have said so far in this chapter, I 
think that such understanding would consist in possessing the relevant concepts 
and conceptual knowledge. Siegel argues that ascribing such a role to an 
additional form of understanding scuppers Dreyfus’s account, because ‘that 
understanding, whatever form it takes, has just as much claim to guiding the 
action as the dynamic of tension and relief has’ (2014: 24). The account I will 
provide, however, accommodates the substantive role of motor intentional 
content   
In conceiving of motor intentional content in this way, I dispute certain 
of Dreyfus’s claims about the non-conceptual nature of practically engaged 
perceptual experience. Specifically, I dispute Dreyfus’s claims that motor 
intentional content is not conceptual content (2007a: 360), that motor 
intentional content accordingly does not represent reasons for acting (2007a: 361), 
and that bringing conceptual capacities to bear on motor intentional content 
203 
 
renders it incapable of ‘directly motivating action’ (Dreyfus, 2007a: 360). In 
terms of this latter claim, I argue that motor intentional content is only capable 
of directly motivating action if it is situated within an operative framework of 
conceptual capacities. As I will show, that such content is situated in such a 
framework means that it is genuinely conceptual content.  
 It is useful to begin by focusing on the claim that motor intentional 
content does not represent reasons for acting. Relevant here is O’Connaill’s 
discussion of the “space of motivations”. O’Connaill distinguishes this 
explanatory space from the space of reasons in order to account for actions 
which he argues are ‘not performed for a reason’ (2014: 443). O’Connaill uses a 
definition of what it means to act for a reason from Alvarez (2009), who argues 
that to act for a reason requires that one takes the action to be good or valuable, 
either instrumentally or in itself’ (O’Connaill, 2014: 443; see Alvarez 2009: 305). 
O’Connaill takes two examples where a practical agent is likely to explain their 
engaging in a particular action in an Anscombean sense, by saying something 
along the lines of “I felt like it”. Two notable examples are performing a 
cartwheel, and catching a frisbee (the latter is an example McDowell uses). 
O’Connaill concludes that neither of these examples involve the agent acting for 
a reason, because “feeling like it” is simply an expression of desiring to do 
something, and ‘if one performs an action merely because one desires to do it, 
one does not perform it because it seems good or worthwhile’ (2014: 443). 
Surely, however, this is an unrealistic and unnecessarily restrictive definition of 
acting for reasons, and O’Connaill doesn’t justify his use of it. What I want to 
suggest, along McDowellian lines, is that “feeling like it” is a reason because it is 
normatively evaluable. Perhaps someone may feel like doing a cartwheel in a 
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deeply inappropriate situation – their protesting that they did it “because they 
felt like it” is evaluable as a bad reason.  
 Now, “feeling like” doing something can be associated with the motor 
intentional, affective kind of perceptual content that Dreyfus emphasises. 
Certainly, the perceptual experience that Dreyfus draws attention to is often 
characterised by feeling drawn toward a particular feature of the environment. In 
terms of the chess player, Dreyfus argues that their fine-grained discriminations 
of positions on the board is what “draws” them to act (2013: 35) Of course, their 
recognition of this position is not intelligible in terms of possessing a concept of 
it – the position might be one that they have never come across before: ‘A chess 
master does not see the board as a propositional structure no matter how specific 
and contextual. When involved in the game, and only while involved, he sees 
“lines of force” (Dreyfus, 2007c: 106). As I highlighted above, we can go along 
with Dreyfus’s account of such perceptual content up to a point. We can affirm 
here that what the agent sees can be construed in the metaphorical language of 
Dreyfus’s phenomenological descriptions, and explained with reference to the 
physiological or neurophysiological development of perceptual capacities. The 
chess player, having played ‘hundreds of thousands of actions’ has developed ‘a 
sensitivity to subtler and subtler similarities and differences of perceptual patterns’ 
(Dreyfus, 2013: 35). On Dreyfus’s account, their actions are therefore directly 
responsive to this perceptual sensitivity – in a way that means that we can’t 
characterise such sensitivity as representing reasons for the agent responding in 
the way that they do.  
 In one of the first poker strategy books, Doyle Brunson (1978) marvels at 
the way in which he is often able to correctly judge the exact hole cards of an 
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opponent. Brunson finds this so peculiar that he invokes the idea of 
“extrasensory perception” and the “electrical impulses” that the brain emanates: 
‘Is it really too unreasonable to suspect that a highly sophisticated electrical 
device as the human brain, during the intensity of concentration in a big pot, 
could broadcast a simple message like “a pair of Jacks” a mere eight feet?’ 
(Brunson, 1978: 23). Of course, we might suspect that an intuition like a “a pair 
of Jacks” is a product of vast experience and practice at a poker table; perceiving 
actions – whether physical tells or strategic actions – that have been 
unconsciously associated with an opponent having a pair of Jacks. However, we 
should note the role that Brunson’s strong intuition is playing here. We can take 
seriously the idea that Brunson cannot specify why he has such a strong intuition, 
and may attribute it to the same highly developed neurophysiology of the chess 
player above. Something similar might be said of the chess player who has 
developed a perceptual sensitivity to the “lines of force” on the board. A 
lightning chess player might simply “feel” that a move is right, or that some 
sector of the board “looks” weak, and reacts accordingly. Indeed, perhaps a 
better chess player would have a slightly different intuition – perhaps that 
segment of the board is deceptively strong, and so they do not respond with the 
suboptimal attacking move of the weaker player.  
 The idea that these are counter-examples to McDowell’s conception of 
acting for reasons is misguided. Take Brunson’s intuition that his opponent has a 
pair of Jacks, and suppose that he folds his own hand – perhaps he does so 
unreflectively. The first thing to say is that for the intuition “a pair of Jacks” to 
have any bearing on Brunson’s action, Brunson must possess knowledge that his 
intuition has a level of reliability, just as an intentional action entails that the 
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agent has some knowledge of their embodied skills involved in that action. 
Brunson acts on the knowledge that his intuitions are generally reliable in these 
cases. The intuition is in the first instance drawn into a conceptual framework in 
which it assumes a normative character. This is essentially a Sellarsian point 
about the nature of intentional responses. In order for us to form the perceptually 
based knowledge that there is a green object in front of us, we must know, 
amongst other things, that our perceptual experience in the relevant visual 
conditions is generally reliable. In order for Brunson to fold his worse hand – in 
such a way that makes his action agential, intentional and “intelligent” in a 
Rylean sense – he must have some knowledge of how his intuition “a pair of 
Jacks” fits into the arc of his intentional action. In much broader terms, his 
intuition that his opponent had a pair of Jacks represented a reason for the 
action he took. I will return to the point of the intuition being “integrated” into a 
conceptual framework below.  
 McDowell notices that Dreyfus makes much of the idea that an 
unreflectively acting agent could not give particularly substantive answers to 
those Anscombean questions about why they did what they did: 
Dreyfus says, “the [chess] master could only respond to 
the demand for a reason by saying ‘I made the move 
because I was drawn to make it’”. And he suggests that 
in saying this, the chess master would be confessing an 
inability to give a rational explanation of his move, and 
that this shows that rationality is not pervasive 
(McDowell, 2013: 47). 
 In giving an explanation of their action, the chess master only refers to 
that perceptual content that Dreyfus has previously described as ‘nonconceptual, 
nonpropositional, nonrational, and nonlinguistic’ (2007b: 352). However, 
McDowell holds that the perceptual content itself represents a reason for the 
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chess master to act as they did; ‘if he explains his move as a response to the 
forces on the board, as Dreyfus of course accepts he can, he is giving a rational 
explanation of it’ (2013: 47). We can certainly talk in naturalistic terms about 
how the chess-master’s discrimination of the board is so highly developed that 
they simply respond to patterns on the board. However, their discriminatory 
ability gives rise to perceptual content that the chess player, as a rational agent, 
‘acts in the light of’ (McDowell, 2013: 47; my emphasis). McDowell notes that a 
master chess player would have the capacity to be more specific in their 
explanation, and to express more detailed knowledge of what they were doing, 
knowledge that they were acting on the basis of: ‘We can expect him to be able 
to say such things as this: “It’s a good move, because it threatens my opponent’s 
queen”’ (McDowell, 2013: 47). As above, I want to point out that this is not 
necessary to secure an account of “responsiveness to reasons”. Although it is 
more often that not the case that an agent can give detailed reasons for why they 
responded the way they did, the fact they can simply refer to some affective 
“feeling” is enough.  
 Earlier in the debate, McDowell distinguishes the kind of affective content 
that a human might experience from that an animal might experience – he 
returns to the terminology of “affordances”. McDowell highlights that in the case 
of human beings, affordances ‘are no longer just inputs to a natural motivational 
makeup; they are available to the subject’s rationality’ (2007a: 346). He also 
states that affordances are ‘data for [the subject’s] rationality’ (McDowell, 2007a: 
344). The human being’s development of conceptual capacities, the development 
of their “second nature”, decisively transforms the way in which the world 
figures in our intentional states. The kind of perceptual content that Dreyfus 
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identifies does not somehow resist being the kind of thing that one can think 
about it. McDowell notes that the chess master can ‘consider how cogent a 
justification the forces on the board provide for his move’ (McDowell, 2013: 48). 
In order for this to be possible, those forces on the board need to be conceptually 
available. The point of demonstrative, de re conceptual content therefore becomes 
apparent. The ability to identify that one was drawn to act by “that kind of board 
position” is crucial.  
Dreyfus does, briefly, respond to this appeal to demonstrative content in a 
paper separate from the main Inquiry debate. Using the example of the chess 
master, Dreyfus asks; ‘couldn’t the master say while pointing: “Because I was in 
this specific position I made this specific move?’ (Dreyfus, 2007c: 105). Dreyfus 
argues that ‘as soon as the coper steps back and tries to name what he has just 
been experiencing even as “that tension”, the tension is transformed into an 
object and it’s motivational character is lost [...] When Merleau-Ponty tries to 
describe specific motivations he can speak only in metaphors’ (Dreyfus, 2007c: 
107). In the case of the chess player, Dreyfus argues that ‘pointing to the specific 
squares on the board as that position doesn’t capture what it is about that 
position that draws the Grandmaster to make that move’ (Dreyfus, 2007c: 105). 
Dreyfus argues that a demonstrative would not capture the specific context of the 
player’s motor intentional understanding of the position, and further highlights 
that ‘a neutral observer could know all those demonstrative facts about the 
position and its context and still have no idea what move to make. What more is 
needed?’ (Dreyfus, 2007b: 105 – 106). That is, the chess player’s demonstrative 
reference to “that kind of board position” fails to capture the important elements 
of what led the chess player to act.  
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However, this objection is based in a misunderstanding of the nature of de 
re conceptual content. McDowell says that ‘if we want to identify the conceptual 
realm with the realm of thought, the right gloss on “conceptual” is not 
“predicative” but “belonging to the realm of Fregean sense”’ (McDowell, 1994: 
107). In parentheses, he adds ‘The stupid idea that those come to the same thing 
is unfortunately still widespread’ (McDowell, 1994: 107). Opposing the “stupid 
idea” that conceptual must mean predicative comes to be crucial to resolving the 
McDowell-Dreyfus debate. A demonstrative proposition like “that feeling that 
led me to act in this way” does not somehow codify the personal feeling under a 
generic linguistic description that becomes independent of the context in which it 
had meaning. McDowell makes this point about Dreyfus’s understanding of 
what language, and the conceptual domain, entails: 
A requirement of situation-independence would 
exclude what might be meant by an utterance of, 
say, “This one is beautiful” from the domain of 
the linguistically expressible and so of the 
conceptual, since there is no telling what thought 
such an utterance expresses in abstraction from 
the situation in which the thought is expressed. 
(McDowell, 2007a: 342)  
What the demonstrative does is to preserve the “perceptible presence” of 
the affective content. The demonstrative is not meaningful or truth-apt in the 
absence of the affective content that it refers to. We might follow Stanley & 
Williamson in holding that the demonstrative content proper to affective content 
is only fully graspable by the practitioner, rather than the observer. Indeed, when 
a player explains to an observer that their actions were in response to “this or that 
particular pattern on the board”, the observer generally understands that the 
precise nature of the experienced pattern is only fully available to the player who 
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responded to it. In this way, the demonstrative can bring any such affective 
content into the space of reasons.  
If this were not possible – if the content were not of a form appropriate to 
being associated with a conceptual capacity – the affective dimension of our lives 
would never be able to figure in our reasoning in any substantive sense. Take a 
simple case of something that would surely count as affective content – an 
emotion. There is no doubt that emotions are not propositionally structured, nor 
is our natural ability to feel them based on our possession of concepts. However, 
in human life, even very particular kinds of emotions are often referred to in 
language, serve as premises in our inferential reasoning, and count as reasons for 
acting in particular ways. They are, in that sense, conceptual. For some content 
to occupy a node in inferential reasoning, it has to count as conceptual (I will say 
more about this directly below). Two linguistically identical propositions “I was 
drawn by those forces on the board” can refer, indexically, to very different things. 
As in the example of embodied skills, the player might utilise such 
demonstratives in order to reason about their performance – for example, where 
they were misled by their perceptual intuitions into making a suboptimal move. 
The idea of de re conceptual content allow us to affirm that conceptual expression 
does not distort the content, but preserves the contextual, embodied, practical or 
personal aspects of that content.    
I want to consolidate my discussion by considering a further natural 
objection here. A concern might be that while motor intentional content might be 
conceptually available, its conceptual availability makes no difference to how the 
practically engaged agent responds to it in the course of their unreflective action. 
There may therefore be something to Dreyfus’s claim that bringing conceptual 
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capacities to bear on motor intentional content renders it incapable of ‘directly 
motivating action’ (Dreyfus, 2007a: 360). As McDowell acknowledges, if this 
claim means that an agent tries to express what is they are responding to as they 
are responding to it, may indeed scupper the immediacy and flow of the 
intentional responses’ (McDowell, 2013: 48). This objection runs parallel to the 
one I identified in the case of the demonstrative identification of a way of acting. 
My response proceeds along the same lines. Above, I suggested that Brunson’s 
intuition that his opponent has a pair of Jacks must in the first instance be 
integrated into a conceptual framework. For example, Brunson must have some 
conceptual understanding of the reliability of his intuition, and must understand 
how his intuition feeds into the overall arc of his intentional action. The 
possibility of responding unreflectively to motor intentional content is based in 
the way in which that content figures in the conceptual framework that I 
established is manifested in any intentional action. In order for it to figure in such 
a framework – in order for it to play that normative role – it must do so in a 
conceptual form. Otherwise, we have a non-conceptual “given” that determines 
our intentional responses. In this way, we can make further sense of the idea that 
perceptual “affordances” represent ‘data for [a subject’s] rationality’ (McDowell, 
2007a: 344).  
Dreyfus’s claim that bringing conceptual capacities to bear on motor 
intentional content renders it incapable of ‘directly motivating action’ (Dreyfus, 
2007a: 360) can therefore be disputed. On my account, motor intentional content 
can only motivate action by being integrated into a relevant conceptual 
framework, and can be integrated in this way only in a conceptual form. 
Accordingly, the claim that motor intentional content does not represent reasons 
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for acting (Dreyfus, 2007a: 361) also fails, because it based on the assumption 
that motor intentional content is non-conceptual. In the same way that the 
involvement of kinaesthetic bodily skill does not clash with the idea that concept-
possession informs the action, neither does the involvement of perceptual 
capacities clash with the idea that the resulting content is not a “given” that 
stands only in causal relations to the resultant actions, but is normatively 
functional in virtue of concepts that we already possess. 
 There seems to be a phenomenological temptation to assume that the 
conceptualist wants to downplay the affective dimension of human life; that 
emphasising the role of conceptual capacities saddles us with an account of the 
human being where all affective content is replaced by some generic 
propositional descriptions of what we perceive, and how we ought to act. 
However, we can preserve the phenomenological reality of that distinctive 
content that Dreyfus refers to as “motor intentional”, and still point out that we 
have to make sense of its normative role with reference to its integration into a 
conceptual framework. Gascoigne & Thornton provide a neat summary of this 
general line of thought: 
It becomes “second nature” to respond as one 
ought, not because the associated habits “blindly” 
track the institutional facts but because what it is to 
have those habits is to have had one’s “eyes 
opened” to the correct view of things. Since we 
are “animals whose natural being is permeated 
with rationality”, what it is to be skilled, to cope 
in a masterful way, to know how to go on, to be, 
in short, a phronimos – is a matter of having had 
one’s animal potentialities “shaped” in the way 
that constitutes understanding of the relevant 
concepts (Gascoigne & Thornton, 2013: 164) 
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 Attempting to conceive of practically engaged experience as isolable from 
our nature as concept possessors and users is a mistake. In this chapter, I have 
tried to provide a detailed account of why this is a mistake, and an account of how 
the distinctive content of practically engaged experience, including those 
embodied practical and perceptual skills we rely on, are integrated into our 
conceptual understanding. 
 
 4.5 Conclusion 
 Here I have demonstrated how we can ascribe the involvement of 
conceptual capacities to distinctly unreflective action. Accordingly, I have 
demonstrated how we can affirm the phenomenological reality of motor 
intentional content, while showing how it must be integrated into a conceptual 
framework in order to have the appropriate normative character. I started with 
two claims that McDowell makes. First, that unreflective action entailed the 
realisation of practical concepts, or concepts of things to do. Second, that 
unreflective action was a matter of responsiveness to reasons. Both of these 
claims are directed at avoiding a flatly causal conception of human activity, 
which Dreyfus’s notion of motor intentionality is in danger of being committed 
to. I argued that Dreyfus’s phenomenological methodology – ignoring as it does 
the transcendental possibilities of phenomenology – leads him to ignore the way 
in which concepts can be operative without appearing in a phenomenological 
description. In the first instance, we can hold that concepts we possess are 
realised – in the sense of “manifested” – in our intentional actions. Further, our 
actions are only possible in the light of a background grasp of conceptual 
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standards or rules. This allows us to provide an adequately normative account of 
intentional human action.  
I then went on to appraise Dreyfus’s positive conception of motor 
intentional content. I argued that Dreyfus’s attempt to develop a kind of 
“normativity” into his account of motor intentionality was flawed. I emphasised 
that we should attempt to preserve the phenomenological reality of motor 
intentional content, but that we must do so through a conceptualist lens. 
Accordingly, I showed that affective content could be construed as providing 
reasons for acting, and as such is situated in a framework of conceptual 
understanding. We must avoid the temptation to conceive of our intentionality 
as dualistic – as involving something ineffable and bodily on the one hand, and 
situation independent conceptual content on the other. That conception remains 
Cartesian in a way that Dreyfus does not always appreciate. Conceiving of our 
embodied skills and developed perceptual capacities as bound up with those 
conceptual abilities that distinguish us as humans surely does justice to Dreyfus’s 
phenomenology while forgoing the need for such a dualism of intentionality. 
Presenting this line of thought represents a resolution to the principle and 









5 Heidegger and Practical Significance 
 
5.1 Introduction 
My previous chapter aimed to consolidate the idea that even unreflective 
forms of perceptual experience and intentional action entail conceptual 
involvement. I demonstrated that we could do justice to Dreyfus’s 
phenomenological insights into “motor intentional content”, while holding that 
this content can only play a normative role in virtue of its integration into a 
framework of operative conceptual capacities. Pursuing this argument, I noted, 
represents something of a resolution to the principle disagreement of the 
McDowell-Dreyfus debate.  
 However, my view is that a satisfying resolution to the debate has to go 
further. Dreyfus’s non-conceptualism is motivated in part by a concern that 
conceptualism is geared toward ‘getting it right about an independent reality’ 
(Dreyfus, 2013: 22). That is, conceptualism’s epistemological purport is not 
designed to capture the familiar, practically meaningful world that human beings 
inhabit. McDowell recognises this concern, and accordingly denies that ‘the 
world as a subject’s experience discloses it to her is devoid of intrinsic practical 
significance’ (McDowell, 2013: 52). In this chapter, I demonstrate how we might 
“secure” the kind of practical significance that existential phenomenology 
attempts to highlight in a conceptualist framework. I do this through a 
conceptualist reading of Heidegger’s notion of the “ready-to-hand”.  
I argue that a distinctive kind of conceptual framework which Heidegger 
calls the “existential-hermeneutic as-structure” is operative in the kind of 
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practically engaged perceptual experience that pertains to the “ready-to-hand” 
environment (see Heidegger, 1962: 200). This framework, I argue, determines 
perceived objects “as” practically significant through the “involvement” relations 
that instantiate between the relevant concepts. My interpretation here has the 
advantage of preserving Heidegger’s clear focus on the practically engaged 
dimension of human experience. Through this reading, I argue, we can offer 
something of a “practical topography” of the space of reasons. We can also 
make further sense of the way in which perceptual content can be said to 
“produce” intentional action. This final chapter therefore demonstrates how 
conceptualism can further accommodate the practically engaged dimension of 
human intentionality, and accordingly consolidate a picture of the mind as 
integrated into practically engaged experience.  
In 5.2, I discuss McDowell’s brief comments on “intrinsic practical 
significance” in relation to certain suggestions that the phenomenon of 
unreflective action requires a “tailored” account of conceptual involvement. I 
specifically focus on Rietveld’s suggestion that we reconstrue the idea of 
“responsiveness to reasons” in terms of “responsiveness to normative 
significance” (Rietveld, 2010: 199). I therefore return to the to the question of 
how perceptual content can be said to “produce” intentional action. I conclude 
that we need to specify in more detail how conceptualism can account for the 
specifically practical significance of the content of perceptual experience. In 5.3 I 
propose that we can develop such a tailored account of this practical significance 
with reference to Heidegger’s early phenomenology. I go on to secure the idea 
that Heidegger is a conceptualist about perceptual experience, referencing recent 
appraisals of his work that take this approach. In 5.4 I move on to examine how 
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this conceptualism makes sense of the distinction that Heidegger draws between 
the “ready-to-hand” and the “present-at-hand”, noting that the ready-to-hand 
signals the practical significance or relevance of the environment. I argue that 
perceiving something as ready-to-hand depends on an operative conceptual 
framework characterised by “involvement relations”. I draw critically on 
Golob’s recent re-evaluation of Heidegger in order to provide a complex, 
coherent account of this framework. I draw a comparison to Wittgenstein’s 
notion of “aspect-perception” in order to make further sense of construing the 
ready-to-hand in perceptual terms. This allows us a plausible way to acknowledge 
how perceptual content can “produce” intentional action. I provide some 
extended concluding remarks in 5.5 that focus on Dreyfus’s uses and misuses of 
existential phenomenology, particularly in the debate.  
 
5.2 Conceptualism and Practical Significance 
Dreyfus’s notion of motor intentional content is partly mobilised to make 
sense of the way in which our perception ‘directly motivates us to act’, which he 
claims that conceptual content cannot do (Dreyfus, 2007a: 357 – 358). It 
therefore offers a particular answer to the question of how perception can be said 
to “produce” intentional action. The primary form of perception, the perception 
that pertains to unreflective action is, for Dreyfus, a ‘totality of interconnected 
solicitations that attract and repulse us’ (Dreyfus, 2007a: 357). The involvement 
of conceptual capacities only works to ‘decouple us from the world of normative 
forces’ (Dreyfus, 2013: 23). I have challenged the account Dreyfus provides here 
in two broad ways – first, demonstrating that the involvement of conceptual 
capacities does not imply reflection or conscious thought, and so does not in 
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principle imply some Cartesian form of detachment that would “decouple” us 
from these normative forces. Second, in showing how these perceived 
solicitations represent situation-specific reasons for actions, and further must be 
integrated into a conceptual framework for them to be genuinely normative, I 
have provided an account of conceptualism that nevertheless accommodates the 
form of perception Dreyfus highlights. However, I think that there is a more 
basic concern in play here. Dreyfus opposes a conception of perception wherein 
it has principally epistemic purport; where our perceptual experience’s crucial 
role is to ‘get it right about an external reality’ (Dreyfus, 2013: 22).  
 At one stage, Dreyfus expresses the concern that McDowell’s 
conceptualism ‘boils down to the assumption that what is always already given 
are determinate, nameable, and thinkable facts structured through and through 
so as to be directly graspable by minds’ (Dreyfus, 2007a: 359). He further notes 
that Merleau-Ponty refers to this assumption as “the prejudice in favour of the 
objective world” (Dreyfus, 2013: 359; Merleau-Ponty, 2002: 58). Conceptual 
capacities can only be operative, for Dreyfus, as ‘propositional structures in the 
mind’ that ‘correspond to the propositionally structured facts in the world’ 
(Dreyfus, 2013: 17). In this way, Dreyfus pays close attention to McDowell’s 
description of perceptual experience as taking in ‘that things are thus and so’ 
(McDowell, 1994: 26). Even if conceptualism can accommodate those 
perceptual instincts that Dreyfus construes in motor intentional terms, the 
conceptual content of our perceptual experience entails information about an 
empirical world whose features are independent of our practical interests – 
propositional structures in the mind that correspond to propositionally 
structured facts. For Dreyfus, McDowell’s ‘world of facts, features, and data’ 
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entails the idea that we ‘experience context-free, self-sufficient substances with 
detachable properties’ (Dreyfus, 2007a: 364). 
As we have seen, McDowell takes perceptual experience to play a crucial 
role in unreflective action. Our perception of relevant aspects of practical 
situations provides us with reasons for our unreflectively acting in the way that 
we do. McDowell also puts this in terms of responding to facts about the world. 
Now, McDowell does not want to restrict the kind of facts that one is able to 
perceive and respond to – he denies that his conception of the factual ‘involves a 
separation from anything with practical significance’ (McDowell, 2007b: 369). 
McDowell states that one might perceive that a hole in a wall is of a certain size, 
and if the perceiving agent is trying to get to the other side of the wall, the fact 
that the hole is of a certain size is practically significant to the agent, and may 
even be described as a solicitation (McDowell, 2007b: 369). We therefore have 
an empirical concept or set of empirical concepts that are operative in our 
perceptual experience of states of affairs in the world, and these states of affairs 
have relevance to one’s practical interests 51 . The general picture here is of 
practical agents who are responsive to perceived facts about their environment 
which entail reasons to act. I want to tentatively highlight a possible concern 
about a remainder of Cartesianism in McDowell’s picture, where we have a 
subject with particular practical interests perceiving a world that is in the first 
instance separable from those interests.  
                                                          
51 In Chapter Four, I argued that Bengson’s own account of the relationship between perception 
and action could be viewed as an elaboration of McDowell’s position. One’s conceptually 
organised perceptual experience bears normative relations to certain “actionable concepts” that 
entail one being “poised” to perform a particular intentional action (Bengson, 2016: 39). 
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We can put the line of critique I have in mind in the following way. 
McDowell’s account of the way in which empirical concepts are operative in 
perceptual experience is designed to capture the epistemological significance of 
the environment. In her analysis of perceptual “affordances”, Siegel notes that 
perception does ‘feel quite different depending on whether it is dominantly 
structured by our roles as agents or not’ (Siegel, 2014: 25). My concern is that 
McDowell’s conceptualism is not well suited to distinguish the perceptual 
experience of a practically engaged agent from an epistemically oriented agent, 
one seeking to ‘get it right about an external reality’ (Dreyfus, 2013: 22). Both 
are simply described in terms of “responsiveness to reasons”. Another way of 
putting this is that there is no way of distinguishing the empirical concepts that 
are operative in our practically engaged experience of our environment, from 
those empirical concepts that are at work in our epistemically oriented 
experience.  
Rietveld’s critique of McDowell’s conceptualist account of unreflective 
runs parallel to the above concern. Rietveld draws upon Charles Taylor’s own 
critique of McDowell, which came before McDowell’s debate with Dreyfus. 
Taylor describes unreflective action as involving “pre-understanding”, which 
corresponds to motor intentionality. Taylor recognises that the point of 
McDowell’s attempt to bring unreflective action into the space of reasons is to 
avoid construing it as a causal event in nature. However, Taylor argues that we 
should distinguish two senses of rationality: ‘the strong Kantian sense, turning 
crucially on conceptual, reflective thought; and the weaker sense, which turns on 
participating in the space of reasons’ (Taylor, 2002: 114). In his response to 
Taylor, McDowell argues that we need a “middle ground” between reflective 
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thought and causal relations. He acknowledges that ‘we need this middle ground 
for thinking about […] what is supposed to be occupied by pre-understanding 
(McDowell, 2002: 283). However, McDowell doesn’t take a concern about pre-
understanding to be relevant to his overall project, and does not develop such a 
middle ground (McDowell, 2002: 283).  
Rietveld agrees with Taylor that McDowell is “not wrong” to place 
unreflective action and perception in the space of reasons (2010: 199). However, 
he agrees with Taylor that McDowell is stretching the explanatory capabilities of 
his conceptualism in the case of unreflective action. Rietveld claims that we get a 
better grip on the phenomenology of unreflective action by developing a 
“tailored account” which admits of an additional explanatory space (Rietveld, 
2010: 200). Rietveld argues that we should place unreflective action in the 
explanatory “sphere of normative significance”. He goes on to refine 
McDowell’s conception of “responsiveness to reasons” into “responsiveness to 
normative significance” (Rietveld, 2010: 200). Rietveld’s point, I think, is that 
we can indeed appreciate McDowell’s view that intentional actions are 
performed for reasons which our perception of a situation presents us with. 
However, these reasons are not always going to be characterized by the strong, 
justificatory relations that arise from “reflective, conceptual thought” on facts 
about our environment. These kinds of reasons that we are responding to in 
unreflective action, for Rietveld, have motivating force ‘thanks to our past 
experience and training as well as our current engagement in socio-cultural 
practices and appreciation of the situation’ (Rietveld, 2010: 202). Although 
Rietveld doesn’t explicitly say as much, the sphere of normative significance is 
internal to the space of reasons, and “responding to normative significance” is a 
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clarified type of responding to reasons. For Rietveld, this clarified terminology 
better describes the phenomenon of unreflective action. Further, it may further 
clarify how perceptual experience can be said to “produce” intentional action. 
This chapter then tries to secure a picture where an unreflectively acting agent is 
responsiveness to normative significance, or “practical significance”, as I will 
call it.  
It is important to note that McDowell’s wider philosophical project has 
resources pertinent to this concern. In the final exchange of the debate, 
McDowell emphasises that his work on virtue is specifically designed to ‘attack a 
conception according to which the world in which one acts is normatively inert’ 
(McDowell, 2013: 52). This is where he expresses the idea of “intrinsic practical 
significance”. This is construed in ethical terms, however. McDowell states that 
actions that ‘manifest virtue are responses to requirements to act that agents 
confront in the situations they act in’ (McDowell, 2013: 52). Of course, this 
account of virtuous action follows his conception of intentional actions entailing 
“responsiveness to reasons”. However, McDowell’s description of a virtuous 
action entailing not only a response to a reason, but a response to a requirement is 
what may complicate matters, for a plausible account of practically engaged 
experience. McDowell states that ‘if one fails to act as virtue requires, without 
being prevented, that reveals at least partial blindness to facts about the world’ 
(McDowell, 2013: 52). What we would need to do here is demonstrate how this 
kind of moral realism – that our moral claims are made true by facts about the 
world – has a general application to intentional action and the perceptual 
content involved. This would indeed be an edifying direction to take. However, 
taking this direction quickly gets us into the field of meta-ethics, an appraisal of 
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which would be too ambitious a task at this stage. Moreover, I want to take a 
direction that is in keeping with the concerns of this thesis as a whole.  
What I want to do is return to the existential phenomenology that 
Dreyfus draws on; specifically, the early philosophy of Heidegger. In Chapter 
Two, I called Dreyfus’s reading of Heidegger on conceptual content into 
question I want to resolve the debate in a way that highlights the continuing 
relevance of existential phenomenology beyond its apparent commitment to non-
conceptualism. In Heidegger, we can find a conception of practical significance 
which suits the purpose of this chapter. So far, we have principally seen 
Heidegger utilised in the debate as a philosopher who attempts to preserve the 
practically oriented dimension of human experience by recommending a non-
conceptualist account of intentional content. Doyon articulates the view of 
perceptual content that might reasonably be drawn from Heidegger, on a 
common interpretation: 
Contrary to the empiricist picture, seeing something 
does not amount to seeing its physical or material 
qualities; it is rather to see it in its referential 
structure where it appears as that which it is for. The 
now classic example here is that of the hammer, 
which, as Heidegger explains, manifests itself as 
practically available for something’ (Doyon, 2015: 
119).  
As I highlighted in Chapter Two, Heidegger’s conception of the ready-to-
hand is supposed to capture the way in which objects are perceived in terms of 
their practical roles, or “referential structure”. Doyon’s description here echoes 
the concern I expressed above; that “seeing” features of our environment might 
be described in quite different terms in the context of practically engaged 
perceptual experience. However, this kind of description, that Doyon himself 
utilises, of “seeing” an object as “for something” tends not to be treated carefully 
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enough. There are surely difficulties and ambiguities in the idea that we perceive 
ready-to-hand objects. While we might offer different descriptions of a ready-to-
hand object than we would a present-at-hand object, what this amounts to in 
perceptual terms is decidedly unclear. We have seen that Dreyfus identifies the 
ready-to-hand with motor intentional content. Perceiving something as ready-to-
hand, for Dreyfus, simply entails being “drawn” toward an object that one 
needn’t perceptually take account of. Turning to Heidegger must involve 
contesting Dreyfus’s non-conceptualist interpretation of Heidegger where 
relevant. In what follows, I explore Heidegger’s philosophical understanding of 
perceptual experience. I argue that we can provide a conceptualist interpretation 
of this account which can make sense of the difficult idea that we can perceive 
things as ready-to-hand, or practically significant, and respond to them as such.  
 
5.3 Heidegger on Perception 
 Dreyfus draws attention to Heidegger’s focus on the “practically 
significant” content of perceptual experience in the debate with McDowell. 
Dreyfus cites the following passage from Heidegger on perception:  
‘What is first of all “given” […] is the “for-writing,” 
the “for-entering-and-exiting,” the “for-illuminating,” 
the “for-sitting.” That is, writing, entering-existing, 
sitting, and the like are what we are a priori involved 
with. What we know and learn when we “know our 
way around” are these uses-for-which we understand 
it’ (Heidegger, 2010: 121; also cited in Dreyfus, 2013: 
17, with his own translation). 
In Being and Time, Heidegger uses the term “ready-to-hand” to describe 
the way in which objects are “perceived” or “seen” in this instrumental sense 
(see 1962: 189). As I noted above, how to understand the idea that objects are 
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perceived “as” ready-to-hand is unclear. Dreyfus associates Heidegger’s 
description here with Merleau-Ponty’s “motor intentional” conception of 
perceptual experience. On Dreyfus’s interpretation, Heidegger is providing a 
phenomenology of something like a “field of forces” that we are bodily 
responsive to. For Dreyfus, the sort of content that Heidegger describes here 
cannot be ‘captured in propositions but rather is directly lived by the absorbed 
coper as a shifting field of attractions and repulsions’ (Dreyfus, 2013: 18). As I 
argued in Chapter Four, that perceptual content is capturable in propositions 
does not preclude it from being “directly lived”52. It is important, for present 
purposes, to remember that Dreyfus rejects a conceptualist account of perception 
because he takes it to imply some form of Cartesian detachment between the 
human being and the world (see Dreyfus, 2013: 31, for example). Dreyfus offers 
a non-conceptualist interpretation of Heidegger partly on the basis of 
Heidegger’s express concern to overcome a Cartesian picture and all its 
trappings. Heidegger wants to reject ‘the idea of a subject which has intentional 
experiences merely inside its own sphere’ (1982: 63 – 64). Conversely, however, 
Heidegger is certainly not a proponent of the kind of perceptual “given” 
critiqued by McDowell and Sellars.  
In an early appraisal of Husserlian phenomenology, Heidegger argues 
against what he calls a “scientific” account of perception which he claims is 
assumed in the epistemology and psychology of his day (Heidegger, 1985: 39). 
Such an account might run as follows: ‘in the first instance and in actuality, with 
my eyes I merely see something coloured, in the first instance I merely have 
                                                          
52  I think this is a particularly ineffective construal of the contrast between conceptual and 
purportedly non-conceptual experience. Dreyfus emphasises “directly lived” in italics as though 
it is doing decisive philosophical work, but it is not at all clear what exactly this specification 
amounts to, and why it prohibits propositional expression.  
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sensations of yellow, to which I then add other such elements’ (Heidegger, 1985: 
39). However, Heidegger does not critique this account because of its 
epistemological incoherence – as Sellars does – but because he finds it to be 
philosophically inaccurate. We find the same sentiment in Being and Time with 
regard to the modality of hearing: ‘What we “first” hear is never noises or 
complexes of sounds, but the creaking wagon, the motor-cycle […] it requires a 
very artificial and complicated frame of mind to “hear” a “pure noise” 
(Heidegger, 1962: 207). In earlier lecture courses, Heidegger often uses the term 
“natural” or “everyday” perception, noting that this should not be understood ‘in 
the narrow sense of optical sensing’ (Heidegger, 1985: 39). Rather, “everyday” 
perception should be understood as ‘simple cognizance of what is found’ 
(Heidegger, 1985: 39).  
Now, in introducing a term like “cognizance” into an account of 
everyday perceptual experience, Heidegger could commit himself to the kind of 
Cartesian model that Dreyfus takes him to be radically opposed to. “Cognizance” 
might signal deliberative mental activity, so that perception becomes a matter of 
forming judgements about what states of affairs are perceptually present. 
However, Heidegger describes cognizance in terms of perceiving ‘the 
immediately given just as it shows itself’ (Heidegger, 1985: 39). Cognizance, for 
Heidegger, does not imply any of the intrusive mental capacities or inferential 
work that Dreyfus would object to. Heidegger’s use of the term “cognizance” 
may signal that he recognises some form of mental understanding must be 
implicated in perceptual experience. We should not assume that Heidegger’s 
attempt to overcome the Cartesian tradition would lead him to dismiss any role 
for the mind, and specifically for conceptual capacities. We know that “the 
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immediately given” cannot correspond to something like sensory information, 
given Heidegger’s scepticism toward that “scientific” account of perception he 
refers to above.  
In fact, Heidegger provides us with a straightforward account of the 
content of perception in another early lecture course: ‘The most immediate state 
of affairs is, in fact, that we simply see and take things as they are: board, bench, 
house, policeman. Yes, of course’ (Heidegger, 2010: 122; my emphasis). 
Preliminarily, we might associate Heidegger’s account of perception with 
McDowell’s conceptualism. In perception, states of affairs are “immediately 
given” to us in virtue of our possessing the relevant empirical concepts. To “take 
things as they are” presupposes that we have a grasp of concepts like “house”, 
“policeman”, “bench”. In Chapter Two, I referred to Heidegger’s conception of 
“interpretation”. It is uncontroversial to take interpretation as a conceptual form 
of intentionality that can arise in the course of engaged activity. The content of 
interpretation has what Heidegger refers to as an “as-structure”,  or ‘the structure 
of something as something’: 
The “as” makes up the structure of the explicitness 
of something that is understood. […] In dealing with 
what is environmentally ready-to-hand by 
interpreting circumspectively, we “see” it as a table, 
a door, a carriage, or a bridge’ (Heidegger, 1962: 
189).  
Where necessary, I will construe “something as something” in terms of 
the variables “a as b” for clarity, following Golob (2014). So, Heidegger’s 
account of “interpretive” perception in Being and Time remains much the same as 
in his early lecture courses. Again, a comparison to the kind of conceptualism 
that McDowell endorses seems apt. In order to see some object “as a table” must 
entail that we possess that empirical concept, and that empirical concept is 
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operative in our perception. That such an account of perceptual experience 
depends on attributing conceptual activity on the part of the agent does not entail 
a lapse into the Cartesianism that Heidegger is trying to overcome. Presumably 
Heidegger would accept that one would have to know what a “policeman” or a 
“house” were in order to have the relevant state of affairs “given” perceptually in 
such a way that entails ‘[taking] things as they are’ (2010: 122)53. Heidegger’s 
account here may be intelligible in terms of the Fregean account of 
conceptualism that McDowell adheres to, where to possess a concept is to be in 
an intentional state – such as perceiving – which has that concept as a constituent. 
I will say much more about this “Fregean” characterisation below, as it becomes 
relevant to the account of “practically significant” content that I am trying to 
secure in this chapter.  
The first problem with this conceptualist account of Heidegger, loosely 
sketched, is that even if Dreyfus would endorse it, he would hold that it only 
applies at the level of “interpretive” perceptual experience (see Dreyfus, 2007b: 
371). As I demonstrated in Chapter Two, he argues that interpretation is a mode 
of intentionality that can only arise in the interruption of our primary unreflective 
practical engagement with the environment54. For Dreyfus, the “as-structure” is 
operative in “interpretive” perceptual experience, but not in that fundamental 
mode of intentionality that Heidegger calls “understanding”. Dreyfus makes 
much of the fact that Heidegger distinguishes “interpretation” from 
“understanding”, and that he makes clear that the latter is a necessary condition 
                                                          
53 Specifying that states of affairs are perceptually given rather than objects implies that “interpretive” 
perception, at least, has a propositional structure. We will see below that Golob denies that 
Heidegger would accept this propositionalist view.  
54  I argued against this view in Chapter Two, accordingly concluding that conceptual 
involvement does not imply a detached, subject-object model of experience.  
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of the former. Heidegger repeatedly describes the world as being first of all 
‘disclosed’ through the understanding (see 1962: 184), and states that ‘all sight is 
grounded primarily in understanding’ (Heidegger, 1962: 187). The understanding 
informs our primary, practically engaged unreflective experience. Dreyfus argues 
that the understanding consists in a totality of ingrained, non-conceptual bodily 
skills which are reliably keyed on to perceptual stimuli. For example, Dreyfus 
gives us this familiar picture: ‘In general, the absorbed coper is directly drawn by 
each solicitation in an appropriate way: the chairs draw him to sit on them, the 
floorboards to walk on them’ (Dreyfus, 2013: 18). For Dreyfus, the Heideggerian 
understanding should be closely associated with Merleau-Ponty’s conception of 
motor intentionality; both attempt to articulate the non-conceptual “know-how” 
that characterises the interrelated nature of the perceptual experience and 
intentional action that pertains to the human being’s unreflective engagement 
with the world.  
There is some limited textual evidence for Dreyfus’s reading, however. As 
I noted in Chapter Two, we might reasonably equate Heidegger’s use of the term 
“non-thematic” with “non-conceptual”. For example, when Heidegger states 
that ready-to-hand objects are not ‘thematically apprehended for deliberate 
thinking about things’ (Heidegger, 1962: 172), it is plausible that his equation of 
“thematic” and “deliberate thinking” entails those things not being conceptually 
apprehended. Significantly, Heidegger seems to think that the perception 
appropriate to ready-to-hand objects is non-propositional; for example, he 
discusses the ‘pre-predicative seeing of the ready-to-hand’ (Heidegger, 1962: 189). 
Similarly, Heidegger states that ‘in dealing with something, I make no thematic, 
predicative statements about the thing’ (Heidegger, 2010: 122). Heidegger also 
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comments on the “as-structure”, specifying that the ‘as-character does not 
become explicit at all’ in our everyday, practical, perceptual engagement with the 
world (2010: 122). Dreyfus therefore seems to have some textual justification for 
how he describes the mode of intentionality pertaining to our primary 
unreflective experience: ‘From the perspective of the skilled coper absorbed in the 
solicitation of a familiar affordance, the affording object, as Heidegger puts it, 
“withdraws”. We need not even be aware of the solicitations to go out as 
solicitations’ (Dreyfus, 2013: 18). Indeed, I have already noted that Dreyfus’ 
non-conceptualist reading here is “dominant” in Anglo-American appropriations 
of Heidegger (I have cited Golob, 2014: 26 and Crowell, 2015: 73 to this effect). 
In assessing Dreyfus’s non-conceptualist reading of Heidegger on the 
“understanding”, Golob highlights the fact that Heidegger never makes any of 
the requisite arguments for something like motor intentionality: 
‘It seems to me simply incredible that if [Heidegger’s] 
account of intentionality genuinely rested on motor 
intentionality he would not have explicitly stated or 
explained or argued for that view in any of those tens 
of thousands of pages’ … ‘Ultimately, an appeal to 
motor intentionality risks turning […] Heidegger’s 
key arguments […] into a promissory note to be 
cashed by the Phenomenology of Perception’ (Golob, 
2014: 46).  
Dennis offers a similar assessment: ‘in over one hundred volumes of 
philosophical writing, Heidegger hardly mentions the body’ (Dennis, 2012: 110). 
Indeed, in section 31 of Being and Time where Heidegger introduces the notion of 
the “understanding”, Heidegger does not refer to the body. There is no doubt 
that Dreyfus comes to associate Heidegger’s anti-Cartesianism with an antipathy 
to any philosophical appeal to capacities belonging to the mind. Accordingly, 
Dreyfus assumes that Heidegger must be appealing to the same sort of bodily and 
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perceptual capacities as Merleau-Ponty. However, Dreyfus’s reading of 
Heidegger wilfully ignores certain important claims that Heidegger makes.  
In particular, Dreyfus’s reading cannot make sense of Heidegger’s claim 
that ‘in interpretation, understanding does not become something different. It 
becomes itself’ (Heidegger, 1962: 188). If the Heideggerian understanding simply 
indicated a set of non-conceptual “coping” skills, and that there really was a 
qualitative transition between non-conceptual perceptual experience, to the 
conceptual perceptual experience of “interpretation”, such a remark from 
Heidegger would be incoherent. Heidegger is clear that interpretive perceptual 
experience has an “expressible” structure. There seems to be a disjunction 
between the claim that the understanding “becomes itself” in interpretation and 
the claim that our primary perceptual experience is “pre-predicative”, or “non-
thematic”. In fact, Heidegger is clear that he does not take “pre-predicative” to 
mean “non-conceptual”. In speaking of the “pre-predicative seeing” of the ready-
to-hand, Heidegger only means that a perceiving agent is not actively 
formulating propositions about the content of their perceptual experience. 
Dennis notes a positive comparison between Heidegger and McDowell, who 
‘both seem to be suggesting that experiential content is already structured by the 
‘as’, only it is not necessarily isolated and focused on as such’ (2012: 116). That 
is, when one “thematises” or “makes explicit” the content of one’s experience, 
one is simply articulating content that was there anyway. This is a reasonable 
reading of what Heidegger means when he says that the understanding “becomes 
itself” when its content becomes articulated in a judgement. In History of the 
Concept of Time (1925), Heidegger makes this very point: 
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We shall see that our comportments, lived experiences 
taken in the broadest sense, are through and through 
expressed experiences; even if they are not uttered in 
words, they are nonetheless expressed in a definite 
articulation by an understanding that I have of them as 
I simply live in them without regarding them thematically. 
(Heidegger, 1985: 48; my emphasis) 
As we can see, Heidegger is not excluding any experiences from his claim 
that experience has an expressible structure (‘lived experiences taken in the broadest 
sense’). He even specifies that this claim applies to experiences that are unthematic 
in character. He goes on to cement his conception of the interrelation between 
language and perception: ‘It is not so much that we see objects and things but 
rather than we first talk about them. To put it more precisely: we do not say 
what we see, but rather the reverse, we see what one says about the matter’ 
(Heidegger, 1985: 56). Our grasp of language, our conceptual repertoire, 
determines what it is that one “sees” in perceptual experience.  
 The subject of the ready-to-hand should be kept in mind here. Heidegger 
is clear that our most primary, practically engaged perceptual experience 
pertains to ready-to-hand objects. In Being and Time, Heidegger associates the 
ready-to-hand with interpretation and the understanding: ‘Any mere pre-
predicative seeing of the ready-to-hand is, in itself, something which already 
understands and interprets’ (Heidegger, 1962: 189). In this way, Heidegger 
makes clear that perceiving something as something – perceiving something as a 
table, for example – characterizes even our pre-predicative experience of ready-
to-hand objects. Dreyfus’s construal of the ready-to-hand in motor intentional 
terms – identifying the ready-to-hand with non-conceptual “attractions and 
repulsions” – is at odds with Heidegger’s comments here. I will return to this 
particular point about the ready-to-hand below. Heidegger is even more explicit 
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that the understanding is characterised by the as-structure. He is unambiguous 
on this point: ‘if the “as” is ontically unexpressed, this must not seduce us into 
overlooking it as a constitutive state for understanding’ (Heidegger, 1962: 190). 
He goes even further, stating that perceiving something ‘free of the “as” entails 
‘a failure to understand it anymore’ (Heidegger, 1962: 190). Where Dreyfus 
maintains that the “as-structure” must only belong to interpretive intentionality, 
which is derivative of the primary, non-conceptual form of intentionality which 
Heidegger describes as “understanding”, Heidegger is clear that the 
understanding itself is characterised by an as-structure, and that perceiving 
something without such a structure is in fact highly unusual55.   
 Dennis therefore claims that Heidegger can be brought into line with 
McDowell’s view here: ‘if an experience is world-disclosing, which implies that 
it is categorially unified, all its content is present in a form in which […] is 
suitable to constitute contents of conceptual capacities’ (McDowell, 2007a: 347 – 
348). Doyon favours this reading, arguing that ‘not only does Heidegger 
recognize that the phenomenological “as-structure” is pervasive in experience 
[…] the point of this analysis is precisely to argue that we need not wait until 
that judgement kicks in to appreciate its crucial contribution’ (Doyon, 2015: 125). 
The Heideggerian understanding is characterised by the “as-structure”, the 
structure of “something as something”. Dreyfus’s non-conceptualist reading of 
Heidegger seems to actually miss the point of Heidegger’s phenomenology, at 
least in the first Division of Being and Time – which is to articulate the structure 
of intentional experience. As I noted in 4.2, Dreyfus is content to appeal to a 
                                                          
55 In fact, it is unclear how one could perceive something without any as-structure; the present-at-




“background” of bodily skills and perceptual capacities as a necessary condition 
of intentional experience, but unjustifiably refuses to countenance that conceptual 
skills and capacities also form a part of that background. In Being and Time, then, 
Heidegger appears to remain committed to his earlier account of the most basic, 
and primary perceptual experience: ‘the most immediate state of affairs is, in fact, 
that we simply see and take things as they are: board, bench, house, policeman. 
Yes, of course’ (Heidegger, 2010: 122). Dreyfus is wrong to attribute a non-
conceptualist account of perceptual experience to Heidegger. Both interpretation 
and the understanding are characterised by the as-structure.  
Before I conclude this initial characterisation of Heidegger’s account of 
perception. it is necessary to engage in some detail with Golob’s recent 
interpretation of Heidegger (2014). Golob offers a significant re-evaluation of 
Heidegger’s conception of intentionality. I am not deviating unnecessarily into 
Heideggerian scholarship here; Golob’s account is directly relevant to my 
concerns in this chapter as a whole. Golob argues that Heidegger’s account of 
the as-structure entails that the content of perceptual experience is conceptual, 
but rejects a Fregean or McDowellian account of Heidegger’s conceptualism. 
Golob intends to offer an account of the “as-structure” where the content of 
perceptual experience is conceptual but not propositional. He therefore disputes 
Cristina Lafont’s view that Heidegger ascribes propositional content to 
perceptual experience (see Lafont, 2000: 181) 56 . Golob similarly expresses 
scepticism at Dennis’s comparison between McDowell and Heidegger: ‘if 
[Heidegger’s] position is really so close to McDowell’s, then why is the whole 
baroque apparatus of texts like [Being and Time] necessary?’ (Golob, 2014: 73n5).  
                                                          
56 Lafont’s Heidegger, Language, and World-Disclosure (2000) builds from a conceptualist account of 
Heidegger to argue that he is committed to a linguistic idealism.   
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Golob argues plausibly that the philosophical function of the as-structure 
is not to explain how intentionality secures reference to particular objects 
through empirical concepts or senses: 
 ‘[The] b variable’s function is not to explain why my 
experience is about this table as opposed to that one, 
or as opposed to the television: it thus does not 
determine reference in anything like the way in 
which representational mediators such as senses or 
noemata do’ (Golob, 2014: 93)57.  
Golob claims that Heidegger’s account therefore ‘structurally occludes 
the question that drives the Frege-Russell-Kripke tradition’ (2014: 145). I agree 
with Golob that a Fregean account of conceptualism does not exhaust the 
purpose of Heidegger’s conception of the as-structure. Below, I argue that this 
reading does not capture important aspects of Heidegger’s philosophy – in 
particular, the distinction between the ready-to-hand and the present-at hand. 
However, if it were not part of the story, Heidegger’s description of our 
perception of ordinary empirical objects would not make sense: ‘we simply see 
and take things as they are: board, bench, house, policeman’ (2010: 122). 
Remember, too, that Heidegger does fill the b variable with an ordinary empirical 
concept; we see an object ‘as a table, a door, a carriage, or a bridge’ (1962: 189). 
Further, Heidegger does in fact have a story about singular reference that we 
find in Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics (1929). 
                                                          
57 One of the reasons why Golob rejects a Fregean account of Heidegger’s conceptualism is that 
Heidegger appears to be opposed to any form of “mediational representationalism”, which 
Golob takes Fregeanism to entail. I don’t take an explanatory position on Heidegger’s comments 
on representation here. However, I would point out that Golob notes that ‘one might supplement 
mediational representationalism with an object-dependent account of the representational 
content: for example, by focusing on demonstrative representations’ (Golob, 2014: 94). Oddly, 
Golob simply goes on to say that ‘Heidegger’s objections to mediational representationalism are 
not solely directed at its object-independent variants’ (Golob, 2014: 94) without explaining why. 
He sums up by saying that Heidegger ‘rejects the foundational appeal to “ideal content”, be it 
object-dependent or not’ (Golob, 2014: 95), but of course de re content is precisely not “ideal 
content”, which Golob identifies with a ‘packet of descriptive information’ (Golob, 2014: 145).   
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I want to be cautious about how I utilise this material; that it is an 
interpretation of Kant means that we cannot always assume Heidegger is 
endorsing the claims he makes. My view, however, is that Heidegger regards the 
claims I evaluate below as compatible with his own philosophical project, and 
further that these claims make some sense of his description of the “as-structure” 
in Being and Time 58 . Firstly, Heidegger describes perceptual experience as 
‘thinking intuiting’, its content as such being ‘necessarily conceptual’ (Heidegger, 
1990: 71). Heidegger appears to offer an account of how such empirical concepts 
are generated from “empirical intuiting” (Heidegger, 1990: 71). Intriguingly, 
Heidegger does not take such intuiting to be non-conceptual, or non-
propositional. He in fact appeals to the idea that the content of our perceptual 
experience is always articulable in a demonstrative proposition. He specifies that 
empirical intuition ‘always has the character of the immediately seen particular 
(“this-here”)’ (Heidegger, 1990: 65). Further, Heidegger clarifies that ‘this does 
not exclude the possibility that a multitude of such particulars might be intuited, 
namely, as a richer “this-here”; for example, this particular totality of this 
landscape’ (Heidegger, 1990: 65). Heidegger does not focus on the philosophical 
role that demonstratives like “this-here” can play in the same way as 
philosophers like McDowell and Evans. However, he highlights how an 
empirical intuition which is expressible in those demonstrative terms allows us 
to form an “image” which essentially functions as a concept.  
                                                          
58 Roughly speaking, I take this view because Heidegger’s interpretation is notable for the way in 
which he filters Kant through his own philosophical sensibilities – he often makes Kant say what 
he wants him to say – and his interpretation is regarded in this way as a “violent” one (see 
Heidegger, 1990: xx). Further, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics also entails a critique, and 
Heidegger is often clear where he regards Kant to have fallen short. 
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Heidegger goes onto state that in our perception of a house, we are not 
“preoccupied” with its “determinate look” – the particularity of the house – but 
with how its appearance corresponds to a pre-conceived image (Heidegger, 1990: 
67). We can fill in some gaps quite plausibly here; a perceptual experience can 
present us with an “immediately seen” particular or set of particulars which we 
can codify in the de re demonstrative content “this-here”, and this content is then 
brought to bear on further perceptual experiences which have the relevant 
features. Golob refers to this as a “prototype” theory of concepts. Golob in fact 
notices that Heidegger has a “prototype” theory of empirical concepts here: ‘as 
Heidegger puts it, the prototype “regulates”, i.e. it allows us to order the 
manifold, by “setting a standard”, i.e. by exemplifying certain properties against 
which other entities can be measured’ (Golob, 2014: 148). Margolis & Laurence 
describe a prototype theory to take ‘categorization to be a feature-matching 
process where an exemplar or individual is compared to a target category for 
how similar they are’ (2003: 196)59. As we will see, Golob makes much of this 
“prototype” account of conceptuality at the primary level of Heidegger’s 
conception of intentionality. With this rudimentary theory of concept-formation, 
Heidegger seems to have much the same view that DeGaynesford attributes to 
McDowell here: 
It is from precisely those simple experiences 
expressed by perceptual demonstrative thoughts that 
concepts derive. These experiences provide 
identifying reference to the basic items about which 
we think and talk and whose totality makes up the 
world’ (DeGaynesford, 2004: 142).  
 I therefore think Golob is mistaken in denying that we cannot 
characterise Heidegger’s conceptualism in Fregean terms. We will see below that 
                                                          
59 Margolis & Laurence identify a prototype theory of concepts with the idea that concepts are 
mental representations, and not abstract entities like Fregean senses.   
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Golob specifies that Heidegger’s “prototype” account of intentional content is 
conceptualist without indicating propositionally structured content. Indeed, 
Heidegger speaks of a prototype concept as an “image”, rather than linguistically 
codified content – but I have established that Fregean senses need not entail such 
content. Furthermore, I only mean to demonstrate here that Heidegger does 
have some theory of singular reference, which I make use of in 5.4; I am of 
course not claiming that Heidegger has a fully worked out model of empirical 
concepts that bears close comparison to the technical moves made in analytic 
philosophy of language.  
 
 5.4 Practical Significance and the As-Structure 
 As I highlighted above, it may be possible to construe the “as-structure” 
in Fregean terms to describe the way in which empirical concepts like “house” 
or “policeman” must be operative in our intentional perceptual experience. At 
this point, however, it seems as though the notion of “practical significance” is 
receding into the background. One way to combine Heidegger’s conceptualism – 
articulated in the “as-structure” of the understanding – with his focus on 
practical significance, is to highlight his remarks on “circumspection”, which is 
his specific term for practically oriented perceptual experience. 
  Prior to Being and Time, Heidegger holds that “natural” or “everyday” 
perception ‘is not a detached observation and scrutiny of things, but is rather 
absorbed in dealing with the matters at hand concretely and practically’ 
(Heidegger, 1985: 37). The first thing to say here is that this specification is 
clearly meant to offset any sense in which perception belongs to a detached, 
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disinterested subject, whose purpose is to acquire information about features of 
the environment. Heidegger further avoids any “Cartesian” connotations by 
emphasising that perception is not ‘self-contained’: ‘I do not perceive in order to 
perceive but in order to orient myself, to pave the way in dealing with something’ 
(Heidegger, 1985: 37). Similarly, he follows up on his description of perception 
as “seeing and taking things as they are,” adding the caveat; ‘but this taking is 
always a taking in a dealing-with, and [is] so originally a taking-as that its as-
character does not become explicit at all’ (Heidegger, 2010: 122). For Heidegger, 
then, our perception is principally in service our practical interests. 
Circumspection describes the ‘skilled possibility of concerned discovering, of 
concerned seeing’ (Heidegger, 1985: 274). It is the mode of perception 
appropriate to ready-to-hand objects60. 
We may therefore offer a fairly “weak” interpretation of how Heidegger’s 
conceptualism, understood in the above terms, sits alongside this focus on 
practical orientation. A.A. Schiller (2012) offers a well worked out account of 
perception that makes sense of Heidegger’s remarks on circumspection, while 
remaining conceptualist. Schiller is mainly concerned to develop an account in 
which it is facts, rather than objects or properties, which feature in our 
perceptual content, allying himself as such with McDowell. Schiller adds the 
specification that our practical interests determine which facts feature in our 
perceptual content. He draws this lesson in part from the psychological “gorilla 
experiment”. Test subjects watch a video of a basketball being passed around by 
a group of players and, significantly, are told to count the number of passes. 
                                                          
60 “Enactive” accounts of perception are in some sense “circumspective” accounts. See Noë 
(2004), who argues that perception is not a matter of passive observation but of active discovery, 
and that this helps us makes sense of its epistemological purpose.  
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Many of the test subjects fail to recognise the arrival of a person in a gorilla suit 
who stops in the middle of the court, beats their chest, and walks back off. The 
upshot of this experiment is clear: the practical interests of the test subjects 
determined what they visually experienced. Their practical interest lay in 
counting the passes, and accordingly other features or facts about the scene – 
even someone in a gorilla suit – receded into the background. Schiller refers to 
Heidegger’s phenomenology in order to argue for the practically oriented 
character of perceptual experience: 
According to Heidegger, perception as a part of 
everyday coping always takes place within the 
context of our interest and goals. As I’d like to put 
the point, perception is structured by contexts that 
we, by way of our interests, determine. If we’re in 
the midst of playing softball, the things that matter 
to us (where the runner is, which way the pop fly 
is drifting, etc.) come into focus and those things 
that don’t (that there’s a jet flying overhead, that 
there’s a fight in the stands) fall away. (Schiller, 
2012: 589)  
This seems to be a largely unobjectionable thesis – it rests on an empirical 
point that perceiving agents focus on certain areas of their visual field, and that 
this may be determined by what objects they have a reason to focus on. 
Heidegger would no doubt agree with this point, and it is likely that he partly has 
something like this in mind with his notion of circumspective perception. 
However, we should recall that initial description of perceptual experience that 
Dreyfus cites from Heidegger in the debate: 
‘What is first of all “given” […] is the “for-writing,” 
the “for-entering-and-exiting,” the “for-illuminating,” 
the “for-sitting.” That is, writing, entering-existing, 
sitting, and the like are what we are a priori involved 
with. What we know and learn when we “know our 
way around” are these uses-for-which we understand 
it’ (Heidegger, 2010: 121; also cited in Dreyfus, 2013: 
17, with his own translation). 
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Heidegger clearly regards perceptual experience as first and foremost 
capturing the practical significance of the environment. Prior to Being and Time, 
Heidegger describes the fundamental mode of intentionality as ‘a primary 
making-sense-of-things in terms of what they’re for’ (Heidegger, 1985: 120). A 
“circumspective” account of Heidegger’s understanding of practically oriented 
perception doesn’t get a handle on Heidegger’s concerns here.  
One way of putting this is that a reading of Heidegger’s account of 
perceptual experience that simply relies on some comments about 
“circumspection” doesn’t make sense of the distinction between the ready-to-
hand and the present-at-hand. Accordingly, it doesn’t explain how “ready-to-
hand” objects are perceived, and so does not provide the kind of “intrinsically” 
practically significant content that this chapter is focused on securing. As we 
have seen, Heidegger seems to hold that empirical concepts of ordinary objects 
are operative in our perceptual experience. However, these concepts would 
surely be operative when attempting to “get it right about a distanced reality”, as 
Dreyfus would put it. That is, those empirical concepts are operative when we 
are perceiving or thinking about an object in that theoretical sense which 
Heidegger describes in terms of “presence-at-hand”. And as we have seen, our 
possession of a concept like “table” is also operative in our unreflective 
perceiving and acting, which Heidegger construes in terms of “readiness-to-
hand”: ‘In dealing what is environmentally ready-to-hand by interpreting it 
circumspectively, we “see” it as a table’ (Heidegger, 1962: 189). The key move 
here is to demonstrate how Heidegger distinguishes between an empirical 
concept being operative in what we might call our “ready-to-hand” experience, 
and being operative in our “present-at-hand” experience. If we are to make this 
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distinction coherently, we are able to secure a Heideggerian account of the 
practically significant content of perceptual experience, which nevertheless 
retains the epistemic and normative advantages of conceptualism.  
My view is that Heidegger’s account of “ready-to-hand” perceptual 
experience entails an operative conceptual framework that is distinguished by 
the kind of relations instantiated between the concepts. Heidegger calls these 
distinctive kinds of relations “involvement” relations. In Chapter Two, we saw 
that Heidegger describes ready-to-hand objects as belonging to a “totality of 
involvements”; a hammer might be ready-to-hand in virtue of its relations to 
other ready-to-hand objects like nails and wood, its relation to tasks, like 
building a book-case, and how those tasks relate to a wider set of human 
activities, goals, and even existential concerns (see Heidegger, 1962: 98). 
Heidegger uses terms like “in-order-to”, “towards-which” and “for-the-sake-of-
which” to describe the kinds of relations instantiated in a conceptual framework 
that pertains to human practical interests.  
In the lecture course where Heidegger claims that the fundamental mode 
of intentionality is ‘a primary making-sense-of-things in terms of what they’re for’ 
(Heidegger, 1985: 120), he later makes clear that what we perceptually 
experience is primarily meaning, and describes meaning as ‘grounded in 
references and referential connections’ (1985: 211). It makes sense to describe 
our primary perceptual experience in terms of those “affordances” like “for-
writing,” and “for-entering-and-exiting,” only because the “meaning” of the 
relevant objects or environmental features is predicated upon their connection to 
other things. Of course, in talking about the “meanings” of the relevant 
environmental features, we must admit a role for conceptual understanding. We 
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can therefore translate these descriptions of the “practical meanings” of 
environmental features into the terms of the operation of conceptual capacities. 
A concept of an environmental feature is operative in practically engaged 
perceptual experience insofar as that empirical concept bears an involvement 
relation to concepts relevant to one’s practical interests.  
Now, involvement relations can still be understood as inferential relations, 
and as such belong to the space of reasons. Specifying that these relations are a 
distinctly practical kind of inferential relation is what allows us to identify that 
subset of the space of reasons that Rietveld calls “the sphere of normative 
significance”. This is how we can make sense of Doyon’s description of 
perception as seeing an object ‘in its referential structure where it appears as that 
which it is for [...] the hammer [...] manifests itself as practically available for 
something (Doyon, 2015: 119). Dreyfus is right to insist that practically engaged 
perceptual experience should not be construed as ‘getting it right about a 
distanced reality’ (2013: 22). As I have demonstrated, the non-conceptualist 
account of perceptual experience that Dreyfus develops in order to offset this 
understanding of perception has clear problems. However, we still need to 
explain what Heidegger then means by the “present-at-hand”, which does 
describe this epistemologically motivated form of perceptual experience. Again, 
the shift from “ready-to-hand” intentional content, to “present-at-hand” 
intentional content should not be understood in terms of a transition between 
non-conceptual content and conceptual content. We can get clear about what 




This is where the “as-structure” becomes relevant again. The kind of 
perceptual experience appropriate to practically engaged activity - and the ready-
to-hand - is underpinned by the “existential-hermeneutic” as-structure. This is 
Heidegger’s name for a structure of involvement relations like “in-order-to” and 
“for-the-sake-of-which”. However, when we adopt an epistemically oriented 
perspective, there is a changeover in the kind of as-structure that informs the 
operation of our conceptual capacities. Heidegger calls the as-structure pertaining 
to the present-at-hand the “apophantical” as-structure (Heidegger, 1962: 201). 
Heidegger refers to the transition between practically engaged, ready-to-hand 
experience and epistemically oriented present-at-hand experience as a 
modification of the as-structure (Heidegger, 1962: 200) 61. Heidegger states that 
the perceived object’s as-structure ‘no longer reaches out into a totality of 
involvements […] it has been cut off from that significance which, as such, 
constitutes environmentality’ (Heidegger, 1962: 200).  
That is, the kind of normative or practical significance that we would 
respond to in intentional action is lost, and ‘only now are we given any access to 
properties or the like’ (Heidegger, 1962: 200). If a conceptual judgement like “the 
hammer is too heavy” becomes evaluable not in relation to our skilful 
engagement, but in how it corresponds to some objective state of affairs, then 
there is a handover in the kind of conceptual framework that we situate a concept 
like “hammer” in. For Heidegger, the conceptual framework of the present-at-
hand is defined by logical or causal relations which don’t refer to anything of 
practical relevance, but rather to material properties: ‘the unexplained 
                                                          
61
 We should recall that Heidegger thinks that such a transition can happen in “breakdown” 
cases, where our practically engaged experience runs up against some sort of problem that 
scuppers the activity.  
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presupposition is that the “meaning” of this sentence is to be taken as: “This 
Thing – a hammer – has the property of heaviness’ (Heidegger, 1962: 200). The 
concept of “hammer” is defined entirely differently – its conceptual framework is 
wholly geared toward an objective description of the environment. In Dreyfus’s 
terms, the perception suddenly manifests a conceptual framework which allows 
us to “get it right about a distanced reality” (2013: 22).  
I want to get clearer on how all of this bears out in strictly perceptual terms. 
We can achieve a more distinct idea of what the difference between the ready-to-
hand and the present-at-hand entails with reference to Wittgenstein’s conception 
of “seeing-aspects”. Mulhall (1990) first draws attention to the possible 
comparison between Wittgenstein’s remarks on aspect-perception with 
Heidegger’s phenomenology. Take what Wittgenstein says about perception in 
his Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology (1980): ‘It is as if one had brought a 
concept to what one sees, and now one sees the concept along with the thing. It 
is in itself hardly visible, and yet it spreads an ordering veil over the objects’ 
(1980: §961). In his famous example of the duck-rabbit figure, Wittgenstein 
draws attention to the way in which the figure can be seen differently - which 
aspect of the figure is perceived - depending on which concept is brought to it: 
 
Wittgenstein’s discussion of perception at least partly turns on the role 
that concepts play in determining perceptual content. There is certainly 
disagreement amongst commentators on what the overarching point of 
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Wittgenstein’s discussion is. Avner Baz (2000) for example, argues that 
Wittgenstein is simply interested in the phenomenon of “aspect-dawning”, 
where one notices a new way in which something can be seen. For Baz, aspect-
perception affords us the realisation that certain things in the world require ‘an 
expression other than the obvious and the common’ (2000: 121) Mulhall, on the 
other hand, thinks that Wittgenstein’s discussion highlights continuous aspect 
perception; Wittgenstein is concerned to articulate ‘the basic or fundamental 
ways in which human beings relate to the world through their linguistic and non-
linguistic behaviour’ (Mulhall, 1990: 150). A figure like the duck-rabbit then 
represents a clear but ultimately trivial example – a stepping stone to a 
characterisation of perceptual experience in general. Mulhall distinguishes 
“aspect” concepts from “material property concepts”. The former ‘involve 
human projections of significance on the world’ (Mulhall, 1990: 129). The latter 
involve ‘properties which entities possess in their own right’ (Mulhall, 1990: 129). 
As with the distinction between the ready-to-hand and the present-at-hand, 
however, empirical concepts like “table” or “hammer” could intelligibly count 
as both aspect and material property concepts.  
The difference, I have suggested, rests in the framework that the concept 
is situated in. In fact, Wittgenstein gestures toward something like this idea 
when he describes the “dawning” of an aspect as consisting in perceiving ‘not a 
property of the object, but an internal relation between it and other objects’ 
(Wittgenstein, 2009: 212a). There is therefore something right about Baz’s 
interpretation of Wittgenstein; different experiences of the same “state of affairs” 
may require different forms of expression. Siegel argues that Dreyfus’s account 
of motor intentional content ‘is inadequate to account for experiences of being 
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solicited by things in the environment’ (Siegel, 2014: 76). As I have noted, 
however, she does take the idea that the perceptual content that pertains to 
engaged activity requires a distinctive description seriously, remarking that 
perception does ‘feel quite different depending on whether it is dominantly 
structured by our roles as agents or not’ (Siegel, 2014: 76). Accordingly, Siegel 
attempts to codify the propositional structure of this normative perceptual 
content – one of her proposals is the form ‘“X is to-be-phi’d”, where phi 
represents an action involving X, a perceived object’ (Siegel, 2014: 72). Such a 
way of formulating perceptual content would be contrary to an epistemologically 
oriented account, where it is simply states of affairs that are perceived. This is 
where we would require Heidegger’s distinction between the ready-to-hand and 
the present-at-hand. What Heidegger calls the “existential-hermeneutical” 
framework may indeed underpin the form of perceptual content that Siegel 
proposes, which represents the kind of normative significance that can be 
responded to in our intentional action.   
Finally, I want to provide some further depth to this account by referring 
to Golob’s recent conceptualist interpretation of Heidegger’s account of 
intentionality. We saw that Golob argues that the point of the as-structure is not 
to secure singular reference to particular states of affairs. For Golob, the b 
variable should not identified with a Fregean sense. Golob provides an 
alternative account of how we should understand the as-structure and its 
variables. His argument here accords with my focus on Heidegger’s description 
of the practically significant structure of human intentionality, for example, that 
‘primary making-sense-of-things in terms of what they’re for’ (Heidegger, 1985: 
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120). Golob similarly identifies Heidegger’s concern with specifying a 
meaningful context that entities are integrated into:  
‘[The] explanatorily basic form of Dasein’s 
intentionality consists in the capacity to locate an 
entity or entities, the a variable, within a meaningful, 
relational context, the b variable. The explanatorily 
primary form which the b variable takes is the web 
of relations which Heidegger calls “world”’ (Golob, 
2014: 83) 
 Above, I have offered an account of such a “meaningful, relational 
context”, specifying that the relations that pertain to the context are 
“involvement” relations, in the case of practically engaged perceptual experience. 
Golob argues that the Heidegger of Being and Time is attempting to explain the 
human being’s intentional grasp of such relations. For Golob, Heidegger is a 
conceptualist because he explains this intentional grasp of involvement relations 
by appealing to a ‘familiarity with a relevant prototype’ (Golob, 2014: 148). We 
saw the “prototype” model of concepts above, where an entity falls under a 
concept if it bears some measure of favourable comparison to an “exemplar” – 
Heidegger seems to understand this exemplar in terms of a visual image. The 
‘capacity to locate an entity or entities [...] within a meaningful, relational 
context’ involves possessing a familiarity with generic types of relations (Golob, 
2014: 83; 148). I have argued that a ready-to-hand entity is perceived as such 
because the relevant empirical concept is situated within a framework of 
involvement relations. On Golob’s account, we can further explain the relations 
pertaining to the ready-to-hand in terms of a grasp of generic types of inferential 
relations that the empirical concept fits into: ‘entities understood as ready-to-
hand are made sense of in terms of multiple generics: Heidegger lists 
“serviceability, conduciveness, usability and manipulability’ (Golob, 2014: 148; 
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Heidegger, 1962: 68). I think it is likely, on this reading, that involvement 
relations like “in-order-to” and “for-the-sake-of-which” also count as those 
generic types of relations.  
Golob’s reading allows us to further vindicate Heidegger’s description of 
the primary form of intentionality as ‘making-sense-of-things in terms of what 
they’re for’ (Heidegger, 1985: 120). Heidegger takes the achievement of human 
intentional activity to be based in a fundamental conceptual grasp of types of 
distinctly practical relations. Of course, I have argued that these relations 
instantiate between the relevant empirical concepts of entities. As I pointed out, 
Heidegger does fill the b variable with ordinary empirical concepts. I would 
suggest that an important advantage to my Fregean reading is that it secures 
singular reference between conceptual frameworks. When the empirical concept 
is “cut off” from the involvement relations that characterise the existential-
hermeneutic as-structure, and refers to something present-at-hand, a concern 
may arise that these two “conceptions” of the object – the ready-to-hand, and the 
present-at-hand – are irreconcilable. We can offset this concern by noting that 
the same empirical concept is operative. Indeed, I think the way to take a 
conceptualist reading of Heidegger forward would be to further clarify, along 
these lines, how the conceptual frameworks pertaining to epistemically and 
practically oriented experience are not mutually exclusive in a way that returns 
us to a familiar dualism: this time, of the practical and the epistemic.  
We have seen that McDowell takes perceptual experience to “produce” 
intentional action in the sense that we perceive states of affairs which give us 
reasons to act. On my reading, Heidegger’s phenomenology can clarify how the 
states of affairs that we perceive are in the first instance practically significant; 
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that the empirical concepts that are operative in the perceptual experience are 
situated within a conceptual framework composed of “involvement” relations.  
We can therefore provide what we might call a “practical topography” of the 
space of reasons 62 . We can do this by specifying the practical relations that 
instantiate between the concepts of those features of the environment that we 
unreflectively respond to in our practically engaged experience. Unreflective 
action, on this picture, can intelligibly be said to entail “responsiveness to 
practical significance”.  
 
5.5 Concluding Remarks on Existential Phenomenology 
The purpose of this chapter was to secure a stronger notion of 
“intrinsically practically significant” perceptual content than McDowell’s 
particular brand of conceptualism is able to account for. I took a cue from 
Rietveld’s assessment of the McDowell-Dreyfus debate, where he concludes that 
we ought to develop a “tailored” account of conceptualism, where we can 
picture unreflective action in the explanatory language of “responsiveness to 
normative significance”, rather than “responsiveness to reasons”. I argued that 
we could develop the right “tailored” account of conceptualism with reference to 
Heidegger’s conception of the “ready-to-hand”. I noted that by taking this route, 
we could highlight how the resources of existential phenomenology might be 
utilised beyond the way they are in the debate.  
I then moved on to argue that we can read conceptualism into 
Heidegger’s account of perceptual experience, and further that we could make 
                                                          
62 I owe the term “topography” to Kukla & Lance (2008), who provide a “pragmatic topography” 
of the space of reasons that focuses on pragmatic speech acts that are not declarative assertions. 
My notion of a “practical” topography is distinct from their pragmatic one. 
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sense of this in Fregean terms. In order to secure the idea of “practically 
significant” content, I moved on to show how Heidegger posits two distinct 
kinds of conceptual framework; one that is operative in practically engaged 
perceptual experience, and one operative in epistemically oriented experience. 
The kind of conceptual framework that pertains to practically engaged 
experience is composed of “involvement” relations between operative empirical 
concepts. We can secure the idea that perceptual content can be intrinsically 
practically significant by emphasising that the operative empirical concepts bear 
involvement relations to concepts pertaining to our practical interests. Our 
unreflective actions are responsive to perceptual conceptual content that in the 
first instance belongs to an operative conceptual framework composed of 
specifically practical relations.  
Before I end, I want to draw attention to the way in which I have utilised 
the existential phenomenology of Heidegger here. My usage stands in contrast to 
the “dominant” approach to Heidegger, which has largely been formed by 
Dreyfus’s interpretation. The point I am concerned to make is that an existential 
phenomenological account of perceptual experience has, of course, distinctive 
contributions to make to our understanding of perception, action, intentionality, 
and the human relationship to the world more broadly. Its contribution to the 
analytic sphere of philosophy has traditionally been to emphasise the 
purportedly non-conceptual, embodied character of our perceptual experience of 
the world. However, this emphasis runs close – as it does in the debate - to being 
cashed out in flatly causal, “baldly naturalistic” terms. A non-conceptualist 
account of phenomenology, however, does not seem to capture someone like 
Heidegger’s clear focus on the human being’s practical engagement with a 
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meaningful world. Accommodating an explanatory role for conceptual 
capacities directly corresponds to the early Heidegger’s project of understanding 
the nature of our experiential encounter with a meaningful world. Dreyfus’s 
attempt to interpret Heidegger as a proponent of motor intentional content not 
only contradicts this stated interest of Heidegger’s, but, as Golob nicely puts it, 
‘risks turning […] Heidegger’s key arguments […] into a promissory note to be 
cashed by the Phenomenology of Perception’ (Golob, 2014: 46). 
Here, I have shown how Heidegger’s phenomenology provides us with 
an account of practically or normatively significant perceptual content. In order 
to do this, however, we do have to emphasise the role of the conceptual 
capacities of the human being. Doing so, of course, does not take us back into a 
Cartesian dualism of a subject that stands over a world of material objects. It is 
true that an existential phenomenologist like Heidegger is sceptical that a 
pervasively epistemological focus will provide us with a philosophically 
satisfactory picture of “being-in-the-world”. However, there is no evidence that 
Heidegger wants to relocate the locus of intentionality from the mind to the 
body. Olafson plausibly suggests that Heidegger may want to ‘tie our mental 
states [...] to the world more securely than is possible’ than through a reliance on 
epistemology (1986: 13). Indeed, I think Heidegger’s early project, at least, is 
only intelligible if he is committed to some form of conceptualism.  
In overcoming Cartesian strains in philosophical thought, I agree with 
McDowell that we should clarify, rather than deny, the distinctively conceptual 
nature of human intentionality. If existential phenomenology is going to play a 
continuing philosophical role, we must go about demonstrating how it assists us 
in this clarificatory project. In doing so, we can present a unified account of the 
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human being’s relationship to the world that takes into account its epistemic and 
its practical characteristics. Simply relocating the locus of intentionality from the 
mind to the body, as Dreyfus urges we should, represents a reactionary anti-
Kantianism that captures neither the spirit nor the philosophical point of a 


















 In this conclusion, I will first provide an overview of what my thesis has 
accomplished, and the significance of its conclusions. I will then provide a 
chapter summary which demonstrates how my argument has unfolded, and 
summarise my argument and conclusions. I then situate my conclusions within 
the relevant philosophical literature, and demonstrating the significance of my 
thesis to the relevant areas of philosophical research. I will then move on to 
assess where my conclusions represent opportunities for further research. I will 
end with some final remarks on the significance of the McDowell-Dreyfus 
debate, and my response to it.  
 
 Overview 
 My purpose in this thesis has been to offer a synoptic resolution to the 
McDowell-Dreyfus debate that emphasises the role of conceptual capacities, 
while preserving crucial insights from existential phenomenology about the 
practically engaged nature of human experience. This thesis offers the only 
unified and extended response to the McDowell-Dreyfus among the literature it 
has generated. I have provided my own account of how to make sense of what 
Dreyfus calls “motor intentional content” in conceptualist terms, arguing that 
“motor intentional content” does play an important role in practically engaged 
experience, but that it can play this role only in virtue of being integrated into a 
conceptual framework that is presupposed by our acting intentionally. 
Furthermore, I have provided a distinctive conceptualist interpretation of 
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Heideggerian phenomenology to secure the idea that the conceptual nature of 
perceptual experience does not preclude its content from being “practically 
significant”.  
The principal disagreement of the debate is over the operation of 
conceptual capacities in “unreflective action” and the perceptual experience that 
pertains to it. This disagreement, and my response to it, should be contextualised 
in terms of broader philosophical difficulties in articulating a post-Cartesian 
position in the philosophy of mind. The approach I have taken plays close 
attention to both McDowell and Dreyfus’s concerns about avoiding or 
overcoming a “Cartesian” picture of the relationship between the human being 
and the world. Where McDowell argues that a proper understanding of the 
conceptual domain is essential to overcoming such a picture, Dreyfus has a 
deeply held suspicion that any philosophical talk about the fundamental role of 
“conceptual capacities” is an expression of the same Cartesian assumptions. 
Dreyfus’s suspicion here informs his position in the debate, and he accordingly 
argues that it is only with reference to the role of non-conceptual bodily 
capacities, rather than mental ones, that we will avoid a Cartesian picture. 
However, this strategy seems to engender a dualism where a bodily form of 
intentionality can be isolated from a minded, conceptual form of intentionality. 
Instead, we should make sense of the role that those distinctly “bodily” 
capacities are playing from a conceptualist perspective. As above, my thesis 
provides a full and unified account of how to do this, and taking this approach 
allows us to articulate a post-Cartesian position that preserves the practically 
engaged dimension of the human being.     
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By focusing on the positive role of the mind, in the specific terms of the 
operation of conceptual capacities, we secure the required normativity and 
epistemic significance that ought to be ascribed to human perceptual experience 
and action. Crucially, in demonstrating how these capacities are operative in our 
skilful and unreflective practical engagement with the world, we are able to 
clarify the “post-Cartesian” credentials of conceptualism in a way that 
accommodates the insights and broader philosophical concerns of the kind of 
existential phenomenology that Dreyfus draws from. A conceptualist resolution 
to the principle disagreement of the debate allows us to demonstrate how the 
mind is integrated into practically engaged experience.  
 
 Chapter Summary 
 In Chapter One, I introduced and defined the phenomenon of 
“unreflective action” that Dreyfus appeals to; as intentional, or “intelligent”, 
skilful, engaged and embodied action that is unreflectively performed, and is a 
pervasive and fundamental component of human experience. I went on to 
demonstrate the philosophical implications that Dreyfus draws from this 
phenomenon. I first adopted an epistemological approach in providing a Rylean 
argument that “knowing how” to do something is not a matter of knowing some 
rule or set of rules that can be construed conceptually. This led into Dreyfus’s 
view that capacities belonging to the mind – such as conceptual capacities – 
needn’t be invoked to explain the intelligent way in which human beings 
perform certain actions.  
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I moved on to put this in terms of the kind of intentionality that pertains 
to unreflective action, providing Dreyfus’s conception of “motor intentional 
content”. It was at this point that I highlighted the question, posed clearly by 
Bengson, of how perceptual experience can intelligibly be said to “produce” 
intentional action, particular those unreflective actions that Dreyfus appeals to. I 
accordingly presented Dreyfus’s argument that unreflective intentional action 
arises from an interrelation between bodily skills and refined perceptual 
capacities, an interrelation which must be described in “motor intentional” terms. 
I further outlined Dreyfus’s argument that motor intentional content is a 
necessary condition of conceptual content, and that bringing concepts to bear on 
motor intentional content distorts its distinctive character, and accordingly 
neutralises the role that motor intentional content plays in motivating 
unreflective action. This chapter therefore presented Dreyfus’s 
phenomenological non-conceptualism as it relates to the phenomenon of 
unreflective action. This allowed me to go on to assess the limitations of 
Dreyfus’s account, and begin building an account of how conceptual capacities 
can be operative in unreflective action.  
 In Chapter Two, I challenged Dreyfus’s association of conceptual 
involvement with a residual form of Cartesianism, which relates to his 
phenomenological account of how conceptual involvement interrupts, scuppers, 
or detaches an agent from their skilful engagement with the world. I emphasised 
accordingly that Dreyfus’s “Cartesian” understanding of conceptual 
involvement is a central part of his case against McDowell. I first showed how 
Dreyfus derives the relevant arguments here from his interpretation of 
Heidegger’s early phenomenology, particularly his notions of the ready-to-hand, 
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the present-at-hand, and the “understanding”. I then went on to dispute both 
Dreyfus’s phenomenology and his interpretation of Heidegger. I took my cue 
from Montero (2013) in arguing that conceptual involvement is not incompatible 
with skilful engagement, but often plays a necessary role there.  
I then showed that Heidegger’s conception of “interpretation” allows us 
to attribute to him much the same view, contrary to Dreyfus’s reading. I 
concluded by noting that the necessary involvement of conceptual content in 
unreflective action weakens Dreyfus’s claim that motor intentional content is a 
necessary condition of conceptual content. This chapter was aimed at 
undermining Dreyfus’s connection between conceptual content and a 
“detached”, Cartesian picture of the relationship between the human being and 
the world, therefore clearing the path for me to demonstrate how we can provide 
a positive conceptualist account of unreflective action.   
 In Chapter Three, I detailed McDowell’s conceptualism as it pertains to 
perceptual experience, with a focus on McDowell’s philosophical motivations 
here. I first demonstrated that McDowell’s motivations are close to Dreyfus’s; 
both are concerned to overcome a Cartesian conception of the relationship 
between the human being and the world. While Dreyfus thinks that a 
conceptualist account must necessarily remain beholden to this Cartesian picture, 
McDowell argues that we must affirm the role of conceptual capacities in order 
to avoid the “myth of the given”. I therefore outlined McDowell’s debt to Sellars, 
who demonstrates the incoherence of any account which purports to derive 
conceptual judgements from non-conceptual sensory data. I emphasised how 
this point is relevant to intentionally shaped responses in general, such as those 
unreflectively practical responses that Dreyfus emphasises. The principle point 
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here was to show why we ought to avoid positing a flatly causal account of 
intentional responses, and accordingly why McDowell tries to secure the 
requisite normativity of intentional responses through conceptualism.   
I went on to demonstrate how McDowell’s conceptualist account of 
perception is both compatible with unreflective action and avoids Cartesianism. I 
first emphasised McDowell’s description of the passive way in which concepts 
are drawn on in our perceptual experience, which accommodates the 
phenomenon of unreflective action. This involved introducing McDowell’s 
Aristotelian conception of “second nature”. I went on to provide an account of 
the “object-dependence” of the conceptual framework that McDowell argues is 
operative in our perceptual experience. The “de re” conceptual content of 
singular thought, expressed in demonstrative propositions, is meant to avoid an 
account of conceptual content that remains tied to Cartesian assumptions about 
the mind. Further, I emphasised that demonstrative propositions would form an 
important strand of my argument in the following chapter. The purpose of this 
chapter was to demonstrate the philosophical importance of an appeal to 
conceptual capacities, why we ought to avoid a flatly causal account of 
intentional responses, to show how a conceptualist account of perceptual 
experience is not incompatible with the phenomenon of unreflective action, and 
finally to further undermine the idea that conceptual content is necessarily 
Cartesian.  
 In Chapter Four, I set out to consolidate a conceptualist account of 
unreflective action and the perceptual experience involved. I began by clarifying 
McDowell’s motivations, revisiting the idea that we require a normative 
characterisation of our intentional responses, rather than a flatly causal one. This 
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provided the necessary background for McDowell’s claims that unreflective 
action entails “responsiveness to reasons”, and “realising practical concepts”, or 
“concepts of things to do”. In order to make sense of these claims, I utilised 
Rouse’s distinction between “descriptive” and “normative” accounts of 
conceptual involvement, preliminarily associating McDowell with a “normative” 
account. I linked this distinction to Gottlieb’s identification of a 
“phenomenological fallacy” in Dreyfus’s argument which turns upon a 
“descriptive” understanding of conceptual involvement. I went on to argue 
accordingly that Dreyfus unjustifiably excludes concept-possession from the 
“background” that determines our intentional content, which he appeals to only 
selectively. I argued that unreflective intentional action is only explanatorily 
intelligible if we ascribe possession of the relevant concepts to the unreflectively 
acting agent.  
 In the latter, decisive part of my fourth chapter, I first explored how 
McDowell’s use of demonstrative, de re, propositions has been utilised to argue 
for a conceptualist, “intellectualist” account of “knowledge-how”; focusing on 
the distinctive way in which our bodily skills carry out an overall intentional 
action. I emphasised that this clarified sense of how content can count as 
“conceptual” allows us to similarly make sense of the motor intentional content, 
or “affective” content, that Dreyfus highlights in his phenomenology of 
unreflective action. I agreed with Dreyfus that any genuinely synoptic 
conception of intentionality has to account for this kind of distinctive content 
because of its central importance in our primary engagement with the world. 
However, I argued that motor intentional content can only play a role in 
unreflective action in virtue of being integrated into the conceptual framework 
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that is presupposed by our acting intentionally in the first place. It is in this way, 
I argued, that we can make sense of McDowell’s claim that unreflective action 
nevertheless entails responsiveness to reasons, and that the status of motor 
intentional content as providing reasons for acting means that we can intelligibly 
count it as conceptual content. Further, appealing to demonstrative propositions 
offsets the concern that motor intentional content is qualitatively distorted in 
some way through its conceptualisation. This chapter therefore provided a full, 
cohesive account of how conceptual capacities are operative in unreflective 
action, while preserving Dreyfus’s phenomenology of motor intentional content.  
In Chapter Five, I moved past the principle disagreement of the debate to 
focus in detail on the idea that the content of our perceptual experience, 
understood in conceptualist terms, could be “intrinsically practically significant”. 
I contextualised this issue in terms of recent suggestions from Rietveld (2010) 
that unreflective action should be understood as entailing “responsiveness to 
normative significance”, in a way that refines McDowell’s characterisation of it 
as entailing “responsiveness to reasons”. I also drew attention to other 
suggestions that McDowell’s conceptualism should be further tailored to 
accommodate the practically engaged dimension of human life, such as Dingli 
(2002) and Arahata (2015), and Taylor (2002).   
I went on to argue that we could derive a notion of “practically 
significant” perceptual content from Heidegger’s analysis of the ready-to-hand. 
In order to make sense of this, I argued for a conceptualist interpretation of 
Heidegger on perceptual experience, and accordingly highlighted the kind of 
“involvement” relations that Heidegger takes to instantiate between the elements 
in that framework – which he refers to as the “existential-hermeneutic as-
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structure” of intentionality. Such relations specify how perceived features of the 
environment fit into specifically practical concerns, and are thus perceived in 
terms of their practical relevance. It is in this way, I argued, that we are able to 
make further sense of the way in which perceptual experience can be said to 
“produce” intentional action in virtue of this practical significance. Finally, I 
offered a general assessment of how Dreyfus uses existential phenomenology, 
such as Heidegger’s, to argue for a non-conceptualist position in the post-
Cartesian philosophy of mind, and contrasted it to my own usage. The purpose 
of this chapter was to demonstrate a way in which we can understand a 
conceptualist account of perceptual experience as preserving the kind of practical 
significance that pertains to our primary engagement with the world. 
In summary: What I have provided here is a synoptic resolution that 
brings together the principal contentions of each thinker in a way that 
demonstrates how the mind is integrated into practically engaged experience, 
thus providing a post-Cartesian conception of the role of the mind that meets the 
demands of Dreyfus’s phenomenology of unreflective action. I have 
demonstrated how conceptual capacities are implicated even in the kind of 
distinctively bodily, affective intentional phenomena that existential 
phenomenology draws attention to. I have concluded that “motor intentional 
content” does play the important role that Dreyfus affords it, but only in virtue 
of its integration into a framework of conceptual capacities. Further, I have 
shown how we can conceive of perceptual conceptual content as practically 
significant, and have accordingly made sense of the way in which such content 
can bear a normative relation to our unreflective actions. In this way, I have 
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concluded that Heidegger can provide us with a conceptualist account of the 
practical significant content of perceptual experience.  
This conceptualist account of motor intentional and practically significant 
perceptual content provides us with a decisively non-Cartesian conceptualist 
account of intentionality that is tailored to the phenomenological demands of 
unreflective action in a way that McDowell’s is not. My thesis therefore provides 
a unified resolution to the principle disagreement of the debate, while 
highlighting its wider significance through a focus on the anti-Cartesian 




I now want to outline how my thesis contributes to the relevant 
philosophical fields. Before moving into specifics, I want to attend to the wider 
philosophical context of the debate, which I touched on directly above. The 
debate should be understood as it relates to a wider debate in the philosophy of 
mind about the nature of human intentionality, or intentional content, and 
specifically contextualised in terms of philosophical attempts to overcome a 
Cartesian picture of the mind, wherein the capacities of the mind are understood 
in terms of internal representations that are independent of states of affairs in the 
world. McDowell’s contribution to the philosophy of mind has been to argue 
that the intentional content of perceptual experience is itself irreducibly 
conceptual, and that this secures a non-Cartesian account of how conceptual 
mental activity is normatively dependent on states of affairs in the world. 
Importantly, it resists the explanatory reduction of such intentional responses to 
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states of the brain; like Brandom, McDowell takes from Sellars the lesson that 
intentional responses are characterised by normative relations to other 
conceptual elements. This is to be contrasted with the “right-wing” Sellarsians, 
who emphasise Sellars’ commitment to the possibility of explaining intentional 
responses in scientifically naturalistic terms, for example Churchland (1995) and 
Millikan (1984; 2017).      
McDowell’s conceptualist approach to intentionality has long been 
challenged by non-conceptualists such as Peacocke (1998), Travis (2004), and 
Kelly (2001). The non-conceptualist challenge that Dreyfus mounts, however, 
has implications that go beyond forcing McDowell to countenance some form of 
non-conceptual content, and to account for that content epistemologically63. The 
pervasive disagreement of the McDowell-Dreyfus debate is indeed about ‘the 
extent to which content is conceptual’ (Gardner, 2013: 111). However, as Schear 
points out, we might construe the disagreement here as over a characterisation of 
the human being as an “essentially rational animal” (see Schear, 2013: 285). 
Dreyfus’s use of existential phenomenology is supposed to demonstrate that 
McDowell’s conceptualism is unable to account for, or accommodate, the 
fundamental way in which human beings are practically engaged with the world. 
Further, it is supposed to show that McDowell is still committed to Cartesian 
assumptions about the mind’s role in constituting our intentional relation to the 
world.  
Existential phenomenologists like Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty tend to 
be presented as distinctive kinds of anti-Cartesian philosophers. Indeed, 
                                                          
63 I have played down the extent to which this analytic brand of non-conceptualist challenges can 
threaten the coherence of McDowell’s overall philosophical project. I just mean to point out that 
Dreyfus’s own non-conceptualist challenge has a distinctive philosophical concern.   
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philosophers like Dreyfus and Charles Taylor take this phenomenology to 
represent the only genuinely post-Cartesian position in the philosophy of mind, 
precisely because it downgrades the role of mind in constituting intentionality. 
However, I have noted throughout that we should not assume that Heidegger 
does away with any conception of the mind’s role in intentionality. Although I 
do not think we should understand the debate in terms of a confrontation 
between “analytic” and “continental philosophy”, the debate surely does tell us 
much about where philosophers like Merleau-Ponty and Heidegger stand in 
relation to philosophical debates taking place within the analytic context of 
philosophy. In particular, I have highlighted how such phenomenology can 
contribute and be integrated into debates in the philosophy of perception and the 
philosophy of action – I say more about this below. However, the non-
conceptualist approach that Dreyfus takes runs very close to giving up 
explanatory control of intentionality to neuroscience. If Dreyfus’s challenge to 
McDowell is right, then intentional responses can indeed be understood in 
scientifically naturalistic terms. The trade-off for preserving the practical 
dimension of intentionality, on Dreyfus’s account, seems to be giving up any 
coherent sense of normativity.  
The debate between Dreyfus and McDowell is the most substantive and 
sustained disagreement over how we ought to conceive of our practical and 
rational capacities in a way that allows us to avoid a Cartesian picture of the 
mind. The debate and its responses represent the primary philosophical literature 
on how to understand the role of the mind, conceived of in non-Cartesian terms, 
in the light of phenomenologically based appeals to practically engaged 
experience. One of the stakes here is the possibility of a post-Cartesian 
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conception of the role and character of the mind, and whether that can be 
exhaustively construed in scientific terms. My resolution to the principle 
disagreement of the McDowell-Dreyfus debate should be understood as 
contributing to that specific area of the philosophy of mind.  
 Now, my resolution of course contributes to the literature directly 
responding to the McDowell-Dreyfus debate, including those papers in Schear’s 
2013 anthology. I have worked to draw together and build upon certain 
responses to the debate in order to provide an account of how the operation of 
conceptual capacities does not conflict with the practically engaged dimension of 
the human being. My response to the principle disagreement of the McDowell-
Dreyfus debate is the only unified and extended response amongst the relevant 
literature. It is one that accounts for the operation of conceptual capacities in 
perceptual experience, intentional action, the skilful, embodied ways in which 
these actions are performed, and how these elements coherently combine 
together in the phenomenon of unreflective action. Further, it attends to the anti-
Cartesian motivations behind the debate, and works to preserve the relevance of 
existential phenomenology. I describe my resolution as a synoptic one because it 
brings together these elements into my own distinctive and cohesive response.  
In particular, I should highlight how my integrated account of “motor 
intentional” content builds substantially on those responses that seek to clarify 
McDowell’s claim concerning the “realisation” of practical concepts in 
unreflective action – most notably Gottlieb (2011) – which do not attend to 
Dreyfus’s more complex phenomenological insights here. Further, my resolution 
has highlighted and clarified McDowell’s appeal to demonstrative propositions, 
understood as de re conceptual content; Carman (2013) touches inadequately on 
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the subject, but no other direct response in the literature takes this approach. In 
the philosophy of action, “intellectualist” approaches to knowing-how have 
made use of demonstrative propositions, as in Stanley & Williamson (2000), 
Bengson & Moffett (2007) and Gascoigne & Thornton (2013). My thesis has 
fruitfully brought this material into dialogue with the relevant phenomenological 
insights, contributing an account of how motor intentional content can be 
cohesively reconciled with an intellectualist account of knowing-how.  
My account of motor intentional content should be contextualised in 
terms of recent debates in the philosophy of perception, specifically on the 
relationship between perception and action. In particular, Siegel’s assessment of 
perceptual “affordances” (2014) and Bengson (2016), who poses the crucial 
question of how perception can be said to produce intentional action, a question 
I have referred back to consistently. As I have noted, Bengson highlights how 
conceptualist approaches like McDowell’s ‘have far broader significance than 
has yet been appreciated’ and that a conceptualist account of the relation 
between perception and action may ‘point the way to a satisfactory 
philosophical treatment of “flow” and related automatic actions’ (2016: 27). The 
account I have contributed here is a conceptualist one, yet has the clear 
advantage of being able to preserve the phenomenologically distinctive content 
that Dreyfus rightly draws attention to. It can be read as an elaboration of 
Siegel’s preliminary suggestion that motor intentional content has to entail 
‘psychologically more complex responses to the situation that involves some 
type of understanding of what the situation demands’ (Siegel, 2014: 24). 
However, my final chapter focused more broadly on the idea that perceptual 
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content entails the kind of “intrinsic practical significance” that can produce or 
motivate intentional action. 
 I drew on Heidegger’s analysis of the “ready-to-hand” to make sense of 
the idea that pereptual experience has practically significant content, and 
accordingly to provide a coherent picture of how one’s actions are unreflectively 
responsive to practically relevant features of an environment. My approach to 
the “practical” role of perception differs from accounts that we find, for example, 
in Schiller (2012); Bengson (2016); and Noë (2006). Those approaches retain a 
sense in which perceived features of the environment are normatively neutral, 
and that practical interests only determine which of those features are 
perceptually focused on. I therefore showed how we can bring a 
phenomenological approach to perceptual experience – interpreted through a 
conceptualist lens – to bear on the question that Bengson poses. I showed how 
Heidegger conceives of the operation of empirical concepts to be dependent on a 
framework composed of “involvement” relations. This point leads into my 
interpretation of Heidegger, and my treatment of a general concern we may have 
about the relevance of existential phenomenology.   
 As I stated in my introduction, Dreyfus’s interpretation of Heidegger can 
accurately be described as the “dominant” approach to framing Heidegger’s 
thought in relation to analytic conceptions of intentionality (Golob, 2014: 26; 
Crowell, 2015: 73). This  point should be linked to how Dreyfus uses existential 
phenomenology in the debate, and a concern that might arise from that. In the 
first paper of the debate, Dreyfus tends to contrast the insights of thinkers like 
Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty with the approach taken by analytic philosophers 
like McDowell. We may then take the debate as a confrontation between 
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existential phenomenological and conceptualist approaches to intentionality, 
roughly speaking. Dreyfus presents existential phenomenology’s fundamental 
contribution to be a non-conceptualist form of intentionality. If the conceptualist 
approach wins out, then, we might have a reasonable concern about the 
continuing relevance of the sort of existential phenomenology that Dreyfus 
draws from. My resolution to the debate has certainly erred toward awarding the 
“victory” to conceptualism. However, my resolution has consisted in 
demonstrating first of all how conceptualism can be refined and clarified to 
equal the demands of existential phenomenological insights. In this way, I have 
emphasised and affirmed the role that “motor intentional” content plays in 
human experience. However, I have also challenged Dreyfus’s interpretation of 
Heidegger in order to demonstrate a relevance to Heidegger’s phenomenology 
that is not exhausted by an appeal to some non-conceptualist form of 
intentionality.  
 There has been a relatively recent wave of scholarship that seeks to 
rethink how Heidegger can be brought into dialogue with analytic approaches to 
intentionality, such as Crowell (2013), Golob, (2014), Lafont (2000), McManus 
(2013), Doyon (2015), and Dennis (2012). Certain of these interpretations 
associate Heidegger with a form of conceptualism. My own interpretation and 
usage of Heidegger contributes to this literature. My conceptualist interpretation 
is able to preserve Heidegger’s focus on the practically engaged dimension of 
intentionality in a way that other conceptualist interpretations have not. Further, 
I have noted that while the Heideggerian notion of perceiving, disclosing, or 
grasping objects as ready-to-hand is often appealed to, it has gone unclarified, and 
its usage in this way is accordingly careless. My conceptualist interpretation 
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accordingly corrects this failing. Importantly, respondents to the McDowell-
Dreyfus debate have not engaged in any sustained treatment of how Heidegger’s 
phenomenology stands in relation to the debate. My thesis addresses this gap in 
the primary literature, first in arguing that Dreyfus’s interpretation of 
Heidegger’s view of conceptual content is mistaken, and second in showing how 
we might bring Heidegger closer to McDowell’s side of the argument - while 
crucially exploiting his focus on practical significance, as above.  
 
 Further Research 
 In Chapter Five, I briefly referred to McDowell’s specification that the 
empirical world is not ‘normatively inert’ in a way which would exclude 
practically significant phenomena like “affordances” from our conception of the 
natural world (2013: 52). McDowell’s position here involves a revised definition 
of “nature” – this position has been described as “liberal naturalism” (see De 
Caro & Macarthur, 2010), and stands in contrast to “scientific naturalism”. 
McDowell’s position here seems to run close to an existential phenomenological 
critique of contemporary ontology and metaphysics, insofar as they maintain 
some continuity with scientific naturalism. An intriguing prospect for further 
research would be to bring Heidegger’s conception of “world” together with 
McDowell’s understanding of “second nature”. My thesis opens up the 
possibility of establishing a more substantive dialogue here. Establishing a 
dialogue between the concerns of what might be called “liberal naturalism” (see 
De Caro & Macarthur, 2010) and the concerns of existential phenomenology 
would, in my view, help us to clarify the ontological status of the kind of 
practically significant world that human beings are a part of.  
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 Further, my conceptualist interpretation of Heidegger opens up 
potentially fruitful opportunities for rethinking other elements of Heidegger’s 
overall philosophical project. Given that I have taken Being and Time to 
accommodate a conceptualist thesis about intentionality, and accordingly placed 
language at the centre of his thinking there, it would then be crucial to see how 
this thesis squares with his explicit later focus on language as ‘the house of being’ 
(2011: 143). Furthermore, this conceptualist characterisation of Heidegger’s 
early project forces us to rethink the development of Heidegger’s philosophical 
project in more general terms; for example, if his understanding of intentionality 
has implications for his work on technology, or art, for example.  
 
Final Remarks 
 The McDowell-Dreyfus debate can be conceived as a problem of showing 
how certain, seemingly disparate aspects of the human being and their relation 
to the world in fact “hang together”, as in Sellars’ description of the purpose of 
philosophy (Sellars, 1963: 1). Philosophically, we must “know our way around” 
the explicitly rational or normative capacities of the human being, capacities for 
deliberating, reasoning, justifying, knowing, as well as those practical capacities 
that are the more obvious signifiers of our “animal” nature. Indeed, my 
motivations for writing a resolution to the McDowell-Dreyfus debate are 
traceable to a friction between two philosophical impulses that will now be 
familiar. 
 I found Heidegger’s phenomenology of everydayness in the first Division 
and Being and Time persuasive, largely through Dreyfus’s interpretation of him. It 
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seemed right that we place a great deal of emphasis on the practically engaged 
perspective of the human being, and the way in which the world is “perceived”, 
“understood” or “encountered” in its practical significance. It also seemed right 
to play down the epistemic dimension of the human being in a way that broke 
from the familiar strains of Cartesian and Kantian epistemology. However, I 
became increasingly aware that Heidegger, as I understood him through Dreyfus, 
didn’t seem to place much importance on language and concept-acquisition in 
making sense of the fundamental way in which human beings engage with and 
find the world intelligible. Dreyfus’s recoil from the role of conceptual capacities 
is motivated, of course, by the required move beyond Cartesianism. However, it 
seemed as though Dreyfus was recoiling too far, into what I have called a 
“reactionary anti-Kantianism”, that seemed uninterested in how the primary 
experience of the human being should be distinguished from that of animals, or 
how the presence of rational capacities might qualitatively affect that primary 
experience. Indeed, I have accordingly noted how Dreyfus’s comparisons 
between the experience of human beings and that of ‘pre-linguistic infants and 
higher animals’ (Dreyfus, 2005: 47) allow science to take the explanatory burden 
here. I found it improbable that our possession of concepts did not play a role in 
our everyday experience, or that the domain of language could be isolated from 
the domain of practical activity.  
McDowell is right to accuse Dreyfus himself of a residual Cartesianism in 
his separation of practical capacities from epistemic ones, so that the “rational” 
nature of the human being is set apart from the “animal” nature (see McDowell, 
2013: 55 – 56). It is philosophically unacceptable to conceive of our intentional 
responses to the world as non-conceptual. However, I have taken seriously 
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suggestions that McDowell’s own emphasis on the rational nature of the human 
being – particularly the capacities to acquire knowledge and to engage in 
reasoning - distorts the practical and non-epistemic way in which human beings 
engage with the world. I therefore wanted to reconcile Heidegger’s emphasis on 
practical engagement and practical relevance with an emphasis on the role of 
conceptual capacities.  
Offering a resolution to the McDowell-Dreyfus debate has been far more 
complex than simply providing a conceptualist interpretation of Heidegger. 
Resolving the debate in a satisfactory way has required me to engage with two 
very different methods of avoiding Cartesianism, while making sure that the 
underlying technicalities of McDowell’s brand of conceptualism were clarified in 
a way that could accommodate that distinctive form of experiential content that 
Dreyfus rightly draws attention to. This has been in service of a resolution that is 
able to provide an account of intentional, conceptual human experience that can 
preserve the essential sense of practical engagement and significance that we find 
in Heidegger’s phenomenology, and accordingly secures a satisfactory, post-













Allais, L. (2009) “Kant, Non-Conceptual Content and the Representation of 
Space”, Journal of the History of Philosophy, 47:3, pp. 383 – 413. 
Alvarez, M. (2009) “How Many Kinds of Reasons?”, Philosophical Explorations, 
12:2, pp. 181 – 193. 
Arahata, Y. (2015) “Seeing and not-seeing as ways of inhabiting the world” in 
Wittgenstein on Perception, eds. Campbell & O'Sullivan, pp. 104 - 125 
Aristotle  (1995) Selections, trans. Irwin, T & Fine, G. (eds.), Indiana, Hackett 
Publishing.  
Baz, A. (2000) "What's the Point of Seeing Aspects" in Philosophical Investigations, 
23, pp. 97 – 121. 
Bengson, J & Moffett, M. (2007) “Know-How and Concept-Possession”, 
Philosophical Studies, 136:1, pp. 31 – 57. 
Bengson, J & Moffett, M. (eds) (2012) Knowing How: Essays on Knowledge, Mind, 
and Action, New York, Oxford University Press. 
Bengson, J. (2016) “Practical Perception and Intelligent Action,” Philosophical 
Issues, 26: 1, pp. 25 – 58. 
Blattner, W. (2006) Heidegger’s Being and Time, London, Bloomsbury. 
Brandom, R. (1994) Making it Explicit, Cambridge, Harvard University Press. 
Brandom, R. (1997) “Study Guide”, in Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind, pp. 
119 – 182.. 
275 
 
Brandom, R. (2002) Tales of the Mighty Dead, Harvard University Press, 
Cambridge, MA. 
Braver, L. (2007) A Thing of This World: A History of Continental Anti-Realism, 
Illinois, Northwestern University Press. 
Brentano, F. (1969) The Origin of Our Knowledge of Right and Wrong, trans. 
Chisholm, M & Schnerwind, E, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul. 
Brownstein, M. (2013) “Rationalizing flow: agency in skilled unreflective 
action”, Philosophical Studies, 168:2, pp. 545 – 568. 
Brunson, D. (1978) Super System: A Course in Power Poker, New York, Cardoza 
Publishing. 
Byrne, A. (2010) “Perception and Conceptual Content” in Contemporary Debates 
in Epistemology, eds. Sosa, E & Steup, M, Oxford, Blackwell, pp. 231 – 249. 
Carman, T. (1994) “On being social: A reply to Olafson”, Inquiry: An 
Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy, 37:2, 203-223. 
Carman, T. (2003) Heidegger’s Analytic: Interpretation, Discourse and Authenticity in 
Being and Time, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
Christensen, C. (1997) “Heidegger’s Representationalism”, Review of Metaphysics, 
51, pp. 77 – 103. 
Churchland, P.M. (1995) The Engine of Reason, the Seat of the Soul, Cambridge, 
The MIT Press. 




Crowell, S. (2013) Normativity and Phenomenology in Husserl and Heidegger, 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 
Davidson, D. (1986) “A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge” in Truth 
and Interpretation: Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson ed. LePore, E, 
Oxford, Blackwell, pp. 307 - 319 
De Caro, M & Macarthur, D. (eds). (2010) Naturalism and Normativity, New 
York, Columbia University Press. 
DeGaynesford, M. (2004) John McDowell, Cambridge, Polity Press. 
Dennis, P. (2012) “Was Heidegger a nonconceptualist?”, Ratio, VII, pp. 108 – 
117. 
Dingli, S. (2005) On Thinking and the World: John McDowell's Mind and World, 
Farnham, Ashgate Publishing Limited. 
Doyon, A. (2015) “The “As-Structure” of Intentional Experience in Heidegger 
and Husserl” in Phenomenology of Thinking: Investigations into the Character of 
Cognitive Experience, Breyer, T & Gutland, C. (eds), Oxon, Routledge. 
Dreyfus, D & Spinosa, C. (1999). “Coping with Things-in-Themselves: A 
Practice-Based Phenomenological Argument for Realism” Inquiry, 42, pp.  49-78. 
Dreyfus, H & Taylor, C. (2015) Retrieving Realism, Cambridge Massachusetts, 
Cambridge University Press. 
 Dreyfus, H. (1980) “Holism and Hermeneutics”, The Review of Metaphysics, 34:1, 
pp. 3 – 23. 
277 
 
Dreyfus, H. (2002) “Intelligence without Representation – Merleau-Ponty’s 
critique of mental representation: The relevance of phenomenology to scientific 
explanation, Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 1:4, pp. 367 – 383.  
Dreyfus, H. (2004) “Taylor’s. (anti-) epistemology”, in Abbey, R. (ed.) Charles 
Taylor, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 
Dreyfus, H. (2005) “Overcoming the Myth of the Mental: How Philosophers 
can Profit from the Phenomenology of Everyday Expertise,” Proceedings and 
Addresses of the American Philosophical Association, 79, pp. 47 – 65.  
Dreyfus, H. (2007a) “The Return of the Myth of the Mental,” Inquiry, 50:4, pp. 
352 – 365. 
Dreyfus, H. (2007b) “Response to McDowell,” Inquiry, 50: 4, pp. 371 – 377. 
Dreyfus, H. (2007c) “Detachment, Involvement, and Rationality: Are We 
Essentially Rational Animals?” Human Affairs, 17, pp. 101 – 109. 
Dreyfus, H. (2013) “The Myth of the Pervasiveness of the Mental,” in Mind, 
Reason, and Being-in-the-World: The McDowell-Dreyfus Debate ed. Schear, J, Oxon, 
Routledge pp. 15 – 40. 
Evans, R. (1982) The Varieties of Reference, Oxford, Oxford University Press. 
Fodor, J. (1998) Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong, Oxford, Oxford 
Univeristy Press. 
Forman, D. (2008) “Autonomy as Second Nature: On McDowell’s Aristotelian 
Naturalism, Inquiry, 51:6, pp. 563 – 580.  
278 
 
Frege, G. (1977) Logical Investigations, trans. Geach, P.T & Stoothoff, R.H, 
London, Yale University Press. 
Gascoigne, N & Thornton, T. (2014) Tacit Knowledge, Oxon, Routledge. 
Gibson, J. (1986) The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception, New Jersey, 
Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 
Ginet, C. (1975) Knowledge, Perception, and Memory, Boston, Reidel Publishing. 
Glazebrook, T. (2001) “Heidegger and Scientific Realism”, Continental 
Philosophy Review, 34, pp. 361 – 401. 
Golob, S. (2014) Heidegger on Concepts, Freedom and Normativity, Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press. 
Gottlieb, G. (2011) “Unreflective Action and the Argument from Speed”, Pacific 
Philosophical Quarterly, 92: 3, pp. 338 – 362. 
Gray, J. (2004) Consciousness: Creeping up on the Hard Problem, Oxford, Oxford 
University Press. 
Hall, H. (1993) “Intentionality and world: Division I of Being and Time”, in The 
Cambridge Companion to Heidegger, Guignon, C. (ed), Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, pp. 122 – 140.  
Han-Pile, B. (2005) “Early Heidegger’s Appropriation of Kant”, The Blackwell 
Companion to Heidegger, eds. Dreyfus & Wrathall, Blackwell, London. 
Haugeland, J. (1998) Having Thought, Cambridge, Harvard University Press. 




Heidegger, M. (1982) Basic Problems of Phenomenology, trans. Hofstadter, A, 
Bloomington, Indiana University Press. 
Heidegger, M. (1985) History of the Concept of Time, trans. Kisiel, T, Bloomington, 
Indiana University Press. 
Heidegger, M. (1990) Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, trans. Taft, R, 
Bloomington, Indiana University Press. 
Heidegger, M. (2010) Logic: The Question of Truth, trans. Sheehan, T, 
Bloomington, Indiana University Press. 
Heidegger, M. (2011) Basic Writings, trans. Farrell-Krell, D, Oxon, Routledge 
Classics.  
http://media.philosophy.ox.ac.uk/assets/pdf_file/0009/23211/Judgment_and_
Ontology.pdf. [Accessed 12 Sep. 2019]. 
Hudin, J. (2006) “Motor intentionality and its primordiality”, Inquiry, 49:6, pp. 
573 – 590. 
Kant, I. (2007) Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Weigelt, M, London, Penguin 
Classics. 
Kelly, S. (2001) “Demonstrative Concepts and Experience”, The Philosophical 
Review, 110: 3, pp. 397 – 420. 
Kelly, S. (2002) “Merleau-Ponty on the Body,” Ratio, XV, pp. 376 – 391. 
Kochan, J. (2011) “Getting Real with Rouse and Heidegger”, Perspectives on 
Science, 19:1, pp. 81-115. 
Koffka, K. (1999) Principles of Gestalt Psychology, Oxon, Routledge. 
280 
 
Kukla, R, Lance, M. (2008) “Yo!” and Lo!”: The Pragmatic Topography of the Space 
of Reasons, Cambridge, Harvard University Press 
Lafont, C. (2000) Heidegger, Language, and World-Disclosure, trans. Harman, G, 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 
Lafont, C. (2002) “Precis of Heidegger, Language, and World-Disclosure”, 
Inquiry, 45:2, 185 – 189 
Levine, S. (2015)  “McDowell, Hegel, and Habits”, Hegel Bulletin, 36:2, pp. 184 – 
201. 
Margolis, E & Laurence, S. (2003) “Concepts” in The Blackwell Guide to the 
Philosophy of Mind, eds. Stich, S & Warfield, T, Oxford, Blackwell Publishing, pp. 
190 – 213. 
Margolis, E. (2007) “The Ontology of Concepts: Abstract Objects or Mental 
Representations?” in Nous, 41:4, pp. 561 – 593. 
Martin, M. (2002) “Particular Thoughts & Singular Thought”, Royal Institute of 
Philosophy Supplement, 51, pp. 173 – 214. 
McDowell, J. (1979) “Virtue and Reason”, The Monist, 62:3, pp. 331 – 350. 
McDowell, J. (1990) “Peacocke and Evans on Demonstrative Content”, Mind, 
99: 394, pp. 255 – 266. 
McDowell, J. (1994) Mind and World, Massachusetts, Harvard University Press. 
McDowell, J. (1998a) “Singular Thought and the Extent of Inner Space” in 




McDowell, J. (1998b) “De Re Senses” in Meaning, Knowledge, and Reality, 
Cambridge, Harvard University Press, pp. 214 – 227. 
McDowell, J. (1998b) “The Logical Form of an Intuition”, Journal of Philosophy, 
95: 9, pp. 451 – 470. 
McDowell, J. (2002) “Responses” in Reading McDowell : On Mind and World, ed. 
Smith, N, London, Routledge, pp. 269 – 305. 
McDowell, J. (2007a) “What Myth?” Inquiry, 50:4, pp. 338 – 351. 
McDowell, J. (2007b) “Response to Dreyfus,” Inquiry, 50:4, pp. 366 – 370. 
McDowell, J. (2009a) Having the World in View: Essays on Kant, Hegel, and Sellars, 
Cambridge, Harvard University Press.  
McDowell, J. (2009b) “Why is Sellars’s Essay Called “Empiricism and the 
Philosophy of Mind?” in Having the World in View, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard 
University Press, pp. 221 – 238. 
McDowell, J. (2009c) “Avoiding the Myth of the Given” in Having the World in 
View, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, pp. 256 – 274. 
McDowell, J. (2013) “The Myth of the Mind as Detached,” in Mind, Reason, and 
Being-in-the-World: The McDowell-Dreyfus Debate ed. Schear, J, Oxon, Routledge, 
pp. 41 – 58. 
McGinn, M. (1997) Wittgenstein and the Philosophical Investigations, Routledge, 
London. 




Merleau-Ponty, M. (1966) Structure of Behaviour, Beacon Press, Boston. 
Merleau-Ponty, M. (2002) Phenomenology of Perception, trans. Smith, C, London, 
Routledge Classics. 
Millikan, R. (1984) Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories, Cambridge, 
The MIT Press. 
Millikan, R. (2017) Beyond Concepts, Unicepts, Language, and Natural Information, 
Oxford, Oxford University Press. 
Mohr, E. (2014) “Mind, Reason, and Being-in-the-world: The McDowell-
Dreyfus Debate”. (review), Continental Philosophy Review, 47: 2, pp. 239 – 242. 
Montero, B. (2013) “A Dancer Reflects” in Mind, Reason, and Being-in-the-World: 
The McDowell-Dreyfus Debate ed. Schear, J, Oxon, Routledge, pp. 303 – 319. 
Mulhall, S. (1990) On Being in the World: Wittgenstein and Heidegger on Seeing 
Aspects, Routledge, London. 
Noë, A. (2004) Action in Perception, Cambridge, The MIT Press  
O’Connaill, D. (2014) “The Space of Motivations,” International Journal of 
Philosophical Studies, 22:3, pp. 440 – 455. 
Olafson, F. (1986) Heidegger and the Philosophy of Mind, New Haven, Yale 
University Press 
Peacocke, C. (1991) “A Reply to John McDowell” Mind, 100:1, pp. 123 – 133. 
Pippin, R. (2013) “What is ‘conceptual activity’?” in Mind, Reason, and Being-in-




Railton, P. (2009) “Practical competence and fluent agency” in Sobel, D & Wall, 
S. (eds) Reasons for Action, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, pp.81 - 115 
Richardson, J. (2012) Heidegger, Oxon, Routledge. 
Rietveld, E. (2010) "McDowell and Dreyfus on Unreflective Action", Inquiry, 
53.2, pp. 183 – 207. 
Rorty, R. (1997) “Introduction” in Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind, pp. 1 – 
12. 
Rose, M. (2004) The Mind at Work, New York, Penguin. 
Rouse, J. (2013) “What is Conceptually Articulated Understanding?” in Mind, 
Reason, and Being-in-the-World: The McDowell-Dreyfus Debate ed. Schear, J, Oxon, 
Routledge, pp. 303 – 319. 
Russell, B. (1905) “On Denoting”, in Mind, 14:56, pp. 479 – 493. 
Russell, B. (1951) “Knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description”, 
in Mysticism and Logic, New Jersey, Barnes & Noble, pp. 152 – 167.  
Russell, B. (1997) Problems of Philosophy, ed. Perry, J, Oxford, Oxford University 
Press. 
Ryle, G. (1945) “Knowing How and Knowing That: The Presidential Address, 
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 46, pp. 1 – 16. 
Ryle, G. (2009) The Concept of Mind, Oxon, Routledge. 
Sachs, C. (2014) “Discursive and Somantic Intentionality: Merleau-Ponty 
Contra ‘McDowell or Sellars’”, International Journal of Philosophical Studies, 22:2, 
pp. 199 – 227. 
284 
 
Sachs, C. (2015) Intentionality and the Myths of the Given, Oxon, Routledge. 
Schear, J. (2008) “Judgement and Ontology in Heidegger’s Phenomenology”, 
The New Yearbook for Phenomenology and Phenomenological Research, VII, Available 
at: 
Schear, J. (ed.). (2013) Mind, Reason, and Being in the World: the McDowell-Dreyfus 
Debate, Oxon, Routledge.  
Schiller, A.A. (2012) “The primacy of fact perception” Philosophical Psychology, 
25:4, pp. 575 – 593).  
Searle, J. (1979) “The intentionality of intention and action”, Inquiry, 22:1-4, pp. 
253 – 280. 
Sellars, W. (1963) "Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind",  in Science, 
Perception and Reality, Routledge, London. 
Sellars, W. (1963) “Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man” in Empiricism 
and the Philosophy of Mind, London, Routledge, pp. 1 – 40.  
Sheehan, T. (2014) Making Sense of Heidegger, A Paradigm Shift, Rowman & 
Littlefield, London. 
Siegel, S. (2014) “Affordances and the Contents of Perception”, in Does 
Perception Have Content? Ed. Brogaard, B, Oxford, Oxford University Press, pp. 
51 – 75. 
Smith, N. (2013) "Rationality and Engagement: McDowell, Dreyfus, and 
Zidane", Hegel Bulletin, 34:2, pp. 159 – 180. 
Smith. (ed.). (2001) Reading McDowell: On Mind and World, Oxon, Routledge. 
285 
 
Stanley, J. & Williamson, T. (2001) “Knowing How”, The Journal of Philosophy, 
pp. 411 – 444).  
Strawson, P.F. (1966) The Bounds of Sense, Routledge, Oxon. 
Taylor, C. (2002) "Foundationalism and the inner-outer distinction", in Reading 
McDowell : On Mind and World, ed. Smith, N, London, Routledge, pp. 106 – 119. 
Thornton, T. (2004) John McDowell, Oxon, Routledge. 
Travis, C. (2004) “The Silence of the Senses”, Mind, 113: 449, pp. 57 – 94. 
Wallace, D. (2006) Roger Federer as Religious Experience. (online) 
Nytimes.com. Available at: 
https://www.nytimes.com/2006/08/20/sports/playmagazine/20federer.html 
[Accessed 12 Sep. 2019]. 
Wittgenstein, L. (1980) Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. II,  Oxford, 
Blackwell. 
Wittgenstein, L. (2009) Philosophical Investigations, trans. Anscombe, Hacker & 
Schulte, Blackwell, West Sussex. 
Wrathall, M. (1998) “Intentionality without representations: Heidegger’s 
Account of Perception”, Philosophy Today, 42, pp. 182 – 189. 
 
 
